

Civil-Military Cooperation in Disaster Management

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Abstract

During Jakarta flood from 2013 to 2015, emergency response optimized roles of military and civil. Civil-military coordination is a mechanism in disaster management in term of accelerating response and minimizing number of victim and damage as well. The aim of this study is to analyze and describe the system of coordination and civil-military cooperation in emergency response Jakarta flood from 2013 to 2015 and find optimal form of cooperation and coordination emergency response of civil-military in the Jakarta flood 2013. This qualitative research is a descriptive research with data collection techniques is literature review and in-depth interviews. The results showed that the civil-military coordination in the flood disaster can be run either although the difference between commando and grammar used in the civil-military provide constraints in emergency operations.

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Selama Jakarta banjir dari tahun 2013-2015, tanggap darurat dioptimalkan peran militer dan sipil. Koordinasi sipil-militer adalah mekanisme dalam pengelolaan bencana dalam hal mempercepat respon dan meminimalkan jumlah korban dan kerusakan juga. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menganalisis dan mendeskripsikan sistem koordinasi dan kerjasama sipil-militer pada tanggap darurat banjir Jakarta 2013-2015 serta menemukan bentuk optimal dari kerjasama dan koordinasi sipil-militer pada tanggap darurat banjir Jakarta 2013. Penelitian kualitatif ini merupakan penelitian deskriptif dengan teknik pengumpulan data berupa studi literatur, dan wawancara mendalam. Hasil

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penelitian menunjukkan bahwa banjir Jakarta menunjukkan bahwa koordinasi antara sipil dan militer dalam bencana dapat berjalan baik meskipun perbedaan komando dan tata bahasa yang digunakan dalam sipil dan militer sedikit banyak memberikan kendala dalam operasi darurat di lapangan.

Introduction

Issues and challenges of civil-military cooperation in emergency response is not structured military involvement in disaster management because of their involvement just spontaneous. In developed countries, the military's involvement in disaster management has become a major national force, they have a special unit trained to perform emergency response in dealing natural disasters, complete with supporting facilities and substantial budget. According Maryono (2014), floods in Jakarta from 2002 until now cause damage that could exceed Jakarta City budget whereas Zaenuddin (2013) describes the Jakarta flood is a "historical legacy" which continues to be burden and serious problem.

Since 1990, civil-military relations have been operating through close cooperation and simultaneously in disasters (Rietjens and Bollen,

2008). Disaster is not only a civil affair, but need for military involvement. Civil-military coordination proven, able to accelerate the handling of natural disasters, so the number of victims and damages could be minimized. Metcalfe and Hanyson (2012) explained Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) per the United Nations means important dialogue between civilian and military actors in the humanitarian field to protect and prioritize the humanitarian principles, prevent competition, minimize inconsistency and achieve common goals. Similar definitions presented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

Based on the problems mentioned above, how the system of coordination and civil-military cooperation between the Civil-Military Coordination theory with

actual situation in the flood emergency response Jakarta from 2013 to 2015? The aim of this study is to analyze and describe the system of coordination and civil-military cooperation in emergency response Jakarta flood from 2013 to 2015 and find optimal form of cooperation and coordination emergency response of civil-military in the Jakarta flood 2013

In the response to natural disasters and humanitarian interaction between Indonesian National Army with civilian authorities (National Disaster Management Agency or Disaster Mitigation Agency), local governments, civil society such as private and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), National Disaster Management Agency and Regional Disaster Management Agency certainly has limitations in conducting emergency response, it would require a coordination and program planning of emergency response is integrated between the civilian and military emergency response, both in the corridors Command System Response emergency (SKTD) and deployment of force and civil-military cooperation

beyond the SKTD. In the large-scale deployment of forces, military faster than civilian.

Problems encountered in military engagement is no remained procedure. National and regional level, procedures and mechanisms for military assistance in dealing with natural disasters is still a problem of bureaucracy for disaster management quickly and accurately. According with Act No. 10 of 2008 about commando of emergency response, it takes one commando in the coordination of disaster management, especially in the emergency response phase decisions of quickly and appropriately that impact on the implementation of decisions on the ground. Disaster response team that has been formed by the government should be able to synergy and work towards Jakarta flood emergency response activities.

Disaster Emergency Response Concept

Emergency response was quick reactions for mitigate the impact of a disaster for maintain the safety of lives and property (McEntire, 2007),

efficient allocation and scheduling of rescue units (Comfort, Ko, & Zagorecki, 2004), to handle adverse impact appeared (Standard Operating Procedures, Unit Quick Response Disaster Management (National Disaster Management Agency), Chapter 1 No. 4), the procedure and process of individual or group to respond disaster and determine the best ways to recover quickly to its original state (Kahn, 2012). Per Reilly and Markenson (2011), three strategic key in the emergency response phase is an attempt to protect or lifesaving, stabilize disaster area and protect or salvage possessions. While Kahn (2012), argues basis for emergency response phase includes responded to disasters by collecting all the team members, analyze magnitude of the disasters impact and initiate recovery actions or emergency response. The disaster management of emergency response regulated in the Indonesian Government Regulation No. 21 of 2008 on implementation of disaster legislation of article 21

Coordination concept

In the civil-military cooperation context, requires a good

coordination. Cordesman (2003) describe lack of civil-military coordination as one of the main causes of the failures to achieve success. With the coordination, each division could be conducting duties and their functions in accordance with a division of work and no tasks are duplicated. Coordination conducted because importance unity in diversity (Kumar and Sharma, 2000). Coordination was also important in creating a culture of teamwork in the leadership (Kumar and Sharma, 2000). Creation of a good cooperation culture can facilitate in achieving common goals.

Stoner (Sagar, 1998) defines a pattern of coordination is integrate objectives and activities of different units to achieve organizational goals. Maintain a balance and harmonious relationship among members in activities (Brech in Kumar and Sharma, 2000). A process, efforts to the accuracy, effectiveness, efficiency in humanitarian service (Bennett et.al, 2006), uniting efforts to ensure the achievement of goals through process of planning, organizing, implementing and monitoring (GR Terry in Kumar

and Sharma, 2000), as part an important of management (Bose, 2002)

The purpose of coordination is reaching objectives harmonious, economical and efficient (Bose, 2002), to achieve 'unity of effort' (Egnell, 2013). While effective coordination includes clear goals, chain of command effective, policies and procedures are harmonized, effective communication, good organizational structure, teamwork, effective leadership, supervision, and personnel routinely meeting (Bose, 2002; Kumar and Sharma, 2000).

Civil-Military Coordination Concept

Mechanism and interaction of of civil-military relations became close during cooperation in peace conditions. Cooperation refers to a maximum state of civil military coordination, including joint planning, labour division and information sharing (Heaslip & Elizabeth, 2014). However, when facing an emergency

complex was formed a liaison both civil and military structure adapted to the operation area being faced. Based on these explanations, it can be concluded that in a state of disasters in peacetime, type of relationship used were on areas of cooperation. Three stages of the coordination; The first stage is formation, second stage is field operations, third stage is evaluation, as the final stage of coordination (model Rietjens, 2008). Stages of of coordination arrangements is the relationship between humans, began of introduction (decided to cooperate or not). After a decision is taken, they will be working under organizational structure and tasks division that have been agreed upon, then ended with an evaluation of activities have been conducted.

The tasks division based on mission per the United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook can be seen in the figure below:

Mission of Military Humanitarian Tasks	Availability and Impartiality of Forces			
	Peaceful	Peace-keeping	Peace Enforcement	Combat
Direct	Maybe	Maybe	No	No
Indirect	Yes	Maybe	Maybe	No
Infrastructure Support	Yes	Yes	Maybe	Maybe

Figure 1 Tasks Division of Military in Disaster

Good cooperative relations in usage military assets to support disaster management. In peacetime, military could direct assistance to communities, but sometimes military task is only help distribute of logistics and resources (indirect assistance). In task assistance, military provide support infrastructure that focuses not only on affected communities. The Figure was also emphasized to core of implementation of the principles of humanitarian assistance e.g humanity, neutrality and impartiality (Schoff and Travayiakis, 2009).

Research Method

The method in this research uses a qualitative method based on theory Civil-Military Coordination of

IASC on case studies flood emergency response Jakarta from 2013 to 2015. The descriptive Method was also used to examine the data accordance with the facts (Irawan, 2007). The data used are primary and secondary data obtained from in-depth interviews and literature study. The research subjects were key actors or leaders and implementer of emergency response activities from agency of executing disaster management (National Disaster Management Agency and Disaster Mitigation Agency), the military unit deployed in the emergency response phase of Jakarta flooding in January 2013, and stakeholders on emergency response phase.

Analyzed data include systems of command, coordination and cooperation in emergency response phase. Selection of these phases due to emergency response phase as a critical phase in the cycle of disasters requiring rapid decision making and action, appropriate and coordinated.

Result and Discussion

Civil-Military Cooperation in Disaster Management

The disaster management, not only a civic responsibility but has become a part of military task. Indonesian National Army are running two task i.e. War Military Operations in emergency and Military Operations than War in a safe condition. Per the legislation, No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Army mentioned that one of the tasks in Military operations than Wars is a disaster. Military could expedite handling when disaster occurs.

Cultural differences between civil-military work make coordination problems. Objectives, ways of working and language usage in conducting different activities between civilians and military. In

many cases, the use of different “language” and the use of civil-military terminology may obscure the understanding of a common goal (Balcik *et al.*, 2010; Heaslip *et al.*, 2012). In the conduct of humanitarian disasters, need clear coordination so that implementation of tasks in the field not having problems. United Nations (UN) explained that use of military option is the last option if the civil personnel not enough for disaster management.

While, in OSLO Guidelines explained military is a tool that complements disaster management mechanism. The military presence would fill shortages in emergency disasters needs. The concept of civil-military co-operation is part for implementing the civil and military relations, the military position fill the gap of civilian capabilities (Franke, 2006). Military powers to disaster response is indispensable because of preparedness and number of personnel were quite large, especially in the emergency response.

In a state of peace, civil-military cooperation to be close, such

as by meetings between civil-military cooperation. However, when facing a complex emergency was formed a liaison both civil and military. The coordination process has been adapted from the model Rietjens (2008).

There are three stages of the coordination; The first stage is formation, second stage is field operations, the third stage is evaluation. Formation of organizational structure the civil-military coordination is needed for see who is doing what and as a control in achieving goals. Jakarta floods from 2013 to 2015 not be separated from the role of civil-military. The forces deployment of conducted after a request from the Jakarta Government.

In 2013, Jakarta Governor declared an emergency floods accompanied by the formation of the Emergency Response Command through the Governor's decision No. 25/2013. The emergency response period of floods specified for 10 days (17 to 27 January 2013) Case. The formation of this commando aims to harmonize disaster management because it involves civilian and

military powers. This command has a function for harmonize civil-military coordination in flood disaster and avoid the misunderstanding both parties. Military forces or military during emergency is not a major force but as a force to help, so the number of personnel deployed during of emergency response depending of request of the Jakarta government. In the implementation of disaster emergency, Jakarta government mandates the Disaster Mitigation Agency.

Commando of emergency response chaired by the Secretary of area as commander of emergency response and head of military district as deputy. This arrangement showed good coordination is expected to be realized with composition of high officials. Division of tasks conducted in accordance with the ability and capacity of both civilian and military. Military were involved in emergency response task force incorporated in Quick Reaction Force for Disaster Management (Task PRC PB) commanded by Military District.

Based on National Disaster

Management Agency regulation No. 10 in 2008, said that Disaster Emergency Response Command System is an emergency disaster management system used by all agencies/organizations by integrating the use of human resources, equipment and budget.

This system is part for the civilian and military join forces in disaster management. During the flood emergency in 2013, the deployment of forces and police are part of our support operation because of the number of personnel a lot, trained and adequate equipment readiness. Such as Reservoirs of Pluit overflow and inundate the surrounding area, people are want to do the activity aided by military trucks. Zaenuddin (2013) explains that residents who are in Teluk Gong utilizes military aid trucks for come home and gone to work because some roads were flooded.

Involvement of the military in a disaster is one of the main tasks of military, accordance with the Act No. 34 In 2004. In 2013, the military is involved amounted to 6 024 personnel from the Indonesian National Army,

navy and air force, while in 2014 and 2015 did not as much in 2013 because of scale of the disaster are not great and the Jakarta government did not issue a disaster emergency status.

The deployment of military personnel in 2014 based on the 23-point priority needs for flood prevention. Personnel needs at that time amounted to 92 people for do various task. Some military task when it is controlling of goods, grievances/community needs, coordinating urban / district and is responsible for the activities of command posts.

A total of 18 unit of the Indonesian National Army personnel help flood management, which are all derived of Military District. Deployed to evacuate as much 15 rubber boats and 18 trucks. (Palagan, 2014). The Jakarta government on January 13, 2014 issued a decision letter No. 70 of 2014 about the Status Emergency of Determination Preparedness Flood Disaster valid until February 11, 2014. Although not to issue a flood emergency status, but the military has been around since enactment of

emergency preparedness status. In 2015, deployment of military forces involved in the Rapid Reaction Force (SRC), the number of forces are alerted in accordance to the stages of disasters, i.e.:

1. Emergency standby 10 to 19 January, 2015: 120 derived from SRC
2. Emergency response 20 to 26 January, 2015: 595 (120 SRC, 475-unit combat forces)
3. Transition from emergency to recovery (27 Jan-February 8, 2015) derived from SRC

The personnel were incorporated in SRC PB deployed to flood in 22 points, i.e. 2 command posts in Central Jakarta, 7 command posts in West Jakarta, 3 in South Jakarta, 5 in North Jakarta, and 5 in East Jakarta. National Disaster Management Agency through the Armed Forces Commander requires additional personnel support for Jakarta flood as much 450 personnel. Additional forces more than 100 of naval forces, 100 air force, 150 personnel of the Indonesian National Army Strategic Reserve Command

and 100 personnel of special force corps. Additional forces serve to reinforce the personnel who had already been in the field.

Implementation of flood management is part of the synergy between civilian and military. Involvement Regional Work Unit, National Disaster Management Agency, Basarnas, military, police and others requires commando are clearly and well-planned. Each implementation of the field should be conducted as directed and conducted evaluation every day. According with the stages described by Rietjens (2008)

The second stage ie the operational field, all meetings coordination and division of work conducted at Main Command posts as well as an evaluation for the implementation of activities in the next day. At the time of of emergency response meeting held in the afternoon. The aim of this evaluation meeting for see the achievements that have been generated by each of the stakeholders and determine the priorities and activities for tomorrow.

Evaluation meeting provides the opportunity for all elements to deliver results and existing constraints in the field.

Extensive flood area cause difficulties in implementing coordination in the field. As the flood in 2013, the extensive area was flooded and many organizations involved in emergency efforts to become an obstacle. Military coming from some units and civilian organizations are was also different, when in the field experienced some difficulties in terms of cooperation because of the different styles of communication and instruction.

The number of community organizations involved in Jakarta flood and military forces that come from some unity, when in the field cannot take orders except from their leaders directly. In line with the opinion of Rietjens et.al (2013), essentially civil-military coordination will be difficult due to power, resources, and potentially conflicting interests, multi-actor and multi-level (Rietjens et.al, 2008), with the aim specific linking and leveraging the

capabilities of military (Gross 2008 and Hynek, 2011) in this case the role of commander commando of emergency response is essential for harmonize coordination in the field. The main problem is a fundamental difference in motivation, purpose and approach of military and humanitarian actors in their involvement in humanitarian action (Metcalf, 2012). Civil-military coordination in disaster management, will meet constraints if there are no equality objectives.

Civil-military coordination are interwoven already began show improvement. In 2013, because of the vast area flooded and many roads impassable who did not lead to coordination on the ground obstacles. The number of forces that were deployed and volunteers lead coordination obstacles. At the next flooding in 2014 and 2015, learned from experiences in 2013 Jakarta flood management are more coordinated. Civil-military coordination was built long before the floods hit.

In the normal state, civil-military coordination built convene regular meetings discussed

contingency plans in case of floods. Flood contingency plans drawn up every year by the city Disaster Mitigation Agency cooperate with all relevant agencies and military/police. In this contingency plan, discussed all credible form are will be carried out when the floods. Starting from the distribution powers personnel, equipment and other resources that can be used to cope with flooding. Determination of flood-prone areas, the number of people and locations that will be used for the evacuation site being recorded and prepared.

Jakarta Flood Management at the Next Year

Jakarta Flooding is a problem that occurred every 5 or 10 years. Nowadays, several ways by Jakarta government for solve the problem of flooding. Construction of the West Flood Canal and Canal East flood, have not sufficiently proven to significantly reduce floods. In recent years, Jakarta government to normalize the river and evicting building located at the border / right-left river. Excavations conducted on the main rivers that water flow is not obstructed and volume capacity

becomes more. Maryono (2014) mentioned that normalization should not be placed as a major program to cope with flooding. The main program at the same time cope with the flood drought and preserve the environment is to integrate upstream and downstream handling seriously. One time, the rivers will be normalized return.

Jakarta government through Disaster Mitigation Agency always update contingency plans for flood management. In this arrangement, all the elements involved directly from the government, military / police and community agencies. The purpose from contingency plans is as a handle when the flood occurred. Coordination are interwoven from the pre, during and post-disasters between the city government and the military would give a great impact in the handling of flooding in Jakarta.

At the the preparation of contingency plans flooding the division of tasks has been clearly spelled out in the document. This will be the direction of tasks and functions of military when the flood came.

Military's role in Jakarta flood is so important, given some time when the flood occurred, the military is one of the most resource ready to be deployed in large numbers.

Conclusion

Civil-military coordination in disaster management has now become a very important part. Coordination is puts the military as a supporting power so that the deployment is highly dependent on demand from the local government, several ways by Jakarta government for solve the problem of flooding. Construction of the West Flood Canal and Canal East flood, have not sufficiently proven to significantly reduce floods. In recent years, Jakarta government to normalize the river and evicting building located at the border / right-left river.

Military in peacetime task and function in terms of on military operations than war, including disaster management. OSLO per the guideline mentioned that military involvement in disaster management is a step to fill the gap are not owned by the civil ability. Jakarta floods that occurred

from 2013 to 2015 indicate that coordination between civilian and military in disasters can work well. Differences command and grammar language used in civilian and military bit much to constraints in emergency operations in the field.

Organization many people involved in Jakarta flood and military forces that come from some unity, when in the field cannot receive commands except from their leaders directly. Now in peacetime or no disasters, civil-military coordination remained built by the Jakarta government. One of the activities is the coordination meetings in preparation of contingency plans and preparations to cope with floods in Jakarta every year.

Recommendation

Coordination in Jakarta flood management should be increased, both at the time of the pre, during and post-flood. Involvement of military and community institutions in preparedness activities and training for people living in flood prone areas need to be improved. Through this research are expected would be able to make

people aware of what to do when the flood occurred. Further research, could discuss the synergy between civilian and military disaster training.

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