



Jurnal Pertahanan

Media Informasi tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan
yang Mengedepankan *Identity*, *Nationalism* dan *Integrity*
e-ISSN: 2549-9459

<http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal>



THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) AND FALINTIL- FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE (F-FDTL)'S DEFENSE DIPLOMACY: A WAY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN TIMOR LESTE

Khory Wandira Ambarsari

Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810
khorywandira95@gmail.com

Helda Risman

Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810
rismancan@gmail.com

Article Info

Article history:

Received 30 October 2019
Revised 1 December 2019
Accepted 2 December 2019

Keywords:

Defense Diplomacy,
Conflict Resolution,
Indonesia National Army (TNI)
F-FDTL,
Timor Leste

Abstract

Indonesia and Timor Leste have had an irrelevant relationship related to the history of Seroja Operation on 7 December 1975 when the TNI, formerly known as ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) carried out a total military operation in order to keep Timor Leste for not separate from Indonesia, while later it caused losses where many TNI and *Falintil- Forças De Defesa De Timor Leste* (F-FDTL)'s personnel were killed in the war. Time passed, now the relationship between both countries is getting better due to the efforts from the Indonesian and Timor Leste's parties, especially the national armies, had been done. To solve the conflict between those countries, defense diplomacy is needed. In this article, the writers tend to describe how both armed forces conduct defense diplomacy so Indonesia and Timor Leste's relationship is getting better, indeed now both countries have done some collaborations in some aspects in the economy and military. Later, the writers will analyze more to find out the best conflict resolution that had been done by both armed forces, and the existence of each State Leaders' participation. It is clearly stated that by utilizing defense diplomacy through visiting state leaders, having an official meeting, holding military cooperation such as doing exchange troops are some best ways of conflict resolution that can be done by Indonesia and Timor Leste to create a better relationship.

DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v5i3.617>

© 2019 Published by Indonesia Defense University

INTRODUCTION

Timor Leste, formerly known as East Timor, is located less than 400 miles in the northwest of Australia's coast which has an area of 18,889 square kilometers with a population of 700,000 in 1975 (Horta, 1998). On 17 July 1976, East Timor was designated by President Soeharto to be the 27th province in the Republic of Indonesia, but then through a referendum on 30 August 1999 the majority of East Timor's population chose to be free. Finally, on 20 May 2002, East Timor, which changed its name to Timor Leste, was officially recognized by the United Nations as an independent country (Pinto, 2014).

FALINTIL, *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste* (Timor-Leste National Liberation Army), or now named F-FDTL was founded by the FRETILIN party and was formed on 20 August 1975 in response to political upheaval (Buletin La'o Hamutuk, 2005). F-FDTL is an armed force in Timor Leste which was served as a defense unit to protect the territory of Timor Leste. Those two armed forces have an inaccurate relationship related to the history of Seroja Operation on 7 December 1975 in which the TNI, formerly known as ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) conducted a total military operation to control Dili and besiege Timor Leste from land, sea, and air. Baucau, Suai, Aileu, Ermera, and Lospalos cities were then successfully seized by ABRI with hard work. However, this Seroja Operation caused an extraordinary loss in which many ABRI and F-FDTL personnel were killed in the war.

The problems, that arose when Timor Leste wanted to be free and separated from Indonesia, triggered both sides and caused many casualties indicates that there has not been good diplomacy between the two parties. The different backgrounds in the political aspect between both countries also affected the conflict. The former President of the Republic of Indonesia, Suharto, concern at the time was to prevent the

formation of a left nationalist regime which was developed well in Timor Leste (Citkowski, 2019).

This article will describe how both armed forces and the State Leaders conduct defense diplomacy by recognizing it, then the conflict resolution will be discovered therefore both countries have a better relationship and do some collaborations. By analyzing those aspects, it is important to know about the existence of each State Leaders's participation in managing defense diplomacy as a way of conflict resolution.

RESEARCH METHODS

This paper uses a qualitative method to analyze the case. It has a role to gain an in-depth understanding of the use of defense diplomacy as a way of conflict resolution between TNI and F-FDTL. In this article, the writers use documentation method and by utilizing literature study (Cresswell, 2010) to obtain weighted data and as written evidence from sources of books, newspapers, papers, websites, memos, research documents, announcements, magazines, instructions, statements, or personal documents like email or letters related to the topic. A literature study, moreover, is used by doing research on documents relating to the object of research and also combining information from secondary data to obtain information. The approach used in this paper is phenomenology by identifying the essence of human experiences about a phenomenon (in this case is about the defense diplomacy between TNI and F-FDTL as a way of conflict resolution) as described by participants (Sugiyono, 2018).

In Timor Leste's case, defense diplomacy is needed to get a resolution towards the conflict that has happened.

Defense diplomacy is the peacetime use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy and more specifically the use of military cooperation and assistance (Cotter & Forster, 2004)

Defense diplomacy occurs when agreement or understanding between

countries takes place intending to achieve peace. It is carried out to understand the world constellation in a diplomatic way using the perspective of national defense. In defense diplomacy's application, there are two concepts inside: by using hard power or soft power. Hard power emphasizes the use of armed force and tends to be coercive. According to Joseph S. Nye (Nye, 2004), hard power can be applied by using solicitation, coercion, violence, and threats. It also can be done through various sources: power, payment, sanctions, and bribes. While soft power is an ability using a persuasive invitation or using the power of attraction to get the pretension (Nye, 2004).

The defense diplomacy concept in this article will be used as a way to analyze the conflict resolution. Johan Galtung formulated the conflict in the form of a triangle called the conflict ABC triangle (1958, p. 105). There are sequences of conflicts that are spelled out in them. (A) or attitude includes assumptions, cognition, emotions in the form of prejudices, beliefs, perceptions, and feelings held by one party towards another party. Attitude is also aimed at the mental states of the actors (Johan, 1973). (B) or behavior is a form of mental, verbal expression, or physical expression in the form of statements, violations, insults, and attacks caused in conflict. These attitudes not only affect individual behavior, but also other behaviors. Behavior leads to new incompatibilities, a sequence of derived conflict that is generated by acts of physical and verbal violence. (C) or conflict is the contradiction in purpose between the parties leading to a conflict that causes acts of violence and behavior (Johan, 1973).

Conflict resolution is an effort to resolve the conflict that is happened. Galtung defines conflict resolution, that is a process leading the action system to a state where the condition in the conflict happened is no longer present, also the system there must no longer have two or more incompatible goal-states (Johan, 1973). The settlement of the problem takes




Figure 1. The Conflict ABC Triangle

Source: Johan, 1973

the form of an agreement made by the parties to the conflict with a democratic way, build and prioritize the benefits of both parties to achieve peace. In seeking conflict resolution, it can also involve a third party outside the conflict parties where the third party must be neutral, wise, fair, and have no interest in resolving the conflict (Johan, 1973). Conflict resolution will encourage and strengthen national integration. This conflict resolution is an effective step to deal with conflict until the root of the problem. Conflict resolution must be done by considering the needs and fears of each conflicting party, to build mutual trust, providing opportunities for community support for an agreement, and seeing peace as an open process.

Meanwhile, Galtung stated that to resolve a conflict, it means to decide whether who is the winner and who is the loser or also what the future distribution of value shall be. Besides, it also means to administer the distribution of value, and to define the conflict as terminated (Galtung, 1965). Four conflict resolution strategies can be done, they are through negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

TNI and F-FDTL's Defense Diplomacy: A Way Of Conflict Resolution In Timor Leste

Indonesian National Army or commonly abbreviated to be TNI, based on the Law of

the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army Article 7 Paragraph 2, is the main actor who has to guard the border region. The existence of the Border Security Task Force (Satgas Pantas) has become a form of military campaign strategy to safeguard national sovereignty as well as being a deterrence to threats at the border (Gumilar, 2017). In this case, the power of the TNI is mobilized by the government as the implementation of political decisions to maintain the people's security, territorial sovereignty, and the stability of the Indonesian state.

Timor Leste is a country that currently shares a direct land border with Indonesia (Anggitta, 2014). The existence of a referendum which resulted in the independence of Timor Leste from Indonesia caused several conflicts since before the separation until it has become a sovereign country now. The conflict was not only based on the feud of the TNI and F-FDTL as the armed forces of each country but also resulted from several parties either from the government or civil society. The desire of some East Timorese to make Timor Leste a sovereign state and part of East Timorese who still want Timor Leste to be part of the provinces in Indonesia, causing conflicts which then spread to cause war outbreaks.

The conflict between Indonesia and Timor Leste by involving the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and F-FDTL then caused relations between those countries became unfavorable since 1975, in which after the Seroja Operation killed many soldiers and civilians between the two parties. Timor Leste (East Timor at that time) felt that the integration process carried out by Indonesia with the support of western countries (the United States and Australia) was felt to be detrimental to Timor Leste because of the integration process was carried out by force and was coercive. The existence of support from the western countries was also motivated by the concern of the west if Timor Leste (East

Timor) became the basis of communism with Fretilin as the main force which had Marxist-Communist orientation (Pinto, 2014). Then there was a referendum on 30 August 1999 in which East Timor voted for independence and was also motivated by the attitude of the United Nations which did not approve of Indonesia's integration into East Timor. On 20 May 2002, East Timor became an independent country and changed its name to Timor Leste.

Taylor (Taylor, 1998), in his book, stated that the Seroja operation which had taken place, if closely watched, was a symbol of military annexation which was a strategy and a way to resolve the problem of Portuguese Timor in a fast way (Horta, 1998). This operation becomes an example of the application of defense diplomacy carried out with the concept of hard power. The real proof is when the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) assumed absolute control in the political, social and economic fields when it occupied Timor Leste. However, it is not one hundred percent true that TNI used hard power in preserving Timor Leste, but they also did soft power to improve and develop the quality of human resources of Timor Leste people. TNI utilized school and church buildings there to educate East Timorese's mental building and to teach science not only for the children but also for the people who wanted to learn. TNI has also done some development in Timor Leste. They built *Puskesmas* (Centers of Public Health to improve the East Timorese's health, because Timor Leste lacked Health Center and also doctor, and it was a struggle for them to seek medicine there. TNI also repaired some infrastructures to increased the living standard in economical aspect in Timor Leste, like building the road to connect the isolated area and to facilitate transportation and communication. In the other side, the Indonesia government through TNI held state defense training to increase people's awareness of their responsibility as a citizen (Pusat Sejarah TNI, 2016).

In the case of Timor Leste and Indonesia, the conflict that occurred was a vertical conflict between the center versus the area where Timor Leste (East Timor) which belong a territory to Indonesia was trying to hold a referendum to be independent and free from Indonesia. Therefore, diplomacy is required to handle conflict as a resolution. Resolution is a decision or unanimity of opinion in the form of a request or demand determined by deliberation.

Based on Galtung's Conflict ABC Triangle, we can see that the conflict appeared when some of the East Timorese believed Timor Leste should separate from Indonesia and became an independent country due to the difference principle concerning the political aspect. It referred to the attitude (A) or assumption from one side since Indonesia thought that Timor Leste better became Indonesia's province considered from the economic situation. The resistance from F-FDTL towards TNI indicates the behavior (B) of East Timorese that caused a great conflict (C) even violence between them.

As an effort to resolve the conflict between the two armed forces, Indonesia and Timor Leste tried to conduct diplomacy in the form of meetings and negotiations. This diplomacy firstly conducted by Danrem Purwanto and guerrilla commander Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao (East Timor's leader) in Lariguto in 1983. After their meeting, then Xanana Gusmao with Major Gatot and Major Wiliam da Costa and TNI's captain in Buburake, Viqueque, met on 20 March 1983 discussing peace so that the conflict in Timor Leste could end soon (Pinto, 2014). After the first meeting took place, the two parties held a second and third meeting subsequently provided there were representatives from the United Nations and international observers in accompanying the negotiation process and the implementation of the peace agreement.

Since July 1983, the diplomatic way to the East Timor issue has focused on the UN-sponsored tripartite dialogue between Portugal and Indonesia (Lloyd, 2003). This

is the main method, also the principle construct that led to the current diplomatic resolution. The pressure from international and organizational in all sorts of kinds across the economic, political, and cultural realms contributed, as did various acts of challenge initiated by the State Leader or politician figures such as Bishop Carlos Belo, Xanana Gusmao, and Jose Ramos Horta. With the downfall of the New Order regime from Soeharto-led in Indonesia, the East Timorese people, aided by international and United Nations diplomatic and economic pressure, were presented, on 30 August 1999, with the first opportunity to determine its future since the vote for integration in 1976.

According to Tur Matan Ruak, a military figure and politician who now is the Prime Minister of Timor Leste, the peace contact carried out in 1983 was a way of resolution and initiation from Indonesia (Pinto, 2014). He considered the Indonesian side to adopt a form of diplomacy using military force that also used soft power by 'seducing' and offering what Timor Leste wanted and then could make Timor Leste follow Indonesia's will. Then between the year 1992 until 1995, Indonesian and Portuguese Ministers of Foreign Affair held meetings persistently seven times to discuss the resolution in Timor Leste. Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Ministers of Foreign Affair in that time together with Joao Deus Pinheiro (the Portuguese Ministers of Foreign Affair) and Kofie Annan (the United Nations Secretary-General) had a deal for having a fair and comprehensive settlement in Timor Leste under the supervision from the United Nation (Pusat Sejarah TNI, 2016). This kind of diplomacy demonstrated that Indonesia utilized defense diplomacy as a way of conflict resolution which was happened in Timor Leste.

After those lengthy negotiations, a ceasefire was finally agreed upon in which Timor Leste requested several conditions to the Indonesian party: 1) to withdraw Indonesian troops from Timor Leste without any conditions, 2) to open up

opportunities for UN peacekeeping troops, 3) for free consultation with the Timor Leste's people, and 4) F-FDTL troops are maintained to protect people's freedom and to avoid intimidation. By analyzing the decision from the Timor Leste's side, it is clearly stated that Timor Leste also used defense diplomacy in proposing the requirements, especially on the fourth point where Timor Leste still used their military as a means of national defense in maintaining the sovereignty of Timor Leste's territory.

Furthermore, when the Suharto era was replaced by B.J. Habibie, he declared that he was considering to offer special status and also wide-ranging autonomy towards Timor Leste on 9 June 1998 (Lloyd, 2003). Then on 18 June 1998, Ali Alatas, the Foreign Affairs Minister in Soeharto and Habibie's era, formally confirmed the offer to the Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General at that time, and also to Portugal (Lloyd, 2003). However, Portugal refused this offer. As a good intention, Habibie later announced a program of troop withdrawals from Timor Leste. Indonesian government thought it would satisfy East Timorese people so they could keep Timor Leste remaining a part of Indonesia. It is indicated that Indonesia through the state leader was struggling to do defense diplomacy towards Timor Leste without doing any harm acts but prefer using its soft power. This diplomatic way was done to get the conflict resolution of this conflict.

Then on 31 October 1998, the fourth All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) opened in Krumbach, Austria which was initiated in June 1995 in Burg Schlaining to give the autonomy proposal that was offered by the Indonesian Government and the pivotal stage of United Nations-sponsored negotiations (Lloyd, 2003). However, those ways failed and Timor Leste had its referendum and separated from Indonesia. The referendum of Timor Leste happened on 30 August 1999 when B.J. Habibie was influenced by a letter from Australian Prime Minister

John Howard that caused Timor Leste to break away from Indonesia authority and formally recognized its independence on 20 May 2002 (Pinto, 2014).

After the referendum on Timor Leste's independence, the relation between Indonesia and Timor Leste deteriorated. However, Timor Leste then reopens cooperation relations with Indonesia after its independence, and this has become one of Timor Leste's foreign policies like a sovereign state (Riskin, 2011). Timor Leste began to take part in maintaining the continuity of international politics, especially in a safe and cooperative regional region through a good relationship with Indonesia, and this was welcomed by Indonesia.

The Indonesian government focuses its operation on the maintenance of national unity and on its leadership capacity for dealing with the conflicts towards Timor Leste. It must attempt to adjust the requirement for interior help with the requirement for global help. In the political and diplomatic context, relations with Indonesia keep on being an essential component that will affect the security of Timor-Leste. Knowing this, the political leaders of Timor-Leste have been very cautious in adopting a disposition of cooperation with its all the more powerful neighbor. The two countries have gained progress in setting up the diplomatic representation crucial to maintain normal relations and increase cooperation between them. This incorporates the exceptionally successful visit of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri to Jakarta in June 2003, and the implementation of a Joint Ministerial Commission, the consenting to of a cooperation agreement between both countries and the regular official visits that the President of Timor Leste Xanana Gusmão has made to Indonesia to fortify the bilateral relationship (Timor Leste's Government, 2007).

The Timor Leste-Indonesia Joint Ministerial Commission was a follow-up to the memorandum of understanding on

bilateral cooperation that was signed between the Government of Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Timor Leste during President Xanana Gusmao's visit to Jakarta in July 2002 (Anggitta, 2014), which was held on 7-8 October 2002. The Indonesian delegation was led by the then Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, and the East Timorese delegation was led by Timor Leste's foreign minister Jose Ramos Horta. The Joint Ministerial Commission aims to discuss various efforts on improving bilateral relations, including unresolved residual issues as a consequence of the establishment of Timor Leste as a sovereign state (Saldanha, 2018).

Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The Government Of The Democratic Republic Of Timor Leste Concerning Cooperative Activities In The Field Of Defense, as the enclosure of Law Number 4 Year 2015 (Ministry of Defense, 2015) which was signed by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Purnomo Yusgiantoro and the Minister of Defense and Security of Timor Leste Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao on 19 August 2011, becomes the best diplomatic way in both side as a conflict resolution. By this agreement, Indonesia and Timor Leste aim to increase and broaden the bilateral relationship through defense relationship based on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and full respect towards sovereignty and territorial integrity. In article two describes the forms of cooperation in the defense sector, they are: 1) dialogue and bilateral consultations on defense and military-strategic issues which are the mutual interests of the two countries, 2) exchange of information in the field of defense and other matters, 3) increasing the work cooperation with the armed forces, 4) cooperation in logistical support and 5) cooperation in other fields mutually agreed by the two countries.

In this agreement, the government of Indonesia and East Timor agreed to form a

"joint committee" in the defense field. The Joint Committee has the aim to start, coordinate, and monitor all types of activities carried out on various cooperation issues that previously have been explained. In the implementation, the Joint Committee holds a meeting once every two years, and the meeting place will take place both in Indonesia and in Timor Leste based on mutual agreement. With this, the diplomacy process between the two countries has become easier because in the process defense officials representing the Joint Committee; both the Minister of Defense and military forces; make an official visit where this becomes a concrete step in formulating conflict resolution.

During the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's leadership, defense diplomacy began to emerge against Timor Leste as a form of bilateral cooperation to improve relations between the two countries. The form of defense diplomacy undertaken is by the existence of military training as an effort to improve the military sector. This method was considered by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as an effort to resolve the conflict between the two countries where they need each other in defense matters by sending military representatives, and each country studied the defense systems, also as a result of their geographical position as a neighboring country.

The other prove of the diplomatic way is by the two-day state visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Timor Leste which had the aim of honoring the independence of Timor Leste. Besides, this state visit also showed the friendly attitude of Indonesia towards Timor Leste to build cooperation. The desire of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to open a land route between Indonesia and Timor Leste is aimed to enhance cooperation in the economic field and also to strengthen cultural ties. During the meeting with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, cooperation was signed to resolve the borderlines of the two neighboring countries and several other

issues. As we know that Timor Leste did experience various kinds of difficulties, especially in the economic field. The operational costs of the government bureaucracy of Timor Leste still depend on foreign aid. With the problems experienced by Timor Leste, it makes an opportunity for Indonesia to help Timor Leste as a way of diplomacy to improve relations between the two countries as well as a way of conflict resolution (Inayati, 2005).

Regardless of the state matters, the close relationship between President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Timor Leste's Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao is an interesting thing to consider in achieving conflict resolution between Indonesia and Timor Leste. It should be known that both State Leaders have a good friendship for a long time ago. Both of their actions in politic are also quite successful. In 2014 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono once invited East Timor Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao to visit his private home in Puri Indah Cikeas in the context of an invitation to a state dinner (Lumanauw, 2014).

In that event, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono used soft power as a diplomatic method by approaching the Prime Minister of Timor Leste more personally. It can be an evidence that can be shown to the people of Indonesia and Timor Leste if the relationship between both countries is going well regardless of the bad history behind the political relationship between them previously related to the use of the armed forces. It is necessary to remember that both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao have a military background.

Other than that, the Adipurna awarding from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao that was given on 10 October 2014 at the Bali Democracy Forum in Nusa Dua, Bali (Maulana, 2014) is the highest award given by the Indonesian government to foreign citizens who are considered to be instrumental in maintaining and

strengthening Indonesia's bilateral relations with the country.

Timor Leste through the National Defence Strategy has planned the development of potential aspects, diplomatic, political, economic, military, and psychological, to guarantee the achievement of national objectives. It can be done not only in a peacetime but also a war and have to cover: 1) develop proactive diplomacy guided by the upper interests of Timor Leste, 2) adopt a military strategy embodying a defensive and discouraging (proactive) stance, with the longer-term views of developing offensive and discouraging capability within the future, 3) outline the operational scope of the armed forces in step with the strategic environment, 4) construct and acquire reciprocal discouraging power components, 5) establish the utilization of resources and integrated means (Timor Leste's Government, 2007). Based on those statements, the government of Timor Leste seriously arrange its national defense strategy particularly in creating a good diplomatic way to other countries, also towards Indonesia. The utilizing of armed forces by Timor Leste indicates that defense diplomacy is considered to be truly important in establishing diplomatic relations.

Meanwhile, Indonesia through TNI does diplomatic relations by utilizing 'soft power'. It can be proven when TNI's commander, TNI Marshal, Hadi Tjahjanto did afternoon tea with F-FDTL's commander, Major General Tito Da Costa Critovao in Belu Regency, NTT Indonesia lately on Thursday, 28 August 2019 (Puspen TNI, 2019). This afternoon party indicates that between Indonesia and Timor Leste armed forces are having a better relationship. Besides, the main cause of this meeting was to increase military cooperation in the education sector by doing troops exchange between Indonesia and Timor Leste.

Borderlands become the other important problem between Indonesia and Timor Leste since Timor Leste chose to secede

from the territory of Indonesia. This problem, in advance, became the complicated case that made the relationship between both countries was getting worse. However now, this problem can be solved surely by doing negotiations on the delimitation of the maritime boundaries after settling the borderland borders. It can be seen when the Coordinating Political, Security, and Legal Affairs Minister of Indonesia, Wiranto, met Timor Leste's chief border negotiator, Xanana Gusmao, in Jakarta on 23 July 2019. They exchanged memoranda of agreement on land borders and they have agreed on the settlement of the unresolved borders; they are Noel Besi-Citrana and Bidjael Sunan-Oben (The Jakarta Post, 2019).

The relationship between Indonesia and Timor Leste is getting better nowadays that can be proven by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno L. P. Marsudi, on May 17, 2019 held a bilateral meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Dionisio Da Costa Babo Soares at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Jakarta. In this meeting, the two sides discussed various issues related to cooperation in the Pacific region, border negotiations between Indonesia and Timor Leste, bilateral cooperation in trade and investment and capacity building support. besides, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor also aims to follow up on his application as a member of ASEAN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, 2019).

In that meeting, the border issue was discussed by the two ministers where they considered negotiations on land boundaries between the two countries to be the top priority. They also hope that this long-running negotiation can be completed as soon as possible. The official visit of the two countries certainly includes the defense attache of each country which they are a 'diplomatic' tool in the field of defense.

Defense attache is an important part of diplomacy activities that occur between both countries since they are representative of each country and they understand very well about the problems and fundamental conflicts that occur so that the presence of the meeting becomes a piece of concrete evidence as a way of conflict resolution between Indonesia and Timor Leste.

By looking at some evidence above, it can be seen that the understanding and trustworthiness formed between Indonesia and Timor Leste along with the time, and it gives priority in using defense diplomacy in doing diplomatic relations, which is a way of conflict resolution. Now, both countries still doing diplomatic relations in a good way especially by the State Leaders and also the military parties.

CONCLUSIONS

This article uses a qualitative method and phenomenological approached to analyze and describe the defense diplomacy done by TNI and F-FDTL as a way of conflict resolution in Timor Leste. Defense diplomacy and conflict resolution concept are also used by the writers in this article to make a better explanation in analyzing the case. As we know that Indonesia and Timor Leste have a bad history about the territory problem, so in this article, the writers tend to give some evidence that the diplomatic relation between both countries is getting better.

Defense diplomacy between the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and F-FDTL has been seen since the two countries experienced conflicts before Timor Leste held a referendum and became an independent state. Defense diplomacy was carried out by holding a meeting between the leaders of the state and the military between the two parties in determining the peace agreement as one way of conflict resolution.

Now, the development of diplomacy between the two countries is getting better. Thus it is clear that there was a change in the defense diplomacy way carried out

which is first done by hard power, then turned into soft power by prioritizing the establishment of peace. It could be marked by the visiting state leaders between both countries discussing the diplomatic relation in some aspects like military and economic, having an official meeting, and holding military cooperation such as doing exchange troops. The existence of the understanding and trustworthiness along with them also affects their relationship. Those are some best ways of conflict resolution that can be done by Indonesia and Timor Leste to create a better relationship.

REFERENCES

- Anggitta, M. (2014). The Agreement on the Land Boundary Between RI and Timor Leste: A Study of Indonesian Border Diplomacy. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, 11(1), 26–29.
- Buletin La'o Hamutuk. (2005). Tinjauan Terhadap Transformasi FALINTIL ke F-FDTL dan Implikasinya. *Buletin La'o Hamutuk*.
- Citkowski, M. M. and E. (2019). East Timor and Indonesia's Political Explosion, in Solidarity. Retrieved November 19, 2019, from <https://solidarity-us.org/atc/83/p922/>
- Cottey, A., & Forster, A. (2004). *Reshaping defense diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance* (365th ed.). Adelphi Paper.
- Galtung, J. (1965). Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A theoretical paradigm. *Journal of Peace Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433650200404>
- Gumilar, N. (2017). DUKUNGAN KAMPANYE MILITER TERHADAP DIPLOMASI INDONESIA DI PERBATASAN DARAT INDONESIA – TIMOR LESTE. *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara*. <https://doi.org/10.33172/jpbh.v7i2.212>
- Horta, J. R. (1998). *Funu: Perjuangan Timor Leste Belum Selesai*. Dili: Solidaritas untuk Timor Leste – SOLIDAMOR.
- Inayati, R. S. (2005). Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* - LIPI. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v2i1.390>
- Johan, G. (1973). *Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, and Formations*. *Foreign Affairs*.
- Lloyd, G. J. (2003). The diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations, and the international community. In *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*. <https://doi.org/10.22459/oa.11.2003.05>
- Lumanauw, N. (2014). SBY Undang Xanana Bersantap Nasi Goreng di Cikeas. Retrieved November 20, 2019, from <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/205453/sby-undang-xanana-bersantap-nasi-goreng-di-cikeas>
- Maulana, V. (2014). Xanana Terharu Dapat Penghargaan dari Indonesia. Retrieved November 20, 2019, from <https://international.sindonews.com/read/910298/40/xanana-terharu-dapat-penghargaan-dari-indonesia-1412938528>
- Ministry of Defense. Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The Government Of The Democratic Republic Of Timor Leste Concerning Cooperation Activities In The Field Of Defense (2015). Indonesia.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia. (2019). Menlu Retno Bertemu Menlu Timor-Leste Bahas Peningkatan Kerja Sama Indonesia dan Timor-Leste. Retrieved November 19, 2019, from <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/i/read/266/berita/menlu-retno-bertemu-menlu-timor-leste-bahas-peningkatan-kerja-sama-indonesia-dan-timor-leste>

- Nye, J. S. J. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. United States: Public Affairs Books.
- Pinto, J. T. (2014). *Dari Invasi ke Rekonsiliasi: Dinamika Hubungan FALINTIL-Forca De Defesa De Timor Leste dan Tentara Nasional Indonesia*. Jakarta: Kompas.
- Pusat Sejarah TNI. (2016). *Monumen Seroja (Seroja Monument), Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia Pusat Sejarah TNI*. Bekasi: CV. Tegarandhika.
- Puspen TNI. (2019). Afternoon Tea Rekatkan Hubungan Kerjasama TNI dan F-FDTL. Retrieved November 16, 2019, from <https://tni.mil.id/view-158474-afternoon-tea-rekatkan-hubungan-kerjasama-tni-dan-f-ftdl.html>
- Riski, G. A. A. (2011). *The Diplomacy of Timor Leste-Indonesia in human Right Settlement: From Multilateral to Bilateral*. Universitas Jember.
- Saldanha, P. (2018). Kebijakan Luar Negeri Timor Leste Terhadap Indonesia. *Jurnal Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta*.
- Sugiyono. (2018). *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: Alfabeta.
- Taylor, J. G. (1998). *Perang Tersembunyi: Sejarah Timor Timur yang Terlupakan*. Jakarta: Fortilos.
- The Jakarta Post. (2019). Timor Leste to Begin Talks on Maritime Boundary Delimitation. Retrieved November 16, 2019, from <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/07/23/indonesia-timor-leste-to-begin-talks-on-maritime-boundary-delimitation.html>
- Timor Leste's Government. (2007). *Force 2020 Plan*. Timor Leste.