



The Effectiveness of the Strategy of the Indonesian Armed Forces' Habema Operation Command in Preserving Peace in Papua

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Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy implemented by the Habema Operation Command of the Indonesian Armed Forces to counter the separatist movement of the Free Papua Organization and foster peace and security in Papua. The objective of this study is to assess how the strategy integrates military operations, socio-political engagement, and modern intelligence technology to support welfare development, as mandated by Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020. A qualitative case study approach was employed, using primary data from interviews with military personnel and secondary data from credible sources, analyzed through Galula's COIN theory and Kilcullen's three-pillar framework. The findings indicate that the Habema Operation Command effectively combines hard power (security operations) and soft power (social programs such as access to clean water and agricultural support) to reduce OPM influence and build community trust. However, challenges such as separatist propaganda and inter-agency coordination persist. The study recommends enhanced coordination, increased socio-economic investments, and diplomatic efforts to counter international separatist narratives.

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INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Papua is one of the longest-lasting social conflicts in modern Indonesia and is rooted in West Papua's dissatisfaction with its integration into the NKRI. Founded in 1965, the Free Papua Organization became the main symbol of resistance to the Indonesian government. This movement demanded independence by raising crucial issues such as the disputed history of integration, marginalization and discrimination against Papuans, development failures, and human rights violations (Widjojo et al., 2010). Based on Anderson (2015), in Papua's Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery, the conflict in Papua is one of the longest-lasting social conflicts in the modern

era. Dissatisfaction with the integration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia, which is maintained by various parties, both local and foreign, is one of the main factors prolonging this conflict.

The OPM is a separatist movement advocating for the independence of Papua from the Republic of Indonesia, employing political maneuvers, propaganda, and armed violence. This movement challenges Indonesia's sovereignty and disrupts security, hindering welfare development in Papua. In response, the Indonesian government mandated accelerated welfare development through Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020, emphasizing the need for conducive security conditions. In 2024, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) established the Habema Operation Command under the Joint Regional Defense Command III (Kogabwilhan III) to implement a counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy integrating military and non-military approaches.

TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto stated, "The TNI has established the Habema Operations Command (*Satgas Koops Habema*) to handle the conflict in Papua by adopting a smart power approach that integrates soft power, hard power, and military diplomacy," during the TNI-Polri Leadership Meeting at TNI Headquarters, East Jakarta, on February 28 (CNN Indonesia, 2024).

This study focuses on the Habema Operation Command's COIN strategy in combating OPM's separatist activities. The object is chosen due to the strategic importance of Papua, the persistence of OPM's insurgency, and the limited academic analysis of Indonesia's evolving COIN approach compared to global models (e.g., Malaya, Colombia, and Afghanistan). Understanding this strategy's effectiveness is critical for informing policy and ensuring long-term stability.

The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the Habema Operation Command's COIN strategy in addressing the OPM insurgency and maintaining peace in Papua. The sub-objectives include analyzing the balance of military force, political engagement, and socio-economic initiatives, assessing the role of modern technology, and comparing Indonesia's approach to global COIN models. The study provided evidence-based recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of COIN.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since Papua joined the Republic of Indonesia, armed conflicts between separatist-terrorist groups of the OPM and the security forces have continued to this day. The main root problems that trigger the conflict are differences of opinion regarding the status of Papua, dissatisfaction with the management of natural resources, and alleged discrimination and human rights violations. One of the main triggers of the conflict is OPM's demand to secede from Indonesia and form an independent state. This group carried out various acts of violence, such as attacks on security forces, public facilities, and civilians. The Indonesian government has made various efforts to address the conflict in Papua, using both hard and soft approaches, which are carried out simultaneously. However, to date, the expected peace in Papua has not been fully realized. The state tends to use coercive and repressive approaches more often, albeit with varying intensity throughout the conflict resolution process in Papua (N. S. Mambraku, 2015).

The country faces significant challenges in performing counterinsurgency operations in Papua, especially in addressing OPM's tactical gaps. The group capitalized on public perceptions of the state's security approach, which sparked public resistance. Researchers who focus on Papuan conflict resolution have different views on the country's security approach to overcoming violence in Papua.

The first view comes from those who reject the security approach and recommend conflict resolution through comprehensive, peaceful dialogue (Febrianti et al., 2019; Nur Rumila & Effendi, 2020; Simamora & Budihardja, 2021; Taum, 2015; Wangge, 2023). The second view comes from those who support peaceful dialogue but do not rule out using a security approach if necessary (Al Fajri et al., 2022; Halkis, 2020; Koibur, 2021; Ramdhan, 2021). In this view, the use of force by the security forces must be carried out with great caution to avoid the emergence of new and larger problems, such as the loss of innocent civilian lives. The security policy must avoid counterproductive measures that could hinder conflict resolution.

COIN strategies have been widely studied across various historical conflicts, with the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) among the most extensively analyzed case studies. As highlighted in Hack (2022), the Malayan Emergency has been a reference point for counter-insurgency doctrines from the Vietnam War to the war in Afghanistan. The British approach in Malaya was characterized by a multi-dimensional strategy that incorporated military action, resettlement programs, psychological warfare, and the "hearts and minds" campaign to weaken insurgent support. Hack's analysis provides a comprehensive, multi-perspective account of the implementation and impact of counter-insurgency measures on both insurgents and civilians.

The limitations and challenges of population-centric COIN strategies have been highlighted recently. Studies on Colombia's counter-insurgency efforts and FARC provided insights into the role of state infrastructure projects in conflict zones. While infrastructure development is often used to strengthen government legitimacy, research shows that such projects do not always secure local support. In some cases, they unintentionally empower insurgent groups or create distrust among civilians due to their militarization. This complexity demonstrates that COIN efforts must be context-sensitive, integrating social, political, and military measures tailored to the specific dynamics of each conflict zone (Voyvodic, 2024).

Indonesia's counterinsurgency operations against OPM share similarities with the Colombian experience, particularly in the use of territorial military presence, economic development programs, and intelligence-based operations. However, Indonesia's COIN strategy in Papua remains heavily military-driven (Wangge, 2023), unlike Colombia, where the FARC was engaged in negotiations and demobilization programs, with limited political reconciliation efforts. This study aims to assess the effectiveness of Indonesia's COIN strategy in gaining local trust, reducing violence, and achieving long-term stability, drawing lessons from international case studies such as Colombia, Afghanistan, and Malaya.

Despite the extensive COIN literature, a significant gap remains in the academic study of the Indonesian Army's counterinsurgency strategies against the OPM. Most

existing research on the Papua conflict has focused on human rights concerns, political grievances, and economic disparities, while little attention has been paid to the military's strategic adaptations and the role of modern technology in shaping COIN operations (Firmansyah et al., 2022; Lele, 2023; Sarjito, 2024). This study seeks to fill this gap by examining how the Indonesian military is combining traditional counterinsurgency tactics with contemporary technological advances to counter the OPM insurgency.

The integration of classical and modern COIN theories to assess the effectiveness of Indonesia's counterinsurgency strategy is a key novelty of this research. Drawing on Galula's (1964) classical counterinsurgency principles and modern insurgency theory, this study examines how conventional military operations, socio-political engagement, and technological innovations shape the effectiveness of COIN in Papua. Unlike previous studies that focus on traditional COIN approaches, this study examines the impact of UAV surveillance and cyber operations on the Indonesian Army's COIN efforts. This study also analyzes how the Indonesian military's territorial approach, which emphasizes grassroots intelligence gathering and local military engagement, differs from Western-centric COIN models, which often rely on large-scale state-building initiatives.

This study extends the theoretical foundations of counterinsurgency studies by applying the COIN frameworks to the contemporary security environment in Papua, Indonesia. Galula's theory of winning "hearts and minds" is tested against Papua's unique sociopolitical conditions, where ethnonationalist grievances and external political narratives shape public perceptions. Roy's modern COIN framework is further expanded by examining how a non-Western military adapts to asymmetric warfare in an era where digital surveillance and cyber warfare have altered the landscape of insurgent operations. Additionally, this study contributes to asymmetric warfare theory by analyzing whether small insurgent groups can successfully adapt to a superior military force in the digital age.

By addressing these research gaps and integrating theoretical insights with an empirical analysis of the Indonesian Army's counterinsurgency efforts, this study provides a new perspective on localized COIN operations in Papua. This study highlights the importance of a hybrid approach that combines military power with political and economic measures, and offers practical recommendations to improve counterinsurgency effectiveness in ethnically and geographically complex insurgencies. Through this research, a deeper understanding of Indonesia's evolving COIN strategy can be developed, contributing to broader discussions about modern insurgency and state responses in the 21st century.

METHODS

This study used a qualitative research method to examine how the SatgasKoops Habema counter-insurgency strategy addressed the OPM movement. Qualitative research methods can provide a rationalization and interpretation of a phenomenon (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). This study uses a case study design to collect and analyze data from multiple relevant sources.

This case study examines a specific problem within defined temporal and geographical boundaries. Detailed data from multiple sources are used to support the analysis (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).

Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews with military personnel involved in the operations of Habema. Secondary data were sourced from credible sources, including government documents (e.g., Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020), TNI statements, academic literature, and media reports (e.g., Kompas TV, 2024)

Based on this presentation, this research will use a single instrumental case study that focuses on the Habema Koops Task Force's modern counter-insurgency strategy as an effort to overcome the OPM's separatist-terrorist threat. This means that the study focuses on the pattern of modern counter-insurgency strategies employed by the Habema Koops Task Force to overcome the OPM's separatist-terrorist threat and create a conducive environment in Papua.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study's analysis is grounded in a comprehensive theoretical framework that integrates several key theories to evaluate the effectiveness of SatgasKoops Habema's counter-insurgency strategy. David Galula's COIN Theory (1964) serves as a foundational guide, emphasizing the importance of securing the population, fostering political engagement, and reducing insurgent influence to win the community's "hearts and minds." Complementing this, David D. Kilcullen (2006) underscored the critical role of security, political engagement, and economic development as essential components of an effective COIN strategy. Additionally, Peter Drucker's Effectiveness (1967) is employed to assess the strategy's success by measuring goal achievement, implementation speed, and resource efficiency. Together, these theories provide a robust and multidimensional framework for analyzing the strategy's components, encompassing ends, means, and ways, as well as its overall outcomes.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Throughout President Joko Widodo's leadership, the government has sought to resolve conflicts in Papua by combining security and welfare approaches. This approach is expected to be a balanced solution to overcoming the conflict in Papua, especially after the resurgence of the separatist movement and the fall of the New Order. One of the security policies implemented by the Joko Widodo administration is a counter-insurgency operation known as the 2018 Papua Special Operation, which later became *Operasi Nemangkawi Papua*. This operation is a law enforcement operation by the Police that combines a hard approach with a humanitarian (soft) approach. As part of these efforts, the Indonesian National Police, supported by the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), initiated *Operasi Kepolisian Terpusat Nemangkawi-2019* to counter the threat posed by the Papuan Armed Criminal Group (KKB). This operation, formalized through *Surat Perintah Sprint/3731/XII/OPS.1.1/2018* dated December 31, 2018, integrated hard and humanitarian approaches to maintain public security and order (Sianturi & Hanita, 2020). Despite these efforts, persistent challenges, including the KKB's guerrilla tactics and the

complex socio-political dynamics of Papua, necessitated a strategic evolution of the government's approach.

To address these issues, the TNI established the *Satuan Tugas Komando Operasi Harus Berhasil Maksimal (Satgas Koops Habema)* in 2024 under the Joint Regional Defense Command III. This new command marked a shift toward a more integrated counter-insurgency strategy. TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto emphasized that "the TNI has formed the Habema Operations Command (Koops Habema) to handle the conflict in Papua by adopting a smart power approach that integrates soft power, hard power, and military diplomacy," as stated during the TNI-Polri Leadership Meeting at TNI Headquarters, East Jakarta, on February 28, 2024 (CNN Indonesia, 2024). A documentary show covering the operational activities of *Satgas Koops Habema* in Intan Jaya, Papua, was launched on Kompas TV's YouTube channel. The video shows how the TNI helps the Papuan people build a better future. The TNI not only maintains security but also helps in various fields, such as education, health, and the economy. This approach emphasizes integrating security, development, and diplomacy efforts to address existing problems. In this context, the TNI not only maintains security through patrols and post guards but also improves the local community's quality of life through various programs, including school construction, health services, and local economic development. The TNI's commitment to building harmonious relations with the people of Intan Jaya while implementing the smart power strategy demonstrates a holistic approach to improving social and economic well-being in a complex region (Kompas TV, 2024).

In the face of the threat posed by the OPM, *Satgas Koops Habema* is implementing a COIN strategy based on the concept of smart power and the principles of the hearts-and-minds theory. This approach combines elements of hard and soft power and applies the principles outlined by Galula (1964) in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Galula mentioned that an effective COIN approach should focus on population security, political engagement, and reducing insurgents' influence. The strategy implemented by *Satgas Koops Habema* in Papua demonstrates the integration of military operations and social activities to win the hearts and minds of the community, a core tenet of the COIN approach.

Satgas Koops Habema employs a multidimensional COIN strategy to address OPM capabilities, integrating security operations and socio-economic initiatives to align with the principles of population security and political engagement of Galula & Nagl (2008). Security operations involve stationing TNI troops near communities to deter OPM's guerrilla tactics and foster civilian safety (SEA Today, 2024). To counter OPM's terrain advantage, the TNI employs advanced technologies, including drones and hot-air balloons, for targeted surveillance of separatist movements. For instance, drone surveillance has enabled the identification of OPM supply routes, facilitating pre-emptive operations that disrupt logistical networks and recruitment efforts (Special Interview Results, 2024). Socio-economic programs, such as the Manunggal Air initiative for clean water access in drought-prone areas, agricultural support through seed provision and technical training, and mobile health clinics near military posts, address critical community needs (Kompas TV, 2024). These efforts align with Kilcullen's (2006) three-

pillar framework, thereby reducing economic marginalization and enhancing state legitimacy to counter OPM's influence.

OPM's Threat Capability

Several factors shape the OPM's ability to challenge state sovereignty. First, their intimate knowledge of Papua's rugged terrain, including mountains and dense forests, provides a strategic advantage for guerrilla warfare. This natural cover enables OPM to mobilize, launch surprise attacks, and evade government forces (Special Interview Results, 2024). Second, their guerrilla strategy involves sporadic, rapid attacks and avoids confrontation with security forces, complicating the complete elimination of the threat (Special Interview Results, 2024).

Despite limited resources, OPM sustains operations through weapons smuggled or looted from security forces, supplemented by funding from illegal activities such as extortion and coerced use of village funds. Financial support from the Papuan diaspora abroad further enables logistics and international propaganda efforts, amplifying their separatist narrative (Special Interview Results, 2024). These capabilities enhance OPM's resilience, making them a persistent challenge to state authority.

Strategy of the Habema Operation Command

The strategy of the Habema Operation Command is analyzed using an Ends-Means-Ways framework, a structured approach derived from COIN and effectiveness theories to evaluate strategic objectives, resources, and implementation methods (Drucker, 1967; Galula & Nagl, 2008; D. Kilcullen, 2006). This framework aligns with the adoption of a "smart power" approach by *Satgas Koops Habema*, which integrates hard power (military operations), soft power (socio-political engagement), and military diplomacy to address the Papua conflict, as articulated by Indonesian Armed Forces Commander General Agus Subiyanto (CNN Indonesia, 2024). Established in 2024 under the Joint Regional Defense Command III, *Satgas Koops Habema* operates pursuant to Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020, which mandates the creation of conducive security conditions to accelerate welfare development in Papua. The strategy is structured around three components: the ends, which focus on neutralizing the OPM separatist threat and maintaining peace to enable welfare development; the means, encompassing the deployment of TNI troops, modern technology such as drones and hot air balloons for surveillance, and socio-economic programs like clean water access and agricultural training; and the ways, which involve combining security operations with community-focused initiatives to build public trust and reduce OPM's influence.

Population Safety by Building Public Trust

According to Galula, one of the main principles of the hearts and minds approach is that providing population security is the first step in building public trust. Without a sense of security, the people will not support the government or reject the rebels. This is relevant to conditions in Papua, where the OPM often uses guerrilla and terror tactics to

create fear in the community. *Satgas Koops Habema* strategically placed TNI troops near communities to ensure that the community felt protected from OPM threats.

In Papua, *Satgas Koops Habema* combines security operations and social activities to strengthen relations with local communities and support social development. One of the main activities is mobile security operations carried out in villages near the Papua New Guinea border, which include providing hygiene education to children, such as proper bathing, as well as social services like haircuts. This activity aims to build trust between the TNI and the community and improve residents' quality of life.

In addition, in Gome District, Central Papua, the army carried out similar activities, encouraging children to apply local values in their daily lives. Brigadier General Lucky Avianto explained that this activity is part of the TNI's efforts to build inclusive social communication and accelerate development in Papua, thereby supporting the country's security and stability goals. Overall, this activity reflects a modern counter-insurgency approach that focuses not only on security aspects but also on social development and education to create peace and stability in the Papua region (SEA Today, 2024).

Political Involvement in Addressing the Root Causes of Social and Economic Problems

The second principle of Galula is political engagement, which emphasizes addressing the root causes of insurgency, such as economic injustice, lack of political representation, or social discrimination, that often trigger rebellions. Galula (1964) stated that COIN is 80% political action and 20% military action, underscoring the importance of the political dimension in winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Satgas Koops Habema adopted this principle by implementing social development programs that cover the health, education, and economic sectors. The Manunggal Air program, which aims to provide access to clean water for the people of Papua, is one example of the TNI's efforts to improve socio-economic conditions in remote and drought-prone areas. The TNI also supports farmers by providing agricultural and seed training to strengthen local food security. Through these programs, the TNI seeks to address the urgent needs of the Papuan people, who lack access to various basic services. The TNI integrates military operations with socio-economic initiatives to counter the separatist threat and address underlying tensions in Papua (Kompas TV, 2024).

Based on a YouTube show by Kompas TV (2024) titled "Intan Jaya Part II | Humanitarian Efforts & Military Operations", this video provides an in-depth insight into the humanitarian efforts and military operations of the Indonesian National Army in the Intan Jaya area, which is known for its ongoing tensions and conflicts. This show highlights how the TNI plays a role not only in maintaining security but also in improving the community's quality of life through various humanitarian programs.

Water Supply Program: One of the important initiatives highlighted in the video, Manunggal Air, aims to improve access to clean drinking water. The program involves drilling wells and building reservoir systems to ensure a stable water supply in both the rainy and dry seasons. This program is particularly important because it addresses limited access to clean water, a situation that often relies on rainwater harvesting

methods. This initiative addresses basic needs and improves the quality of life of people living in remote, drought-prone areas.

TNI Agricultural Support also provides seeds and technical assistance to local farmers. The program aims to strengthen local food security and create economic stability by promoting sustainable agricultural practices. The TNI helps the community overcome challenges related to the high cost of living and limited natural resources in the area by supporting farmers.

Health Services: Health services are an important component of TNI activities in Intan Jaya. Health facilities established near military posts enable residents to quickly and efficiently access basic medical services. This includes emergency care, vaccinations, and general medical consultations. The program ensures that people in remote areas still receive the care they need, thereby reducing disparities in access to health services.

The TNI also provides educational support in the area, focusing on building national awareness among local youth. The program provides educational materials and small gifts, such as candy, to increase children's interest in learning. Through this activity, the TNI seeks to build positive relationships with local communities, promote the values of nationalism, and create an atmosphere that supports the development of education in conflict-affected areas.

Although humanitarian efforts are a priority, security maintenance remains important. This broadcast emphasizes that TNI troops undergo rigorous training before deployment to conflict zones, ensuring they are ready to face a range of challenges on the ground. The implemented security protocols also ensure that interactions between soldiers and residents are safe and help build trust. The TNI attempts to avoid the impression of being a threatening force and instead presents itself as a community-supporting partner (Kompas TV, 2024).

Reducing the Influence of the Insurgency

The third principle Galula (1964) was the reduction of rebel influence, which aimed to sever the relationship between the rebels and the population that supported them. In the context of OPM, this separatist group relies heavily on local communities for legitimacy, recruitment, and logistics. Therefore, a successful COIN strategy must create conditions in which society no longer considers rebels legitimate or relevant.

The strategy of *Satgas Koops Habema* in this case is to integrate military activities with social development programs to reduce people's dependence on OPM. Through programs such as hygiene education, agricultural training, and improved access to health services, the TNI strives to build positive relations with the Papuan people and strengthen the country's legitimacy. These efforts focus on creating the impression that the TNI is present not only to address military threats but also to support development and community welfare.

In addition, the Habema Koops Task Force also uses intelligence operations and technology to break the flow of logistical support to OPM. By monitoring separatist groups' movements using thermal drones (Special Interview, 2024), the TNI can identify and stop rebel attempts to gain support from outside the region, a key factor in weakening

the OPM's position. Countering this threat requires effective military capabilities to support counterinsurgency operations. As explained by Mella, Timur & Widodo (2023), the national defense strategy for dealing with asymmetric warfare in Papua must cover various aspects, ranging from information operations and intelligence capabilities to border guarding and tactical air mobility to support troop movements.

The strategy of the Habema Koops Task Force demonstrates the effective integration of hard and soft power in addressing OPM threats. The hard power approach is evident in military operations that involve modern technology and TNI troops stationed in strategic areas. Meanwhile, the soft power approach is reflected in social programs that improve the quality of life for the Papuan people, such as infrastructure development, health services, and agricultural training (Kompas TV, 2024).

The COIN approach applied by *Satgas Koops Habema* in Papua reflects the three-pillar COIN framework developed by Kilcullen (2006). In this theory, Kilcullen explains that the success of COIN relies not only on military operations but also on a multidimensional approach that includes security, political engagement, and economic development. This approach aims to eliminate people's dependence on insurgent groups and increase the state's legitimacy.

One of the main aspects of the COIN strategy, according to Kilcullen, is security. He argues that without a sense of security, people cannot provide support to the government or reject the existence of insurgents (D. J. Kilcullen, 2006). In Papua, *Satgas Koops Habema* applied this principle by deploying TNI troops around the community to protect the community from OPM threats. This step aims to create stability and reduce the fear generated by guerrilla and terrorist tactics employed by separatist groups. Security is the foundation for building public trust, which in turn can pave the way for further engagement in reconciliation and community development efforts.

In addition to security, political engagement is an important element of the COIN strategy. Kilcullen (2006) asserts that counterinsurgency is more than just a military operation; it is also a political effort aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people. In Papua, the Koops Habema Task Force not only conducts security operations but also implements social programs to improve community welfare. Programs such as Manunggal Air, which provide access to clean water, support for farmers through agricultural training and provision of seeds, as well as health services for communities in remote areas, show that the approach implemented by the TNI is in line with Kilcullen's theory regarding the importance of political engagement in COIN operations. This effort aims to address structural factors that often trigger instability and conflict in the area.

Furthermore, Kilcullen (2006) also emphasizes that economic development is the third pillar of an effective COIN strategy. He argues that without sustained economic improvement efforts, communities will remain vulnerable to insurgent influence. The Koops Habema Task Force implemented this principle through programs that improved the welfare of the Papuan people, including agricultural support to strengthen local food security. In addition, the provision of health and education services is part of a long-term development strategy, in which the TNI seeks to reduce social disparities and improve the quality of life of local communities.

Overall, the strategy implemented by *Satgas Koops Habema* in Papua reflects the real implementation of the three pillars of counterinsurgency theory proposed by Kilcullen. This approach integrates aspects of security, politics, and economic development in one coherent strategy to create long-term stability. Kilcullen (2006) emphasizes that COIN is not just about defeating insurgents militarily but also about building government legitimacy and improving relations between the state and society. Therefore, the strategy implemented by the TNI in Papua can be viewed as aligned with modern COIN theory, in which long-term success depends on a balance between military power and social development efforts.

Effectiveness Analysis

The effectiveness of *Satgas Koops Habema* COIN strategy is evaluated using Drucker's Effectiveness Theory (Drucker, 1967), which assesses strategic success through goal achievement, speed of implementation, and resource efficiency. This analytical framework aligns with the Literature Review's emphasis on integrating military and non-military approaches to address the OPM separatist threat, as informed by Galula & Nagl (2008) population-centric COIN principles and D. Kilcullen (2006) three-pillar model of security, political engagement, and economic development. The Habema Operation's goal of neutralizing OPM and fostering peace to enable welfare development, as mandated by Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020, has been partially achieved. In regions such as Intan Jaya and Gome District, reduced violence and increased community participation in health and education programs indicate progress in building trust and weakening OPM's influence, consistent with Galula's focus on securing the population (Kompas TV, 2024).

However, as noted in the Literature Review, OPM's guerrilla tactics, leveraging its intimate knowledge of Papua's rugged terrain, and international propaganda, supported by diaspora funding, continue to challenge full neutralization, echoing the persistent separatist dynamics discussed by Anderson, (2015b) and Wangge, (2023). The deployment of TNI troops near communities and the use of advanced surveillance technologies, such as drones and hot air balloons, have disrupted OPM's logistical networks, aligning with D. J. Kilcullen, (2006) emphasis on security as a foundational pillar (Special Interview Results, 2024).

Nevertheless, the vast and rugged Papuan landscape, coupled with coordination gaps among government agencies, slows comprehensive impact, a challenge consistent with the Literature Review's discussion of inter-agency coordination issues in Papua N. ST. Mambraku (2015). Resource efficiency is optimized through the integration of military operations with cost-effective socio-economic programs, such as the *Manunggal* Air initiative for clean water and mobile health clinics that leverage military posts, which reduce infrastructure costs while addressing community needs (Kompas TV, 2024). These initiatives align with Kilcullen's economic development pillar and the Literature Review's focus on addressing root causes such as economic marginalization (Widjojo et al., 2010). This analysis underscores the *Satgas Koops Habema's* alignment with COIN principles while highlighting areas for improvement to achieve seamless integration and greater effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMMITATIONS

Based on the analysis, the strategy implemented by *Satgas Koops Habema* has demonstrated moderate effectiveness in confronting OPM. This integrated approach, which combines security operations, technological surveillance, and socio-economic development, aligns with recognized counterinsurgency frameworks, including David Galula's population-centric theory and David Kilcullen's three-pillar model.

Operational effectiveness is evident in areas such as Intan Jaya and Gome District, where OPM attacks have significantly decreased, and community participation in state programs has increased. The integration of technology, such as drones and hot air balloons, has also enhanced surveillance and reduced the OPM's ability to move undetected. However, the OPM's intimate knowledge of the terrain remains a challenge that needs to be addressed.

Furthermore, socio-economic initiatives such as the "Manunggal Air" program and mobile health services have improved perceptions of state legitimacy within the community and helped address the root causes of the insurgency. Nevertheless, the goal of fully neutralizing the OPM has not yet been achieved, primarily due to persistent propaganda, support from diaspora networks, and operational limitations in remote areas. Overall, this strategy demonstrates partial success by combining military force with political and economic measures, serving as a hybrid model for local COIN operations.

Overall, the strategy has achieved partial success. While it has improved local security and public trust in certain areas, structural and environmental challenges, particularly OPM's guerrilla tactics, difficult terrain, and international support, continue to limit its overall effectiveness.

To enhance the effectiveness of *Satgas Koops Habema* and better align its strategy with counter-insurgency principles, several targeted recommendations are proposed to address identified shortcomings and strengthen future operations in Papua's complex socio-political context. First, to bolster political engagement, as emphasized by Galula (1964), the operation should establish structured dialogue platforms, such as community-led mediation councils that involve local Papuan leaders, to address grievances related to integration and autonomy. Second, to counter OPM's diaspora-funded propaganda, a robust information strategy is essential, encompassing digital campaigns to refute separatist narratives and diplomatic initiatives to engage international actors, addressing concerns raised in the literature. Third, expanding socio-economic initiatives, such as deploying mobile agricultural units and telehealth services to remote areas, would advance Kilcullen's (2006) economic development pillar, reducing OPM's appeal in underserved regions. Fourth, addressing inter-agency coordination gaps requires establishing joint task forces with clearly defined command protocols to ensure seamless collaboration. Finally, developing community-based informant networks to complement technological surveillance, such as drones and hot air balloons, would enhance efforts to isolate OPM from local support, aligning with Galula's principle of severing insurgent-population ties. These recommendations, grounded in COIN frameworks and empirical findings, aim to refine the *Satgas Koops Habema* approach and provide a model for effective COIN strategies in Papua.

This study is limited by restricted access to classified military data, which may constrain insights into operational details. The focus on a single case (Habema Operation Command) limits generalizability. Future research could incorporate comparative case studies or quantitative assessments to measure long-term impacts.

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