




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# THE ROLE OF ASSISTANT GENERAL TO SUPPORT AND STRENGTHEN BATTLE OPERATIONS OF INFANTRY BRIGADE UNITS

Darmawan<sup>1</sup>, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, [darmawan@uin-suka.ac.id](mailto:darmawan@uin-suka.ac.id)

Sudaryati<sup>2</sup>, STIA LAN Bandung, [dartysudaryati@gmail.com](mailto:dartysudaryati@gmail.com)

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### Abstract

This conceptual paper proposes a model theory of applying strategic management to the field of personnel resource management. When a country is about to engage in war, one very important thing to understand is the characteristic of the war. In peacetime, the armed forces must prepare for wartime. No two wars are identical, because war is produced by The Paradoxical Trinity. Therefore, the big question is: what is the function and role of Adjutant General corps in this increasingly multidimensional war? The recruitment of adjutant general personnel can no longer rely solely on officers and staff and civil servants on the basis of qualifications as drafted in the Conception of the Adjutant General Transformation in order to support the basic tasks and functions of Army. The Adjutant General corps will also need officers and staff who have experience in the war and staff who have comprehensive analysis skill that includes the three elements of war in The Paradoxical Trinity. This means that Adjutant General should have a specialty in accurately analysing personnel's capabilities. The main advantage of this scheme is allowing higher vigilance to anticipate war. The ability to receive data and then process it will affect the strength of the army as a whole. Upon this conclusion it is recommended to establish a new sub directorate which functions are to collect information on legislation, daily orders; organizing, inspecting, controlling, and mobilizing troops, military punishment, desertions and rotation of troops to then analyse it for the purpose of providing reports and suggestions for personnel/troop deployment, logistics and movements at headquarters and users. The breadth of this function will result in the importance of the improvement of the competence and position of the Directorate of Adjutant General from Brigadier General to Major General.

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<sup>1</sup> Corresponding Author. Darmawan is a Lecturer at Economic and Islamic Business Faculty, State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, gets his doctoral degree in management studies, in Institute of Government Account and Finance, New Delhi, India.

<sup>2</sup> Sudaryati is a *Perwira Menengah* or Middle Rank Officer in Directorate of General Adjutant Army, a Master in State Apparatus Resources Management studies from School of Public Administration, National Institute of Public Administration, Bandung

## INTRODUCTION

When a country is about to engage in war, one very important thing to understand is the characteristic of the war. Because when an interaction takes place during war, each party will dynamically attempt to dictate its opponent so that they can utilize the advantages they possess while exploiting the opponent's weaknesses at the same time. We need to admit that, in today's modern situation, identifying those things will be more difficult. It is true then what Carl Von Clausewitz says (in his book, "On War"), that "War is an art not a science" (Clausewitz, 1908). To carry out war, one should not only follow a set of rules or principles as their guidelines, even if it is trusted. Victory in war is often determined by the talents of its military leaders. However, Clausewitz affirmed that war is an organized use of force. Hence only those who are well organized can win the battle. Although in some battles, this is not entirely true.

The Napoleonic Wars gave many lessons, some of them gave rise to one big question that had to be answered; how the French troops under Napoleon achieved great success in Europe while their soldiers were poorly trained, undisciplined, lacking talented officers, lacking logistical support, lacking organizational structures and so on. It was founded then that the answer is strongly correlated to the transformation of society that emerged at that time in France who wanted to establish a nation-state of France. In other words, the militancy of the French people at that time was an extraordinary force that mobilized its troops in such a way that it was not easy to defeat. Therefore, in order to conquer the French army, it is not enough to know its war strategy and tactics, but also to know the political context underlying its war strategy.

The Indonesian war of independence is another example of this situation. The Dutch army and even the allied (British) army that had just won World War II; well organized troops and armed with modern equipment can be defeated by a group of

people's security forces? This case not only teaches the importance of militancy to us, but also the importance in ensuring the greatest strength of our armed forces, i.e. the unity of the army and the spirit of nationalism of its people, is not compromised.

In peacetime, the armed forces must prepare for wartime. No two wars are identical, because war is produced by The Paradoxical Trinity - agreement and balance of decisions and policies of three elements: People, Military and Government. The new balance between the three will be greatly influenced by the conditions of the times, territories and also by what is happening in other countries and regions. But it is the experience of other people's wars that will at least serve as the basis for analysis of the current and upcoming war through a model composed of the interaction of each element of the parties in accordance with existing war theories. This model should be the initial foundation of the strategy to be implemented as "a set of rules or principles as the standard guide."

What are we facing right now? Which battles and wars are we going through? Even the crucial question arises: in accordance with the definition described by KASAD General Gatot Nurmantyo ("*Pesan Perang dari Jaarbeurs [The War Message from Jaarbeurs]*," 2015), that war is essentially a matter of killing or being killed. Hence, we must have sufficient understanding on where and who we should kill. In essence, battle cannot be won by a single branch, but will be won by involving multiple branches. Misunderstanding on this principle will create a collateral damage that can undermine the morale of troops due to the decline of people's support. This can be seen from the mistakes of American soldiers who failed to understand the situation in the Vietnam war, which resulted in a crushing defeat. America failed to understand Ho Chi Minh's head so they were unable to understand the reason behind the movement of his troops.

Therefore, the big question is: what is the function and role of Adjutant General corps in this increasingly multidimensional war? History teaches us that in addition to Napoleon, the greatest Captain in history, there is also Helmuth von Moltke, the greatest war manager in the modern era of war. Our choice in acquiring wisdom must necessarily be based on the experiences of others and the circumstances in which we and our wars are in progress. For as Moltke said that during the peace period, the adjutant general should spend as much time as possible to prepare for wartime in regard to how to employ people, troops and maneuvers (Ropp, 1970).

The main problem that will be discussed in this paper on strategic management in the field of military personnel resource management is "What is the strategic role of Directorate of Adjutant General in supporting and strengthening the battle operations of infantry brigade unit?"

This paper, which on strategic management field especially military personnel resource management, aims to find out the strategic role of Directorate of Adjutant General in supporting and strengthening the battle operations of infantry brigade unit.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Infantry Brigade

Infantry is a branch of military force that relies on foot as troops that engaged, fight and confront the enemy face to face. These troops will usually have the greatest casualties both quantitatively and qualitatively. Historically, as the oldest branch of army, infantry is the spearhead of the modern army, and is constantly undergoing training that demands more physical and psychological strain than any other branch of military force.

Infantry can enter and maneuver in terrains that military vehicles and military personnel cannot penetrate with heavy weaponry. Transport and delivery of modern infantry to engage in combat will

usually use parachute or helicopter air strikes and amphibious landing from the sea.

Most of the Indonesian troops consist of infantry. This is because the procurement of infantry troops is the easiest and cheapest. Infantry is the largest corps and the backbone of the Army. Indonesian Army Has no less than 89 Infantry Battalions. In addition to the Infantry Battalion under the command of the Army, there are still 10 Marine Infantry Battalions under the command of the Marine Corps of the Navy.

Infantry are the main ground combat troops, i.e. foot soldiers equipped with light weapons, trained and prepared to carry out close combat. Around the 16<sup>th</sup> century in England, the Infantry was employed as an army that walked to the battlefield, and fought and defeated the enemy directly - usually aims to take and conquer the terrain. As such, war victory without the presence of infantry within the enemy's defensive barrier has hardly ever occurred for centuries.

### Adjutant General

The phrase adjutant general came from the Spain word, *ayudante*, which means senior staff who works in General's office. This phrase first appeared in military terminology around the 17th century. There are many definitions of adjutant general in the world but each has similarities in at least two things: The adjutant general may mean senior staff assigned as assistant general; and a personnel organizing body.

In France, during the beginning of French Revolution, adjutant general was a senior staff member assigned as an assistant to the office of general. This position was for lieutenant colonel and colonel. Since 1795, only colonels can fulfill this position. Then since 1800 it was entered into the commander's aide position. Since 1803, the position of the adjutant general begins with the colonel. In the Russian empire adjutant general was the assistant of the Tsar, Marshal or general. In the United Kingdom, the adjutant general was the most senior

staff officer in the British army. He is responsible for the making of personnel policy and supporting the armed forces.

In India, the adjutant general is senior administrative staff for the Indian army and reports to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Pakistan has its peculiarities – its Adjutant General includes the judge advocate general, as a legal officer. As for the model structure of Adjutant General in the American armed forces, in many respects have similar structures and functions with the corps of Adjutant General in Indonesia.

### Role

In an effort to understand the duties and functions of adjutant general, it helps to read General Thiebault's notes (Sigler, 2006a), "*Manuel des Adjudans generaux*" (Sigler, 2006b), around the end of November, after the battle of Arcole, November 15-17, 1796. Captain Thiébault has just begun his duties as an adjoint (assistant) in Masséna division under the leadership of adjudant général Jean-Baptiste Solignac (1773-1850). One of his first assignments was to deliver a report to Bonaparte's headquarters:

"I thought this was the most important part of my servitude: the speed of delivering the shipment, but I was wrong. The commander invited me into his room, took a report from my hand and read it carefully. He started giving me a lot of questions that were more numerous and faster than what I imagined. Bonaparte checks the number and conditions of the General Masséna forces, its logistical situation, location, the position of the hospital against the enemy" (Sigler, 1895).

Thiébault, however, only responds to a small portion of these questions. Bonaparte was far from satisfied, but Thiebault was satisfied although a little. It may be this episode that forces him to think critically about the importance of systematic preparation and the staff's theoretical capabilities.

Under the same principle, the stigma that Directorate of Adjutant General is only for personnel administration should be changed. This stigma has been embedded since the establishment of Staff "A" dated December 19, 1949 which is the forerunner of the Adjutant General organization (Organisasi Kementerian Pertahanan dan Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia, 1949). We can see that the function of Adjutant General in Staff "A" organization is limited to personnel administration, not management. Therefore, Corps of Adjutant General is only tasked to administer military personnel instead of managing them. Therefore, in order to answer the challenge of modern war which dynamics tend to be far quicker, Corps of Adjutant General should be tasked with more than just administration – they should be tasked to provide suggestions for the field general and army headquarter on the deployment of personnel.

Deploying and lodging infantrymen in combat will only be appropriate if we have accurate data on the strengths and weaknesses of our opponents and also our own strengths and weaknesses. The main change from this scheme is the addition of analytical function that will be employed to provide suggestion for war strategy to the infantry generals in the field, but not on tactical level.

We must understand that the main purpose of war is to weaken and then destroy the enemy forces. A total war aimed at defeating and then dominating other nations. Fighter planes, sea ships will only weaken the enemy forces while the infantry troops in the field will ensure whether or not the enemy has been defeated – meaning being destroyed and conquered. Destroying the enemy by not conquering the state and its people will undermine the meaning of victory (Howe, 2015). The infantry ensures every detail of the victory is sought. On the other hand, heavy equipment and technology is not something that can be easily transferred from street to street or from one area to another (Beckett, 2009).

But this will lead to increased risk and sacrifice – a war reduced to its most essential principle, killing or being killed.

The scheme that adopts de Bourcet's work on *maréchal-des-logis d'armée* (Hittle & Wilkinson, 1915) adds the administrative function of personnel data into personnel deploying and lodging analysis. This will facilitate the field infantry commander in determining appropriate tactics based on their own intuition. No matter how modern war has become today, when ground battles occur the function of the infantry brigade will go back to conventional wars – that war is just a matter of numbers and numerical calculation. Therefore, the preparation of statistical data becomes important as an analysis material, not only for analysts in the adjutant general's office but for infantry commanders in the field. The expansion of the function of the adjutant general will obviously come with the risk of friction, “Any reorganization of the staff of the Army without the introduction of General Staff is doomed to failure” (William Harding Carter, 1918). After all, recognizing the reorganization and the limits of delegation of authority and liability of the unit and a commander must be done with caution.

We can see that in ground battle, the infantry brigade is the spearhead of the armed forces. These troops are the most reliable eyes to see the enemy, capable of providing a field analysis on the strategies set by headquarters and intelligence analysts. This will change the meaning of modern war in which almost all of its battles are carried out and directed at a distance. Ground battles are a traditional war that requires traditional war tactics as well. Therefore, the strategy to be suggested by the adjutant general is intended to reduce the number of victims on our side. It is the accuracy of data that will reduce the unnecessary victims of ground battle.

Ground battles today are no longer merely guerrilla warfare, which is one of the strengths of our infantry brigade, but a new model of guerrilla warfare where trees are

replaced with dense housing, mountains are replaced with multi-story buildings, and rivers are replaced with culverts and underground aqueducts. The war of the city as a new guerrilla war would have to be addressed with different strategies and tactics. The need for real-time battle information data will become an increasingly urgent need. The Headquarter of Adjutant General Corps should provide this accurate information based on the personnel database that it owns. Unlike the adjutant general at the brigade level who only has limited personnel data on his brigade, Headquarters has a wider range of data. This is intended to immediately provide real-time personnel advice based on the needs of combat commanders in the field for the problems they face – which might include needs for personnel, equipment and of course movement infantry forces based on the analysis of the movement of enemy personnel.

Failure of army headquarters in managing assets/personnel can be learned from the case of Strelkov (Dugin, 2014). How could it be that Putin failed to capitalize on his personnel in Ukraine, and let Igor Ivanovich Strelkov lead nearly 20,000 infantries against the whole country? In fact, the lack of personnel data made Putin asked:

“On whose behalf and in whose name is he fighting? He has been holding the defense of Slavyansk and of the entire DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic] for so long. Who gives him orders? Who stands behind him? Who is this Strelkov?”

However, there is also the possibility that this was Russia’s tactic to claim uninvolved in anything that happened in Crimea, Slavyansk, Donetsk, Ukraine (Winnerstig, Carlsson, Hedenskog, Sundberg, & Pallin, 2014).

Based on that, the recruitment of adjutant general personnel can no longer rely solely on officers and staff and civil servants based on the qualification degree of State Administration, Human Resource Management, Bahasa Indonesia,

Informatics Engineering, Information Systems, Informatics Management, Computer Engineering, Arts/Music, and Karawitan, as conceptualized in the Conception of the Adjutant General Transformation in order to support the basic tasks and functions of Army. Corps of Adjutant General will also need officers and staff who have combat experience in the field as well as staff who have comprehensive analytical skill covering all three elements of war in *The Paradoxical Trinity* (William H. Carter, 1902): People, Military and Government—ours and enemy's. This means that adjutant general personnel will need to have specialty in accurate personnel analysis in addition to understanding the basic task of a general's aide.

Therefore, the duties of adjutant general at the level of Brigade, battalion and so on should include managing information on personnel data, formation, organization, movement and history copy of the command of general/commander. This will allow a better and more accurate crosscheck process before deploying troops. At the same time, the administrative measurement design can be made to improve the strength of the discipline, morale and system as a whole, and above all improves the combat abilities of the infantry forces and the strength of the army in general.

The main advantage of this scheme is allowing higher vigilance to anticipate the increasingly varied and bigger war. The accuracy of personnel data and its analysis will allow the directorate of adjutant general to provide continuous, up-to-date, accurate and sustainable advice on the reform and transformation of the Army. This data analysis must be supported by a steady supply of data from each troop. It even includes daily commands to every person in the morning, about what to do during the next 24 hours. This is an additional task to be undertaken by the staff of the adjutant general – making a daily performance report. The staffs of the adjutant general are military personnel who should be the first to

know every issue that affects troops. Then, issues that require major decisions that could affect the capabilities of the operating unit should be communicated to the commander. The ability to receive and then process this data will affect the strength of the army as a whole.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. To win the battle and the war, field general/commander of infantry forces requires accurate data and advice. The data and analysis include the number and conditions of the troops, its logistical situation, location, and the position of our side's and enemy's supporting system.
2. Analysis to personnel and other relevant matters will provide suggestion on the deployment of infantry personnel and its supporting personnel to win the aforementioned battle.
3. To produce accurate analysis, the staff of the directorate general should be recruited and developed not only from the adjutant's branch but other branches as well. This is in order to ensure that adjutant general is capable to conduct accurate personnel analysis and useful to the field troops due to its administrative and combat competence.
4. This analysis aims to minimize losses and casualties either on the infantry brigade as the spearhead of combat or on the part of stakeholders and to win the war in general.

## SUGGESTIONS

1. Establish a new sub directorate which functions are to collect information on legislation, daily orders; organizing, inspecting, controlling, and mobilizing troops, military punishment, desertions and rotation of troops to then analyze it for the purpose of providing reports and suggestions for personnel/troop deployment, logistics and movements at headquarters and users.

2. More thorough research and details will be necessary to find the most likely form of this function.
3. The breadth of this function will result in the importance of the improvement of the competence and position of the Directorate of Adjutant General from Brigadier General to Major General.

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