

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL AGENCY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM'S DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM TOWARD TERROR CONVICTS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract – Deradicalization programs have been implemented in Indonesia since 2012. This program employs preventive paradigm in implementing the policies it produces. During the seven years of implementation, deradicalization experienced challenges and obstacles. So far, there are many critics addressed to deradicalization program, such as criticism toward the lack of budget, prison facilities, deradicalization materials provided to terror convicts, post-deradicalization follow-up, as well as negative public reception on the idea of ex-terror convicts returning to society. These problems are hampering the effectiveness of deradicalization program. This paper employs theory of deradicalization and theory of effectiveness. It employs qualitative method with deductive and conceptual analysis, and the data is obtained through literature studies. This paper aims to see the effectiveness of deradicalization program carried out by National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) toward terror convicts in Indonesia.

Keywords: Terrorism, Deradicalization, Terror Convicts, Resocialization and Reintegration

Introduction

Ever since the 9/11 tragedy, states have been searching for means to manage and control radicalization in various forms. Example ranges from preventing radicalization in prison to enacting public policy strategy to counter radicalization in order to prevent people from associating with terrorist organization.³ Terrorism is a fearsome threat for a lot of states because radicalism, its key inherent aspect, is

intangible or invisible. This also includes our country, where efforts to counter it are still being experimented up to this day.

Throughout 2017, there have been 172 people suspected of involvement in terrorism. This is reported by the Chief of Indonesian National Police (Kapolri) General Pol Tito Karnavian. He mentioned that this figure is higher compared to the previous two years, which is 163 in 2016 and 73 in 2015. From those 172 suspects, 10 have been proven guilty, 76 are still in trial,

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³ John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 155.

68 are still under investigation, and 16 were shot dead.⁴ Currently, the authors estimate that there are up to 300 terror convicts in all prisons throughout Indonesia.

Currently, there are 800 terror convicts who have received deradicalization program from National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). The Chief of BNPT, Suhardi Alius, stated that deradicalization program has been implemented since 2012. "In detail, 630 ex-convicts have been released from prison. Out of the 630, 325 have participated in deradicalization. The others have not. They have been released before we started this program in 2012. And among more than 300 people who have not participated in deradicalization program, some repeat their crime, namely Cicendo, Thamrin and Samarinda. These are terrorist recidivists who have not received deradicalization. Among those who have received deradicalization program, none became recidivist."⁵

Since terrorism is one of the greatest issues faced by this nation, the

Government of Indonesia has been searching for the best method to counter it. During the second tenure of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), BNPT was established as the main avenue to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. In the beginning, BNPT is an institution developed out of the Coordinating Desk for Eradicating Terrorism (DKPT), which was established by President SBY in 2002. DKPT is an institution under a Coordinating Ministry, which is tasked to assist Coordinating Ministry for Political, Law and Security Affairs to formulate policies to eradicate terrorism crime, which includes aspects of deterrence, prevention, mitigation, resolution, and all necessary legal actions.⁶

BNPT was established under President Regulation No. 46 of 2010 concerning the Establishment of National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). This President Regulation was amended by President Regulation No. 12 of 2012. The establishment of BNPT is a national policy to combat terrorism in Indonesia. BNPT is also established as an elaboration of Law

⁴ Saefudin Zuhri (b), "Muhammadiyah dan Deradikalisasi Terorisme di Indonesia: Moderasi Sebagai Upaya Jalan Tengah", *Maarif*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2017, p, 74.

⁵ Detik.com, "Klaim Program Deradikalisasi Berhasil 100 Persen", 22 May 2018, in

<https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4033545/bnpt-klaim-program-deradikalisasi-berhasil-100-persen>, accessed on 30 May 2019.

⁶ Agus Surya Bakti, *Darurat Terorisme: Kebijakan Pencegahan, Perlindungan, dan Deradikalisasi*, (Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2014), p. 74.

No. 34 of 2004 concerning National Armed Forces (TNI) and Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning Indonesian National Policy (Polri), to provide more detailed provisions on “Rule of Engagement” of TNI, in relation to Military Operation other than War (MOOTW) task, including TNI’s rule of engagement to combat terrorism, as well as TNI’s task to assist Polri. Structurally, BNPT answers to the President. BNPT has five functions to combat terrorism, i.e. prevention, protection, prosecution, national preparedness, and deradicalization.⁷

The initiative for deradicalization policy in Indonesia was announced in February 2007 when the parliament supported deradicalization policy by the government to stop the formation of extreme religious groups and to combat terrorism. Parliamentary members suggested the government to focus on poverty alleviation and provision of jobs. At the same time, they stressed the importance of not giving opportunity and space for radical groups and terrorist network to develop and disseminate their propaganda to recruit new members in the name of religion. The role of mainstream religious groups is essential in

promoting the initiative, to unite in preventing radical elements from justifying terrorism in the name of religion. However, formally speaking, BNPT has only started to implement this program in 2012 toward arrested terror convicts.

With regard to deradicalization function, this institution conducted activity to combat radical ideology propaganda, prevent radical ideology, implement re-education and re-socialization program. Deradicalization is a program with various objectives, with the focus on mitigating terrorism issues as a whole. Deradicalization program includes, but not limited to, counter-terrorism, preventing radicalization, provocation, hate speech, and interfaith hostility, preventing the community from being indoctrinated, raising community’s awareness to reject terrorist ideology, and enhancing knowledge on interfaith comparison.

Out of the five BNPT functions to combat terrorism, deradicalization is one that needs to be studied in detail. Deradicalization program is interesting because it prioritizes the paradigm of prevention, instead of prosecution. In addition, psychological aspects and vibes

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 74-75.

are really thick in this deradicalization program. This is due to this program aims to change the perspective or views of ex-terrorist so they can return to the right path, i.e. no longer believing in radical ideology.

The aim and purpose of this paper is to dive deeper into deradicalization program, particularly in its effectiveness since its first implementation in 2012. Authors also aim to collect data on the seven years of deradicalization program implementation, to be analyzed using qualitative methods, in order to find out whether or not deradicalization program has been implemented effectively.

Theoretical Framework

Combating terrorism in Indonesia is proven ineffective if it relies only to military approaches. Bullet might pierces body, but it is unable to pierce the hearts and minds of radical groups. BNPT then popularized a new method called deradicalization. The emergence of deradicalization is a response to the flourishing religious radical ideology which can lead to terrorism which destroys life, collapsing order and corrupting religious teaching, society and nation.⁸

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 173.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 173-174.

The following paragraph lists opinions from several experts on how to optimize deradicalization. According to Agus Surya Bakti, this method is an attempt to invite radical society, especially terror convicts, ex-convicts, their family and network to return to the right path in accordance with religion, moral and ethics which go hand in hand with the essence of all religious teaching to respect diversity and difference. Deradicalization program aims to teach terror convicts to become an Indonesian citizen once again as per Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution within the territory of Indonesia, under the principle of unity in diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*).⁹

Deradicalization is part of counter-terrorism strategy. Deradicalization is understood as part of the method to create drastic change in the ideology of terrorist group. This drastic change is not only materialized in individuals freed from violence, but also freed from radical group which has been sheltering them. Deradicalization program is more akin to soft approach, toward the society in general, certain group, and also to individuals in radical network.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 174.

Petrus Golose in his book, as well in several of his seminars, has provided an expert point of view on deradicalization issues. He argued that deradicalization is all attempts to neutralize radical ideology through interdisciplinary approaches. These interdisciplinary approaches include legal, psychology, religion and also socio-culture. Deradicalization is aimed for people under the influence of radical ideology, which tends to commit violence (pro-violence). These people are usually terror convicts, ex-convicts, militia who have been involved in violence, their family, sympathizer, and also broader community. Deradicalization program is implemented by reorienting their motivation, re-education, re-socialization and also providing social welfare and equality to other community for people who have been involved in terrorism crime, as well as those who are merely sympathizing. Deradicalization program is implemented to encourage them to fully release or leave violence ideology, including stopping the dissemination of that ideology. In practice, this means deradicalization must be implemented along with de-ideologization process. De-ideologization process can be the main

element in attempts to disenchant and reorient violent terrorist ideology, so they can return to the right path.¹¹

The four components of deradicalization program are re-education, rehabilitation, re-socialization and reintegration. Re-education is defined as deterrence method carried out by providing people with education and enlightenment on the threat of radical ideology, to prevent the ideology from growing. Re-education for terror convicts is carried out by providing enlightenment on deviant doctrines which legitimize violence. This will allow them to realize that committing violence, such as suicide bombing, cannot be considered as 'jihad'.¹²

The next method is rehabilitation process. This process has two meanings, namely training independence and personality. Independence training means training and guiding ex-terrorists to prepare skills which they can use once they are released from prison. Whereas personality training is an approach to have a dialogue with terror convicts to straighten or fix their views, as well as providing comprehensive knowledge on accepting people with different point of

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 174-175.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 181-182.

view. Then, to facilitate terror convicts in returning to society, they need to be assisted in socializing and reintegrating with normal neighborhood, or the community they used to have.¹³

As an institution in charge of deradicalization program, BNPT is of the opinion that this program does not aim to cause Muslims to stray away from their religion, or even to criminalize Muslims. On the contrary, deradicalization program aims to allow Muslims to be closer with Islamic understanding which is moderate, humanist, and continue to maintain peace in diverse community (*ummatan wasathan*).¹⁴

There are a lot of other states which also implement programs similar to deradicalization. The authors also believe that BNPT has learned a lot from other states experiencing similar case, i.e. terrorism threat. Two such examples are Netherland and Britain. In Netherland, in order to combat radicalism from immigrants, especially from Africa and Middle East, the government invited experts and universities to formulate strategy to deal with religious radicalism threat. The Government of Netherland has also implemented monitoring and

observation to religious institutions deemed dangerous, because it could potentially become a place to grow and disseminate radical ideologies. Meanwhile, Britain implemented deradicalization program through personal talk with inmates in prison. This talk is made voluntarily and may be stopped anytime. Although its impact is still unclear, we can be sure that British community and government continue to cooperate to prevent radicalism from spreading further.¹⁵

Combating terrorism can also be argued as a resistance toward the ideology adhered by terrorists. This resistance also includes stopping its dissemination process. This program is important because it plays a role in releasing the violent ideology adhered by those radical terrorists, to be replaced with Pancasila ideology, which they have left behind. Deradicalization is not only provided to terror convicts, but also to their families. This is to ensure that once the convicts finish their sentences, they can be accepted by their family. In addition, this method also prevents the family from being contaminated by radical

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 182.

¹⁴ *Bakti, op.cit*, p. 177.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 180.

ideology due to the influence of violent ideology.¹⁶

Given that this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of deradicalization program, we need to first understand what effectiveness means. The word 'effective' means success or something which is well-conducted. Popular science dictionary defines effectiveness as appropriate use, result or something which supports the objective. H. Emerson's argument, which was cited by Soewarno Handayani, stated that Effectiveness is a measurement in the achievement of pre-determined objectives.¹⁷ The measurement of effectiveness will be the authors' foundation in the chapter on result and discussion based on the data that authors have collected through literature review method.

Methods

This is a qualitative essay which employs logical reasoning method commonly used in academic papers. Data for this paper is collected through literature review on issues concerning the effectiveness of BNPT's deradicalization program toward

terror convicts in Indonesia. Through deductive and conceptual analysis, the authors analyze the deradicalization program since its first implementation by BNPT as one of the methods to combat terrorism, in order to find out whether or not it has been implemented effectively.

Results and Discussion

During the seven years of its implementation, deradicalization program to change the perspective of terror convicts experienced various obstacles. These obstacles were not only arising from the terror convicts as the subject of the program, but also from external factors, such as lack of budget, prison facilities, and also negative public reception toward the idea of ex-convicts returning to society. Not to mention, deradicalization materials provided to terror convicts are also in need of improvement. These external factors are hampering the effectiveness of deradicalization program. In this section, the authors will attempt to further study issues, criticisms, and obstacles in implementing deradicalization program.

¹⁶ Saefudin Zuhri (a), *Deradikalisasi Terorisme*, (Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2017), p. 103-104.

¹⁷ Soewarno Handayani, *Pengantar Studi Ilmu Administrasi dan Manajemen*, (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1994), p. 16.

At implementation level, deradicalization is often redundant and cannot be interpreted concretely. This is because, at conceptual level, deradicalization is still heavily debated. For BNPT, deradicalization refers to US' definition which has two meanings, i.e. disengagement and de-ideologization. Disengagement is attempts which lead to change in behavior, such as a person quitting terrorist network and change their views, as well as leaving the rules of their group. Further, de-ideologization is aimed at eliminating ideological understanding of Islamic political doctrine and replacing it with Islam as noble values which nurture peace. Deradicalization is oriented at changing individual's spectrum so they can become moderate, no longer radical.¹⁸

In general, this program received heavy criticism because it is ineffective in changing the mindset of terror convicts to not repeat terrorism crime. There are several cases where released terror convicts repeat their crime by joining with radical group, or even turning into lone

wolf (individual terrorist). For example, Rofik Asharudin who detonated a bomb near Security Post in Tugu Kartasura, Sukoharjo, Central Java during the fasting month (3/6/2019). Chief of Police General Tito Karnavian said that the explosion was committed by a lone wolf, meaning that he did it by himself. Tito added that, "It means that he has been self-radicalized, making a bomb by himself using information from the internet, and selecting, surveying his own target, without involving the network. However, since he is alone, the bomb's quality in Kartasura is imperfect."¹⁹

Furthermore, some materials in deradicalization program to date have only been implemented through seminars about Pancasila, family visit to persuade terror convicts, and also provision of capital to help terror convicts starting business once they are free.²⁰ According to Sofyan Tsauri, an ex-convict who has received deradicalization program since his arrest in 2010, even though he was happy to participate in this program and has successfully be deradicalized, he still

¹⁸ Zuhri (b), *op.cit*, p. 75.

¹⁹ Beritasatu.com, "Kapolri Sebut Terduga Teroris Kartasura Lone Wolf, Ini Maksudnya", 5 June 2019, in <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/558023/kapolri-sebut-terduga-teroris-kartasura-lone-wolf-ini-maksudnya>, accessed on 21 June 2019.

²⁰ Tirto.id, "KontraS Anggap Program Deradikalisasi Pemerintah Kurang Efektif", 19 May 2018, in <https://tirto.id/kontra-anggap-program-deradikalisasi-pemerintah-kurang-efektif-cKKF>, accessed on 4 June 2019.

believe that the program needs to be criticized and improved. After all, the program is still weak if it can only change one's perspective. There are a lot of external factors which weigh ex-convicts, one of which is the ability to reintegrate with society. Not to mention that getting job is still difficult for him. Fortunately, he had been invited on various occasions as a speaker. He was invited by BNPT to raise awareness about deradicalization. He persuaded ex-convicts to leave the network and realize that they have been making a great mistake. Sofyan added, "deradicalization has not touched the nature of ideology, I think. And this leads to ineffective deradicalization efforts. Even if there is a counter-narrative or counter-ideology, this will usually be delivered by incompetent people who do not know what is *takfiri* and I think it is a mistake to employ these people."²¹

The next obstacle is the lack of guidance from the guardian of convicts (terrorism case), because many guardians are not equipped with capacity building, whether capacity as guardian or capacity as a person who need to handle high-risk convicts. They also do not receive

structural recognition and clear incentive in relation to the risk they must face. The lack of regulation on the authority of state institution in handling terror convicts in prison is also an issue.²²

In the new Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning Eradication of Terrorism Crime), issues related to arrangement between Directorate General of Corrections of Ministry of Law and Human Rights with BNPT as state institution authorized in combating terrorism crime have not been clearly regulated. To this day, all terror convicts arrested by BNPT will always be handed over to prisons throughout Indonesia which will then become the responsibility of Directorate General of Corrections (DG-PAS).

Although there is already a Collaborative Agreement (PKS) between DG-PAS and Deputy II of Prosecution and Capacity Building Affairs of BNPT, as follow up to the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between BNPT and Ministry of Law and Human Rights on 30 May 2018, its implementation is not easy. The number of prisoners in Indonesia is currently no more than 253 thousand

²¹ Merdeka.com, "Hidup Mantan Napi Teroris. 11 June 2018", in

<https://www.merdeka.com/khas/hidup-mantan-napi-teroris.html>, pada 4 June 2019.
²² *Ibid.*

from various criminal cases. The largest portion of them are drug convicts, including distributor, dealer, and user. Meanwhile, the number of terror convicts in Indonesian prison is 590. “Even if we only have 590 people, they all have huge potential of destruction. Hence they got special treatment, it is not easy to handle them,” said Director General of PAS, Sri Puguh Budi Utami, Bc.IP, M.Si.²³”

According to the Director General of PAS, there are up to 254,000 people in Indonesian prisons. Among those 254,000 people, 115,000 are drug convicts. In addition to drug convicts, the large majority of prison contains people convicted of theft, terrorism and corruption. Currently, the total number of prisoners does not reflect the total availability of prison, which is only 524. This condition causes each prison to be overloaded in capacity. The number of prisoner in Indonesia tends to increase because drug user, thief, perpetrator of

minor crime and household violence are all detained in prison.²⁴

This condition is also an obstacle to deradicalization program, since prison is the main location for the implementation of this program. As information, there are 289 terror convicts in 113 prisons in Indonesia. According to the Chief of BNPT, there needs to be one special prison which can replace the function of Salemba-branch prison in Mako Brimob complex, Depok, especially after the riot in last year. One of the reasons behind the prison riot is the problem of overcapacity which resulted in hostage situation caused by terror convicts at Mako Brimob in early May of last year. Suhardi Alius stressed the need to build one special prison, which is currently being constructed in Nusakambangan, including Chief of Police’s proposal to build new prison in Cikeas to replace the prison in Mako Brimob.²⁵

The authors argue that deradicalization program should be

²³ Damailahindonesiaku.com, “Meski Jumlah Napi Terorisme Sedikit, Namun dalam Menanganinya Tidak Boleh Dianggap Sepele”, 5 Desember 2018, in <https://damailahindonesiaku.com/meski-jumlah-napi-terorisme-sedikit-namun-in-menanganinya-tidak-boleh-dianggap-sepele.html>, accessed on 6 June 2019.

²⁴ Gatra.com, “Penghuni Lapas Di Indonesia Kebanyakan Napi Narkoba”, 31 Januari 2019, in

<https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/386285-Penghuni-Lapas-Di-Indonesia-Kebanyakan-Napi-Narkoba>, accessed on 6 June 2019.

²⁵ Kompas.com, “BNPT: Ada 289 Narapidana Terorisme yang Tersebar di 113 Lapas”, 30 May 2018, in <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/30/12294981/bnpt-ada-289-narapidana-terorisme-yang-tersebar-di-113-lapas>, accessed on 6 June 2019.

implemented in prisons which house terror convicts, such as in Indonesian Peace and Security Center (IPSC) area in Sentul, Bogor, which is a special prison for terror convicts. This will help prison guards to be prepared since the prison has adequate facility to implement deradicalization. BNPT needs to coordinate with prison on the technical aspects of implementing this program, as the prison will play more roles in the day-to-day interaction with the terror convicts.

Even though BNPT has Deputy of Prevention, Protection and Deradicalization affairs, BNPT personnel is still lacking if they are to become implementers of deradicalization program throughout Indonesia. The role of prison in the success of deradicalization is important because prison guards in the field are the one who will have direct contact with the terror convicts. However, BNPT shall continue to become the coordinator and they must provide all necessary instruments for deradicalization program.

Furthermore, according to Professor of Psychology of University of Indonesia, Hamdi Muluk, deradicalization toward

terror convicts is anything but easy. After all, people who have been exposed with radical ideology needs a lot of time to be enlightened. Approaching and enlightening them is a very complex process due to the fact that terror convicts are not the easiest to be approached and talked to. They only want to interact with their own. The way to enlighten them is different than in the case of criminal convicts. This is because terror convicts have been attracted to an idea about the establishment of Islamic state, even if it must be achieved through violence. As such, there must be an understanding and correct strategy to invite them to communicate with outsiders. Prison guard must also have the ability to carry out special approach to them. In addition, guidance must be provided to terror convicts who have been released from prison. Then, there must be a follow-up process to reintegrate them into the society after they serve their sentences.²⁶

Another opinion came from the Research Division of Applied Psychology of University of Indonesia (DASPR-UI). To this day, BNPT's deradicalization program toward terror convicts tends to be

²⁶ Tirto.id, "Pakar Psikologi: Deradikalisasi Napi Terorisme Butuh Waktu", 11 March 2016, in <https://tirto.id/pakar-psikologi-deradikalisasi->

[napi-terorisme-butuh-waktu-hzy](https://tirto.id/pakar-psikologi-deradikalisasi-napi-terorisme-butuh-waktu-hzy), accessed on 6 June 2019.

exclusive by not involving prison guard. One of its activities is religion discussion by inviting several religious figures and education on state ideology. Such approach tends to make terror convicts feel special and further exclude them from the social process in prison in general. They then become unwilling to participate in deradicalization program because they deem it to be unimportant.²⁷

DASPR-UI has accompanied deradicalization program toward terror convicts since July 2017 in some prisons, such as Cipinang Prison, Cibinong Prison, Semarang Prison, and Pasir Putih Prison in Nusakambangan. Their activities include Life Management Training or Conflict Management Training which is participated by all convicts and prison guard. The involvement of prison guard will minimize exclusivity of terror convicts. Their exclusivity is the one which causes them to be reluctant to participate in general activity in prison. According to the senior consultant of DASPR-UI, Nasir Abas, one of the trainings is role playing. Convicts can role play as warden and vice

versa. This activity is aimed at making a person realize what it feels to become another person and to learn empathy. The point is, making them mingle with others.²⁸ However, Faisal admitted that inclusive programs, such as management training, is a best practice due to its participative nature and also because it teaches skills that are necessary for terror convicts whether when they are in prison or once they are reintegrated to society.²⁹

So far there are a lot of institutions other than BNPT which are involved in deradicalization process. Unfortunately, there is no clear coordination between these institutions. Many institutions are assisting deradicalization process at prison without the approval of BNPT, they simply inquire the approval of the prison. Ideally, all institutions other than BNPT which provide assistance in deradicalization program in all Indonesian prisons should be under BNPT's command. This is important because there must be a consistency between deradicalization materials and methods provided to terror convicts in all

²⁷ Benarnews.org, "Penelitian: Kegiatan Inklusif Lapas Mampu Deradikalisasi Napi Terorisme", 9 Februari 2018, in <https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/lapas-deradikalisasi-02092018114320.html>, accessed on 6 June 2019.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Voaindonesia.com, "Pemerintah Perlu Evaluasi Program Deradikalisasi di Lapas", 9 Februari 2018, in <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/pemerintah-perlu-evaluasi-program-deradikalisasi-di-lapas-4244745.html>, accessed on 4 June 2019.

Indonesian prisons. BNPT, as an authority in deradicalization program, must carry out supervision to all deradicalization activities throughout Indonesia, by not only leaving it to the prison, let alone external parties.

Another example where external party assists deradicalization process, and even reintegration process, is in Purwakarta District. The regent of Purwakarta, Dedi Mulyadi, assists ex-convict Agus Marshall to be employed as cleaning staff. In fact, since his release in 2015, Agus has been provided with capital to open a food stall by Dedi. However, due to his inexperience as businessman, and lack of any business training when in prison, his business eventually went bankrupt. Since then, Dedi worked as cleaning staff at Sadang street, Purwakarta district.³⁰

Dedi Mulyadi's initiative in empowering terror convict can also be seen in his effort to establish Purwakarta School of Ideology in 2016. The goal of this school is to introduce Pancasila as Indonesian national ideology to local people. This school targets students from Junior high school, senior high school,

university and even teachers, villagers and officials from youth community in Purwakarta. The class is held once a week. The school enables ex-convict such as Agus to share his experience and educates students about the threat of extremist teaching. The class put an emphasis on tabayyun culture (verification and confirmation) among students when dealing with sensitive information and political and religious news. Other famous speakers also include Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra and advocate of freedom of religion, Romo Antonius Benny Susetyo.³¹

The initiative of Government of Purwakarta City is an appropriate alternative to reintegrate ex-terror convicts in Indonesia. The authority often faces challenge in monitoring ex-terror convicts throughout the country and they cannot rely on direction from central government in Jakarta or even NGO due to their limited outreach. BNPT has no representative in local area which can carry out routine monitoring on the effectiveness of reintegration program. There are also several experienced local NGOs such as Peace Generation NGO

³⁰ Matamatapolitik.com, "Mantan Napi Teroris Indonesia, Apa yang Harus Dilakukan pada Mereka?", 17 Desember 2018, in <https://www.matamatapolitik.com/mantan->

[napi-teroris-indonesia-apa-yang-harus-dilakukan-pada-mereka/](https://www.matamatapolitik.com/mantan-napi-teroris-indonesia-apa-yang-harus-dilakukan-pada-mereka/), accessed on 2 June 2019.

³¹ *Ibid.*

which is based in Bandung and tasked to assist various reintegration programs for deported people in various districts in West Java such as Bandung, Majalengka and Subang. Their resources are spread to thin and required to cover a very wide location.³²

Government of Purwakarta is able to provide an appropriate program even though there is no special guidance and instruction from central government. The stigma in community can eventually be handled with the presence of School of Ideology which enables dialogue between ex-terrorist and local community. Government of Purwakarta also provides financial assistance to Agus. Such assistance must be adjusted to individual's condition, and should not be limited to small businesses but also cover other type of jobs. In that way, the individual can feel grateful to local government and local apparatus can monitor reintegration process more effectively.³³

Aside from its advantage, the reintegration model offered by Dedi is still far from perfect. BNPT must cooperate with various NGOs to refine their initiatives and support counter-terrorism efforts of local government. Local

government will also need significant help to be able to effectively implement professional development program and formulate routine monitoring procedure.

However, once again, coordination should remain in the hand of BNPT to ensure that all deradicalization programs in Indonesia is carried out using consistent material and method, not adjusted to the interest of external parties. Their proposals should be included into deradicalization curriculum which BNPT should already have in order to implement deradicalization program in all prisons in Indonesia. The authors believe that so far there is no standardized material and method for BNPT in implementing its deradicalization program. Ideally, BNPT should prepare a standardized curriculum which is applicable for all areas in Indonesia, so it can be implemented by external parties, such as NGO or local government, and obviously excluding prison guard, as mentioned before.

Next, the most important part of deradicalization is how to reintegrate terror convicts to society after they have served their sentences. Efforts to reintegrate terror convicts into society are no easy task, because it will mean fighting

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

the negative stigma from the society, and even their own family. The fact that they are an ex-terror convict will make people scared of the possibility for them repeating their crime. The phenomenon of people rejecting the funeral of a terror convict is clear indication that it is difficult for people to accept the ex-terror convict even if they have passed away. This fact can be seen in people's rejection toward the idea of funeral to terror convict.³⁴

Based on this understanding, BNPT still has no concrete, effective program on what to do after a terror convict has served their sentences. Re-socialization and reintegration cannot be disregarded in the implementation of deradicalization program. State must provide appropriate distribution channel for terror convicts to prepare them in life. It should also be noted that there are quite a few reasons for people to commit terrorism, such as injustice, economy, social, culture, politics and so on. Terror convicts need social partnership, such as training of skills, to allow terror convicts restart their life independently, and achieve welfare.

Reintegration is carried out to ensure that ex-convicts can reintegrate

into the society, thus criminal sentence is purported to resolve conflict or to return them to society, including their family. Therefore, guidance outside of prison is required to change the condition of ex-convict, by treating them as humanely as possible. This can be done by providing protection to the rights of ex-terror convicts as normal citizen. A grass root morality movement against terrorism or radical ideology needs to be built. The community morality movement must prevent ex-convicts from being alienated and ensure that they can play a role in society. Morality movement is aimed to assist counter-terrorism efforts which do not require military approach. However, there needs to be new research, idea and strategy to implement it. Since the root of terrorism is religious ideology and doctrine, and since it can be disseminated through various means, a multidisciplinary approach will be required to handle it, including psychological approach as mentioned previously.³⁵ Unfortunately, the authors are of the opinion that BNPT has not been effective in implementing this process of deradicalization program.

³⁴ Muhammad Khamdan, "Rethinking Deradikalisasi: Konstruksi Bina Damai

Penanganan Terorisme", *Jurnal Addin*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, p. 198-199.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 201.

The authors argue that there is still something missing from deradicalization program, namely the difference between deradicalization and disengagement. We need to understand and differentiate these two concepts. If deradicalization tends to lead to attitudinal modification (changing principle, attitude and stance), disengagement tends to lead to behavioral modification (changing behavior). To put it simply, disengaging from terrorism is not the same as being deradicalized. They might still retain their ideology and perspective, even when they no longer willing to be involved in terrorism.³⁶

Disengagement is often more realistic than deradicalization. For example, a terrorist can disengage from terrorism activity without necessarily reject their cause or ideology, even when they no longer have the willingness to commit terrorism. In one of his analysis, John Horgan argued that in the context of counter-terrorism, disengagement is more important than deradicalization because it can occur without deradicalization process.³⁷

According to Tore Bjorgo, there are two factors which cause a person to be disengaged from a group, i.e. push factors and pull factors. Push factors are negative condition or social pressure which drive people to no longer be interested in being part of an organization, among others because of legal prosecution, societal rebuke, loss of position in the organization, etc. Whereas pull factors are opportunity or social demand which attracts people to alternative they deem more promising, among others the desire to return to “normal” life, new employment, education and desire to return to family. The conclusion is that “pull factors” are more effective than “push factors.” It means that a person is more likely to disengage from terrorism because they are interested in “normal life,” new employment or new social groups compared to disengaging because they are afraid of punishment, violence or negative reputation.³⁸

However, the authors argue that terror convicts should already be disengaged when they undergo deradicalization process. Push and pull factors might improve re-socialization and reintegration,

³⁶ Jurnalintelijen.net, “Mengenai Deradikalisasi”, 26 Oktober 2017, in <https://jurnalintelijen.net/2017/10/26/mengenai-deradikalisasi/>, accessed on 4 June 2019.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

because terror convicts might be interested to normal life, back to when they were not radical. The option to be employed like most people, for example, will be far more attractive to terror convicts.

However, these pull factors might become unattractive upon experiencing failure, such as when there is no job they can get due to their ex-convict status. That is why deradicalization is still important, in order to minimize the possibility of recidivism when they fail to reintegrate. Even though disengagement can occur without deradicalization process, ideally this process should be carried out after deradicalization. Push and pull factors are more on the external side, while psychological factor plays more important role in turning terror convicts to terrorist recidivist. On the contrary, disengagement can be carried out during re-socialization and reintegration stage, after rehabilitation and reeducation, where deradicalization process has not been carried out comprehensively.

However, re-socialization and reintegration stage cannot be underestimated. The authors believe that the effectiveness of deradicalization program heavily relies on this stage. Deradicalization does not necessarily

mean completely eliminating a person's radical ideology and behavior. Even if the terror convicts who participate in this program can deradicalize their ideology and behavior, they will still need to continue their life. Not to mention, terror convicts will still need to find employment to survive after being released from prison, and they must also deal with the stigma or public perception about themselves without taking into account their deradicalized status.

The authors believe that BNPT has not effectively handled this situation. BNPT must pay more attention in returning the terror convicts to society, by empowering them. Creating positive climate on the presence of ex-terror convicts among the society is also very important. Efforts from parties outside of BNPT, as mentioned previously, should also be taken into account by the number one institution in Indonesia which deals with terrorism affairs.

By referring to Soewarno Handayani's opinion which believe that a program can be considered effective if it can achieve the goal of the program, the authors argue that deradicalization program cannot be considered effective. While the authors do not employ quantitative parameter in this

paper, the qualitative analysis is already sufficient to prove that point. Based on literature review which has been mentioned previously, the authors argue that deradicalization program has been ineffective due to the following:

1. There are still a lot of terrorism cases occurring in Indonesia, with varying perpetrators, from lone wolf to one household becomes terrorist.
2. Deradicalization material is still unclear, and there is no standardized curriculum prepared by BNPT.
3. BNPT has no concrete, effective program to ensure the future of terror convicts after they finish their sentences.
4. BNPT's deradicalization program toward terror convicts is still exclusive, not involving prison guard.
5. There is no law which regulates the authority of state institution to manage terror convicts in prison.
6. Indonesian prisons are experiencing overcapacity, hence there is no separation between terror convict other convicts.
7. The lack of coordination with other state institutions, such as the Police, Armed Forces, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Directorate General of

Corrections, and Ministry of Finance with regard to budget proposal.

Finally, the effectiveness of BNPT's deradicalization program heavily relies on how BNPT can optimize stages in deradicalization program. However, if the six issues that the authors list above are not handled effectively, the implementation of deradicalization program will continue to be ineffective, even though the authors still believe that this program must be continued. It is indeed difficult, especially in the midst of increasing threat of terrorism, but it is not impossible. The authors believe that this is a program with high success rate. Therefore, the commitment of related institutions in implementing this program more effectively is absolutely required.

Conclusion

During the seven years of its implementation, deradicalization program to change the perspective of terror convicts experienced various obstacles. These obstacles were not only arising from the terror convicts as the subject of the program, but also from external factors, such as lack of budget, prison facilities, and also negative public reception toward the idea of ex-convicts returning to society. Not to mention,

deradicalization materials provided to terror convicts are also in need of improvement. These external factors are hampering the effectiveness of deradicalization program.

At implementation level, deradicalization is often redundant and cannot be interpreted concretely. This is because, at conceptual level, deradicalization is still heavily debated. Through literature review, the authors found that the implementation of deradicalization program toward terror convicts has been ineffective due to several factors. Re-socialization and reintegration stages should not be underestimated in the implementation of deradicalization program. State must provide appropriate distribution channel for terror convicts to prepare them in life.

It should also be noted that there are quite a few reasons for people to commit terrorism, such as injustice, economy, social, culture, politics and so on. Terror convicts need social partnership, such as training of skills, to allow terror convicts restart their life independently, and achieve welfare. On that basis, the authors argue that deradicalization has not been effective during the seven years of its implementation. However, a comprehensive counter-terrorism does

require holistic steps, which takes time. It is not impossible for deradicalization to become a milestone in Indonesian counter-terrorism. However, all related parties must work together for the success of this program.

Recommendation

Even though the authors argue that deradicalization program has been ineffective, this program can have high success rate if implemented better. Therefore, the authors recommend that deradicalization program should be continued as one of the methods to combat terrorism. Obviously, the continuation of this program will require improvement of several sectors that are still lacking, especially these six:

1. There must be a standardized curriculum which contains deradicalization materials taught congruently to all terror convicts in Indonesia
2. The curriculum must also provide re-socialization and reintegration plan after the convict finish their sentences
3. Deradicalization program with its new curriculum must also involve prison guard in its implementation.
4. A regulation must be enacted concerning the authority of state

institution in handling terror convicts in prison.

5. Terror convicts should be placed in special prison, but this policy should be made by determining priority scale, meaning only certain terror convicts would be placed in that special prison.
6. Coordination with related parties, such as the Police, Armed Forces, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Directorate General of Corrections and Ministry of Finance in relation to funding.

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