



Comparative Analysis of Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL) and Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) Military Training as Precursors to the Indonesian National Armed Forces

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Abstract

The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) were formed from three groups with different training backgrounds: those trained by the Dutch, Japanese, and civilian militias. Only the first two groups underwent professional military training. The Dutch military trained the first group as part of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL), and the second group received military training from the Japanese while being part of the Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Homeland (Pembela Tanah Air or PETA). This article conducts a comparative analysis of the military training received by soldiers from KNIL and PETA. It examines the aspects that differentiate the training of these two armed forces, which served as the foundation for the Indonesian military. This research approach uses historical methods and sociological analysis. The study utilizes primary and secondary sources, with primary sources as the main references. These primary sources were obtained by examining contemporary newspaper records and autobiographical notes from individuals who underwent training in KNIL and PETA. Notable newspaper sources include Asia Raya, Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, De Sumatra Post, Kan Po, and Soerabaiasch Handelsblad. The findings revealed significant differences between the KNIL and PETA training programs, which can be classified into technical training and training culture. Technical training differences included divisions, recruitment, classification, duration, and content. Training culture differed as KNIL adopted Western military professionalism, emphasizing separation from civilian life. In contrast, PETA adopted the Japanese bushido doctrine and the Remarkable Trinity concept, emphasizing harmony between the military, government, and people. This study concludes that the training and frameworks established by both groups played a crucial role as precursors to the TNI.

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INTRODUCTION

The military is one of the most critical components of a sovereign state. A military group is a unit composed of organized individuals trained through disciplined tasks for combat. The characteristics of the military include having a structured organization, wearing uniforms, maintaining discipline, and adhering to the laws of warfare. Without fulfilling these characteristics, the group cannot be called the military; instead, it would be termed an armed mob (Simanjuntak, 2022). The Indonesian Military Unit is formed based on the foundation of three groups with different military training backgrounds. The first group received Dutch military training, the second group received Japanese military training, and the third group had no professional military training (Atno & Pratama, 2018).

The first group, those who underwent Dutch military training, is part of a professional military unit directly integrated into the Colonial Army's armed forces, established in 1830 under the name Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL). After the independence proclamation and during the war of independence, KNIL forces were divided, with some joining the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and others remaining loyal to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Yusuf, 2023). The next group is those who received military training from Japan. The native army force formed by the Japanese was divided into two: first, the Heiho, an integrated auxiliary force directly becoming part of the Japanese military; and second, units in Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) and Giyugun conceptualized as voluntary territorial defense forces (Amelia, 2020). Although Heiho, in concept, was directly integrated into the Japanese military, they mainly functioned as workers or assistants to the Japanese Army, gradually viewed as uniformed workers. The estimated number of Heiho troops at the end of the Japanese occupation was approximately 42,000 (Siregar & Najmi, 2020).

The second Japanese training model is the concept of voluntary territorial defense forces seen in the units of PETA and Giyugun. Although these voluntary army units appear similar, differing only in their territorial locations—PETA in Java, Madura, and Bali, while Giyugun in Sumatra—there are slight differences between them. The Sumatra unit was not trained by officers who graduated from Nakano Gakkō, a Japanese intelligence training school providing non-conventional military skills like guerrilla warfare techniques. Furthermore, the officer ranks in the Sumatra unit were lower because this force was still combined with the Japanese 25th Army units, unlike the PETA unit, which was organized into battalions directly under the command of native leaders.

The third group comprises individuals from youth organizations or militias scattered throughout the Indonesian territory. This group never received military training or rifle training; they only used bamboo spears (Zulfadilah, 2022). Through semi-military training, this group was not designed as a primary combat unit and was only utilized as a supporting group in warfare. The three groups above, those born and associated with KNIL and PETA units, hold the most central position among others. These two units played the most significant roles in the national military. They initiated the formation of the Indonesian armed forces, from the establishment of the People's Security Agency (BKR) to becoming the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) (Kodir et al., 2022).

The focus of this study on PETA and KNIL, while excluding the third group of civilian militias, is further reinforced by the impact of the Reconstruction and Rationalization (RERA) policy under the Hatta cabinet in 1948. This policy significantly reduced the presence of civilian militias in the military, as it aimed to create a more professional and organized armed force. Consequently, civilian militias, despite their contributions during

the early stages of the struggle, played a less central role in the long-term development of the Indonesian military (Widaningsih, 2018). PETA and KNIL, with their formal military training and institutional influence, were far more crucial in shaping the future of the Indonesian armed forces, making them the primary focus of this study.

The two groups competed as rivals in influencing and vying for leadership early in the national Army's formation (Mietzner, 2023). Regarding their positions in the national military, both groups, despite existing competition, have been crucial and complementary in organizing the newly formed armed forces. Ben Anderson stated that former PETA officers, especially section and company commanders, played a significant role in battlefield strategies during the war with small-scale guerrilla operations. Meanwhile, former KNIL officers played an important role in organizing the central military organization (Mubarok et al., 2022). These facts are intriguing and lead us to delve further into the background of the army training received by both forces.

Research on the KNIL and PETA military units has been explored by various authors, but most studies focus primarily on their existence and roles. Discussions specifically addressing aspects of military training remain limited. For example, Buiskool (1941) examines KNIL training up to 1934, while Bouman (2002) highlights training at the Koninklijke Militaire Academie Bandung during the 1940-1941 period. On the other hand, regarding PETA training, works by Lebra (1998) and Notosusanto (1979) have addressed aspects of PETA's training. However, there is a notable gap in studies that specifically compare the military training between KNIL and PETA. This research aims to fill that gap by providing an in-depth comparison of the military training of these two units, contributing new insights to the historiography of Indonesian military history.

METHODS

To comprehensively explore and understand the comparison of KNIL and PETA training practices, this research employs historical methods to present technical facts about the training and sociological analysis to examine the cultural background of military training. The historical method involves critically analyzing historical documents (Wasino & Hartatik, 2018). A reliable narrative of facts is developed through topics such as topic selection, heuristics, source verification, interpretation, and historiography (Kuntowijoyo, 2013). Sociological analysis is applied to examine the cultural background that influences the training practices of KNIL and PETA. This analysis highlights the influence of cultural values, ideologies, and social contexts on both the conduct and perception of soldier training. The sociological approach also explores the relationship between the military and civilians (Huntington, 2013). This approach enables a deep understanding of the technical aspects of training and the role of cultural and ideological contexts in shaping the military culture.

Research sources are categorized into primary and secondary types. Primary sources include contemporary newspapers reporting on government and military affairs. Notable examples are the *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, *De Sumatra Post*, and *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*, all accessed through Delpher, a digital archive of Dutch historical newspapers. Additionally, newspapers such as *Asia Raya* and *Kan Po* from the National Library of Indonesia are used. These sources cover the period from 1940 to 1945, which is crucial for this study. Primary sources include autobiographical records from individuals involved in KNIL and PETA training, with many sourced from the Mandala Bhakti Museum Library. As derivative sources, secondary sources are obtained from previous research, including books, e-books, and academic journals. Many books from the

Army History Service discuss the biographies of former Indonesian National Army personnel who underwent training in KNIL and PETA.

This study focuses on the period from 1940 to 1945 to ensure relevance and accuracy. The chosen timeframe is close and contemporaneous due to the extended existence of KNIL training. This period reflects the distinct training phases of KNIL and PETA. KNIL training is examined from 1940 to 1942, starting with the establishment of the Koninklijke Militaire Academie in Bandung, which produced graduates who played a key role in the national military. Conversely, PETA training is analyzed from 1943 to 1945, corresponding to the active years of the PETA training program.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Exploring KNIL Military Training Practices

From 1830 onwards, in line with the formation of the independent colonial military force of the Dutch East Indies known as the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL), a military school was established in the Weltevreden area (Central Jakarta), serving as a training ground for prospective officers. This Weltevreden military school operated successfully for a considerable period until 1882. Initially, from the early period until 1835, the facility was used as a training and selection center for officer candidates from all military divisions. However, in the subsequent years, it became exclusively dedicated to artillery training (Wijnmalen, 1883).

Graduates from the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands, Koninklijke Militaire Academie (KMA) in Breda, Netherlands, were brought in to meet the officer needs, especially within the infantry units. However, the number of officers in the Dutch East Indies still required to be increased (Verwijnen, 1897). Consequently, a decision was made to establish a military school to train personnel in the Dutch East Indies. In September 1852, the military school was built in Meester Cornelis (Jatinegara), Jakarta, named Inlandsche Officiëren School (IOS). Initially, the admission system at IOS Meester Cornelis was exclusively for European individuals, but opportunities for native individuals began in 1907. Until its dissolution in 1914, training at Meester Cornelis produced 13 native officers. Among the graduates of IOS Meester Cornelis were Oerip Soemohardjo, Holland Soemodilogo, A. H. Kawilarang, Wardiman Wirjosapoetro, and Benjamin Thomas Walangitang (Bouman, 1995).

In 1913, the Dutch colonial government decided to concentrate military education in the Netherlands. Education conducted in the Netherlands would provide officer candidates with an understanding of conditions in the Netherlands and Europe, along with more comprehensive training and equipment. Finally, in 1916, the possibility for native officer candidates to be educated in the Netherlands opened, albeit in minimal numbers. With this opportunity, between 1919 and 1939, 27 native cadets successfully underwent education at the KMA in Breda (Fakih, 2020). Among the native officers who graduated from KMA Breda were Sultan Sjarief Hamid Alkadrie, Djatikoesoemo, Didi Kartasmita, Poerbodipoero Soemitro, and Soerjadi Soeriadarma (Bouman, 1995). From their educational background, it can be observed that KNIL officers had two distinct educational backgrounds: those who graduated from the Inlandsche Officiëren School (IOS) in Meester Cornelis and the more elite group from Koninklijk Militaire Academie (KMA) in Breda.

Leading up to World War II, the Reserve Officer Training Service was established in Bandung in 1938 and was named The Corps Opleiding Reserve Officiëren or CORO. The CORO program was designed to recruit and train reserve officers and select the best cadets for further training at the Military Academy. Those who successfully graduated

from CORO would receive advanced training at KMA. At the same time, those whose grades did not meet the required level would be directly assigned to the corps as *vaandrighs* to lead a unit as section heads or platoon leaders (Rocher, 1996).

The KNIL officer training system, which was previously conducted and centralized in the Netherlands, changed the official German occupation of the Netherlands on May 15, 1940. This occupation led to the closure of the military school in Breda. Considering the circumstances, several Dutch military leaders established a military academy in Bandung, Indonesia. The KMA Bandung training officially commenced on October 1, 1940, and was inaugurated by Lieutenant General G.J. Berenschot, the Supreme Commander of KNIL (Ruis, 2016). The Royal Military Academy Bandung graduated 228 officer cadets divided into three batches. Training for the first batch commenced on October 1, 1940. For the inaugural batch, all cadets were selected from graduates of the 1938/1939 CORO class, totaling 30 individuals. The first batch of cadets undergoing training consisted exclusively of European individuals, as initially, only Dutch individuals were allowed to enter CORO (De Sumatra Post, 1940). For native individuals, the opportunity to enter KMA Bandung arose with the second batch. Recruitment for second-year cadets at KMA Bandung began in May 1941. Applicants were selected from those who had undergone CORO training. Successful native cadets entering the second-year training included A.H. Nasution, Aminin, Rachmat Kartakusuma, Mantiri, Liem King Ien, Lim Kay Hoen, A.E. Kawilarang for infantry; Askari for artillery; T.B. Simatupang for engineers; and Samsudarso and Tan for administration (Ramadhan, 1988).

The new training curriculum at KMA Bandung made every effort to emulate the customs of Breda. Five instructors from KMA Breda were present during the training to maintain the traditions and terminology of Breda. Their presence aimed to transfer the characteristics of traditions at KMA Breda and the corps' customs there. Although most of the training material aligned with Breda's practices, adaptations were made concerning modern warfare techniques in tropical regions (Herlina, 2024). The adjustments ensure a comprehensive and effective training program at KMA Bandung that is well-positioned to meet the challenges of the military landscape. At KMA Bandung, cadets were distinguished by the logo on their shoulders, which indicated their rank within each batch: first-year cadets wore bronze-colored epaulets, second-year cadets had silver, and third-year cadets had gold. They were initially divided alphabetically into classes of fifteen individuals, primarily in the infantry section, as other sections had fewer participants, such as the ten students in the engineering class (De Sumatra Post, 1941). In keeping with the Breda tradition, cadets at KMA Bandung were addressed as *Jonker*, a term that carries an honorable meaning related to nobility. This nomenclature originated from Dutch military culture, where KMA Breda trainees were often selected from noble families (Utama, 2023).

Training activities commenced daily at 5:45 a.m. with morning exercises, led alternately by one of the cadets. This was followed by a health check at 6 a.m. conducted by dr. M.M. Hilfman, the military health science instructor. The theoretical training sessions were conducted after physical fitness or other physical training activities (Bouman, 2002). At 09:00 a.m., after the cadets received their breakfast rations, training continued with theoretical lessons (Nasution, 1982). Each division—infantry, artillery, engineers, and administration—had separate classes, and the material provided was tailored to each section. The training followed guidelines or *voorschrift* outlined comprehensively for each field. These *voorschrift* were divided into sections covering general drill guidelines, marksmanship, weapon maintenance, and specific training guidelines for each field. Among these *voorschrift*, one of the most crucial, studied across

all KNIL units, was the *Voorschrift omtrent de Politik-Politienele Taak van het Leger* (Guidelines on the Political Policing Task of the Army), abbreviated as VTPL (Joshua, 2023).

The initial training covered military fundamentals, law, disciplinary regulations, and the military's position in state affairs. Later, subjects such as ethnography, health sciences, leadership, and sports science were introduced. Some of these subjects differed from those at Breda, such as the Arabic knowledge required for cadets studying at KMA Breda. In Bandung, Arabic language learning was omitted due to time constraints, focusing instead on technical aspects of warfare (Simatupang, 1991). Following the morning to midday theoretical training, practical outdoor lessons commenced. Cadets were sent to the KMA Bandung training center field to hone their skills and combat readiness. Drill exercises were integral to the training, reinforcing military discipline, movement coordination, and unit cohesion. Tactical exercises included formation arrangements, team maneuvers, and open-field tactical planning. After outdoor practical training, activities continued with sports and swimming (Ruis, 2016).

Starting from the second-year batch, the training was shortened by one year due to the pressing need for officers (Bataviaasch Nieuwsblaad, 1941). With this change, the training became more intensive, presenting more frequent and extensive subject matter often completed until late at night. Due to this intensified program for the second batch, they were exempted from night duty, and instead, training resumed after 10:00 p.m. (Ruis, 2016). This adjustment reflected the evolving needs of officer recruitment and signified a shift towards a more rigorous and demanding training approach. Advanced learning was conducted to enhance the skills of cadets in each division. For example, in the engineering section, subjects based on mathematics and construction science included road construction and water building. Artillery cadets received advanced training in Anti-Aircraft artillery using 4 cm and 8 cm caliber weapons. In the military administration field, cadets had additional subjects on logistics and medical assistance (Bouman, 2002).

KMA Bandung initiated training for the third batch in October 1941, approximately six months after the second batch. In contrast to the previous batches, the third batch was comprised of cadets who directly underwent training at the Military Academy without prior CORO training. These cadets were selected from those in the Dutch militia services. It should be noted that since 1941, a mandatory military service policy was introduced for indigenous individuals used as auxiliary forces for KNIL. Among the third batch of cadets were Ahmad Yani, Soeprapto, Mokoginta, Suryo, Suriosumarno, Abdulkadir, Satari, and Susatio (Nasution, 1982). Ahmad Yani was one of those who underwent training at KMA Bandung in the third batch, following mandatory military service. Before joining KMA Bandung, Ahmad Yani entered militia service in Malang's Topography section. He trained and served as a militiaman for approximately six months. After completing militia service in Malang, he was selected for advanced training and sent to join the training at the Military Academy Bandung (Fakih, 2020).

The training for the third batch lasted only about four months, with less intensive training. This was due to the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, followed by the advancing Japanese forces approaching the southern region and nearing Indonesia. The continuation of the Military Academy in Bandung became less conducive due to Bandung being a primary target of Japanese attacks. In light of this situation, it was decided in January 1942 to relocate the Military Academy to Garut, situated in the Papandajan Hotel area. The operation in Garut was brief, and by the end of January 1942, it was unfortunately declared closed. The closure was necessitated by challenging

circumstances, considering the rapid advancement of Japanese attacks (Rocher & Santosa, 2016).

The PETA Military Training Approach

Military training for Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Homeland (PETA) initially commenced at a site known as Seinen Dojo. Initially, this training was intended to train indigenous youth to become intelligence personnel in anticipation of a possible war against Australia. However, after the idea of forming the PETA military emerged, those undergoing this training were then designated as PETA officer candidates. Training at Seinen Dojo commenced in January 1943 in Tangerang, Indonesia. The training was led by Beppan officers (Special Division of the 16th Army), namely Lieutenant Marusaki and Lieutenant Yanagawa (Jenkins, 2021). The first batch in training consisted of 50 students. Candidates for Seinen Dojo underwent rigorous selection, considering social backgrounds such as officials' children, *priyayi* (Javanese nobility), nobility, and the children of religious leaders. Entrance exams included health assessments, physical tests, and questions about Dutch colonialism to measure patriotism (Lebra, 1998).

Training at Seinen Dojo lasted for six months. In the first three months, they focused on introduction and standard exercises, emphasizing physical conditioning. The training became more intensive in the next three months, covering various learning programs consisting of theoretical materials and field exercises (Moehkardi, 2019). The knowledge imparted included instilling spirit and ideology and lessons on Indonesian, world, and war history. Students were also equipped with various war tactics and communication techniques. Practical training encompassed drills, gymnastics, sumo wrestling, swimming, fencing, espionage, counterintelligence tricks, propaganda, and more. Additionally, students were taught various skills such as marksmanship, reconnaissance, communication, camouflage, and others (Idris & Anwar, 1996). Among the youth who underwent this training were individuals like Zulkifli Lubis, Kemal Idris, Daan Mogot, and Suprajana Jonosewojo, who later became high-ranking officers in the Indonesian Republic army. The graduates of Seinen Dojo later became instructors at the PETA officer training center in Bogor.

The training center for PETA officer candidates in Java was then established in Bogor, Indonesia, under the name Jawa Boei Giyugun Kanbu Renseitai (Corps for Training Volunteer Leaders in Defense of the Homeland in Java). This training was implemented following the official establishment of the PETA Army through the *Osamu Seirei* No. 44/2603.13 decree (*Osamu Seirei* No. 44/2603, 1943). The recruitment process was under the control of Beppan through Captain Maruzaki. Three Beppan officers, Lieutenant Yanagawa, Tsuchiya, and Yonemura, were sent to the West Java, Central Java, and East Java regions, respectively. They utilized local officials, ranging from *shuchokan* (residency) to *kencho* (city) and *shicho* (regency), to assist in the implementation. Selection criteria for PETA officer candidates considered specific conditions. Platoon commanders (*shodancho*) generally came from youth who had recently left school without work experience. Meanwhile, company commanders (*chudancho*) were selected from those with work experience, such as teachers, local government officials, and individuals with societal positions. On the other hand, battalion commanders (*daidancho*) usually came from older individuals who influenced the area where the battalion would be established, such as local religious or political leaders (Jenkins, 2021).

The initial test for PETA officer candidates involved a physical endurance test, starting with lifting a sack filled with sand multiple times. Subsequently, the candidates were tested by walking a marathon distance to assess their overall physical health.

During the test, they were required to fill out a resume and undergo a series of health examinations. According to Lieutenant Tsuchiya's report, approximately 300 individuals had to be selected daily through a week-long selection process (Purnamasari, 2014). Those who successfully passed went on to undergo training at Bogor. The total number of recruits undergoing this training was 856 individuals. These recruits were then divided into five groups, with the first group designated as a unique company for 30 individuals to be trained as battalion commanders (*daidancho*), the second company for 127 company commanders (*chudancho*), and the remaining three companies for platoon commanders (*shodancho*) (Jenkins, 2021).

Training for each rank, namely *daidancho*, *chudancho*, and *shodancho*, had differences. The duration of training for those undergoing *daidancho* training was only two months, ending in November 1943. Meanwhile, those at the *chudancho* and *shodancho* levels received three months of training, ending in December 1943 (Kodir et al., 2022). The shorter training for *daidancho* was due to its role, which did not involve direct combat but acted as a liaison to ensure PETA units received full support from the local community. Although their position was the highest, the Japanese authorities decided that the military policies should be implemented at this level. The position of *daidancho* was more symbolic of ensuring subordinates followed orders from superiors. Therefore, individuals chosen as *daidancho* were respected figures in the community.

The training principles for PETA soldiers were aligned with the training principles of Japanese soldiers outlined in the *Go Cuihya Doctrine* (Seven Military Paths). PETA officers were required to emphasize discipline, respect, courtesy, frugality, and simplicity. One of the disciplined and frugal attitudes of the Japanese Army was reflected in the doctrine of *Ipat Izats* (one bullet, one life). Training materials were also directly adapted from Japanese soldier manuals such as *Rikugun Hohet Séten* (Infantry Guide), which had been translated into Indonesian (Goto, 1976). The training starts at 06:00 a.m., signaled by the sound of the Japanese trumpet. Cadets are given 10 minutes to prepare and quickly run to the training field for attendance. This is followed by a flag-raising ceremony conducted with remarkable seriousness. As the Japanese flag gradually ascends the flagpole, the cadets bow towards the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. The next activity involves morning gymnastics, known as *Taiso*. The execution of morning exercises is done in various groups; instead, other groups engage in self-training activities such as marksmanship. The activities continue with a four-kilometer run through the streets of Bogor, where youth squads make rounds around the palace and botanical garden. A penalty of an additional 200 meters is imposed on the ten slowest members of each group (Asia Raya, 1943a).

After breakfast, from 9:00 a.m. to noon, company members were divided into four sections for classroom lessons. The subjects taught included the Japanese language, marching regulations, and military science. Practical instructions usually followed morning lessons in one or more field exercises related to the infantry textbook of the Japanese Army, *Hohei Soten Kaisei Riyu Setsumet Sanko*. Additionally, they studied the history of the United States and England, which had colonized Greater East Asia, to instill hatred towards the enemies. Lessons also covered daily etiquette, anti-spy lessons, and especially those related to Bushido. Bushido, often translated as the way of the warrior, literally means *finding death* in the context of a warrior's bravery and dedication. This definition comes from the phrase *bushido to lu ha, shinu koto wo mitsuketari*, which refers to the idea that a warrior should be prepared to die in pursuit of victory or to protect honor. However, a deeper meaning of Bushido is the commitment to live life with wholehearted dedication and effort. This philosophy emphasizes that a meaningful life is

achieved through hard work, discipline, and relentless effort, reflecting humanity's noble aspiration for success and honor. In this context, Bushido is not just about death but about how one should live with integrity and resolve (Baskara, 2009).

In the training of PETA, Bushido principles were integrated with traditional Javanese values, particularly through Wayang. Bushido, the samurai code of conduct, emphasizes values such as honesty, courage, kindness, courtesy, love of truth, sincerity, honor, and loyalty. These values were illustrated using Wayang, a traditional Javanese puppet theater that imparts moral and ethical lessons. Wayang stories often feature heroic figures and epic battles, aligning culturally with the virtues upheld by Bushido. In PETA training, spiritual guidance included Wayang narratives that complemented the Bushido ethos, helping soldiers internalize these values within their cultural context. For many Indonesians, especially from Java, Wayang serves as a primary source of chivalric values and traditions, and integrating these stories with Bushido principles provided a meaningful framework for instilling discipline and honor among the soldiers (Notosusanto, 1979).

Evening training occurred after the cadets had a thirty-minute nap at 1:00 p.m. However, this break was never utilized for rest; instead, it was dedicated to preparing for the evening training. At 2:00 p.m., a physical examination was conducted to assess health, and anyone feeling unwell had to report. At 3:00 p.m., the training commenced, with the cadets assembling on the field. During the evening, specialized field training was conducted, emphasizing small unit tactics, particularly those focused on offensive actions against the enemy (Asia Raya, 1943b). In these sessions, the cadets learn how to attack and assault defensive positions. They study the use of rifles and techniques for facing the enemy bare-handed by mastering Japanese army bayonet techniques. Evening training concludes at 7:00 p.m., marked by the cadets returning to their barracks. Afterward, at 8:00 p.m., a nutritious dinner is served, including rice with meat, tomatoes, and legumes. After dinner, cadets have time for self-study or prayer, followed by night training (Asia Raya, 1943a). Field training with the well-known gore choice procedure is provided for leadership training. Selected cadets practice giving commands using signals like company sergeant majors; if the orders cannot be heard clearly, they face penalties (Jenkins, 2021). The course of the war significantly influenced the nature of PETA training. Training at Bogor Renseitai initially emphasized infantry unit training, night combat training, and static defense. Lessons on guerrilla warfare were not initially provided because, at that time, they still believed they could engage in open warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a military technique that emphasizes tactics of surprise attacks and ambushes (Tari, 2023).

After completing Renseitai training, Bogor's PETA officer training center changed its name to Boei Giyugun Kanbu Kyoikutai. This renaming took place on January 18, 1944. The PETA troop training school Kyoikutai conducted its first training program from April to August 1944 (Asia Raya, 1944). The total number of first-year cadets undergoing training in Kyoikutai was 881 people. The cadets were divided into seven companies, consisting of five companies for *shodancho*, each with 170 members, except for the first company, which had only 100 members. One company for *chudancho* consisted of 81 members, and one for *daidancho* had 20 members. The training program included four months for *shodancho* (section commanders) and *shodancho yugeki* for eight months. Training for *chudancho* (company commanders) lasted three months, and the training for *daidancho* (battalion commanders) was relatively short, only two months. A new aspect of this training was the special Yugekitai training. Forty Japanese individuals and approximately 160 Indonesian platoon commanders participated in this training. The training for Yugekitai members started in August 1944 and continued until December

1944. Combined with the previous 4-month Kyoikutai training, members of Yugekitai underwent training for approximately seven months in total (Moehkardi, 2019).

Yugekitai training was a specialized military program introduced to enhance the combat skills of PETA troops. This training focused on guerrilla tactics, intelligence operations, and using infantry support weapons such as mortars and light machine guns. Yugekitai members received more advanced military knowledge than regular PETA officers, including proficiency in the Japanese language, territorial operations, and deepened combat strategies. Compared to other PETA officers, Yugekitai cadres have more extensive military knowledge. Although a deeper understanding of military knowledge and techniques is emphasized, significant emphasis is still given to the context of the spirit and doctrine of willingness to sacrifice one's life, as expressed through calls like *shinu made or saigo made* (until death or until the last moment) (Suwondo, 1996). The Yugekitai group later became a particular unit with operational areas divided into three: *seibuhancho* (western Java), based in Lembang; *chubuhancho* (central Java), based in Salatiga, and *tobuhancho* (eastern Java), based in Malang. These forces wore blue uniforms with ungroomed hair, often also wearing informal uniforms. The group was led by Captain Yanagawa, previously the former commander of Seinen Dojo in Tangerang and the former commander of Kyoikutai (Lubis, 2022).

In addition to general field training covering infantry training, there was also education for officers in specific fields, including *eisei* (health), *keiri* (finance), and *keiki* (equipment). Training for *eisei* officers was primarily centralized in Jakarta, located in the complex now known as Gatot Subroto Hospital. All students in the health field were doctors. These students already had expertise in the health field, so the education mainly focused on non-medical aspects such as organization, administration, and basic military training. *Keiri* officers' training was held in various places as courses. Basic military training was conducted in the nearest Japanese battalion. Because these officers would be directly involved in handling financial matters, Japanese officers provided training to alleviate their burden in preparing monthly financial reports. Education for *keiki* officers was also conducted in the form of courses. Other courses, such as simple motorized cavalry training, were also held in Bandung (Notosusanto, 1979).

A Comparative Exploration of Training Models

Before delving into the discussion, it is essential to emphasize that the broadest scope of the comparative analysis of this training is for the officer training category. Officer ranks are crucial within a military institution, representing individuals with authority or jurisdiction over strategic warfare policies. Effective leadership from officers fosters trust among the enlisted personnel. Competent officers with strong military-strategic abilities play a vital role in the success of military operations (Lubis, 2022). In the context of training, it is known that every modern military unit typically has a military academy or an equivalent training service dedicated as the central hub for professional military officer education. In the KNIL unit, military training was conducted in various locations, but this analysis focuses on the most recent training service held at KMA Bandung. Meanwhile, training in the PETA unit was conducted in Bogor.

The backgrounds of both military training institutions, KMA Bandung and Renseitai Bogor, show notable similarities as they were established under urgent circumstances. Neither was founded with thorough planning or consideration for long-term sustainability. In its development, KMA Bandung, where KNIL training was conducted, and Renseitai Bogor, where PETA training took place, each had relatively short

existences, concluding in less than three years. Table 1 shows a general comparison of the training.

Table 1. Comparison of Military Training Aspects for KNIL and PETA

Aspect	KNIL at KMA Bandung	PETA at Renseitai Bogor
Educational Requirements	HBS or AMS (High School)	Junior High School (but in practice also accepted graduates from lower educational levels)
Training Categories	Infantry, artillery, engineering (<i>geni</i>), and administration	Infantry and Administration (administration training conducted at Salemba, Jakarta)
Training Classification	All cadets start at the same level and graduate as second lieutenants	Classification into <i>shodancho</i> , <i>chudancho</i> , and <i>daidancho</i> with rank differences established from the beginning
Training Duration	- 18 months for those not from CORO - 9 months for those who have completed CORO - The third batch lasted about 5 months due to the closure of KMA	- 2 months for <i>daidancho</i> - 3 months for <i>chudancho</i> - 4 months for <i>shodancho</i> - Special group Yugekitai approximately seven months

Regarding the technical aspects of training, the first aspect to analyze is the difference in training categories. KNIL training at KMA Bandung encompassed several training categories: infantry, artillery, engineering, and administration. In contrast, PETA training in Bogor focused solely on infantry training (Hestiliani, 2020). Training in fields such as artillery and engineering was not part of PETA training, while administration training was conducted separately in Salemba, Jakarta. The difference in training scope reveals that KNIL's program aimed for a more versatile officer corps capable of handling multiple military functions. In comparison, PETA's training was specialized to fit specific operational needs and align with Japanese strategic priorities. This distinction highlights the varied approaches to military training based on organizational goals and strategic contexts. This indicates that the scope of officer training for KNIL is more comprehensive than PETA officer training.

PETA training is focused on infantry, aligning with the Japanese military doctrine that heavily emphasizes infantry factors in battle. It is essential to note that during World War II, Japan had the most significant infantry force in the world. For perspective, the Japanese infantry's approximate proportion was 40-50% of the total personnel, significantly contrasting to the United States forces, where infantry comprised only about 20-25%. Japanese military thinking considered that a well-led and motivated infantry unit could overcome enemy forces with material superiority. This is consistent with Japan's military strategy following the Total War model (Drea, 1998).

This focus on infantry was a strategic choice reflecting Japan's operational needs and resource constraints. Japan's limited resources made it challenging to invest in advanced technology and heavy equipment, making infantry—more cost-effective and easier to supply—a key component of their military strategy. Additionally, Japan's strategy emphasized close-quarters combat and territorial control, with infantry units being crucial for executing these tactics, especially in protracted battles. Japanese forces also frequently operated in challenging terrains like forests and mountains, where infantry adapted more effectively than armored units. Consequently, PETA's training

policy was designed to align with this doctrine, focusing primarily on infantry training to meet Japan's strategic priorities and operational context.

The following highlighted technical training differences are related to recruitment and training classification issues. Recruitment requirements for KNIL and PETA training services differ, particularly in education. The minimum educational qualification for recruiting prospective KNIL officers at KMA Bandung is an HBS (Hogere Burgerschool) or AMS (Algemene Middelbare School) diploma, which represents a senior high school education. In contrast, the education requirement for PETA officer candidates is a Junior High School diploma. However, the educational requirements for PETA officer candidates are not strictly enforced in practice, as examiners usually consider the skills and abilities of individuals, even if they still need to meet the minimum educational requirements (Asia Raya, 1943b). His educational requirement difference indicates that the minimum educational standards for KNIL officer candidates are higher and more strictly enforced.

This difference in educational standards compared to KNIL reflects Japan's focus on rapidly assembling a local militia force to meet immediate wartime needs. Rather than prioritizing formal academic qualifications, the Japanese military valued loyalty, obedience, and the ability to follow orders. The relaxed educational requirements for PETA officers also aligned with Japan's resource constraints and urgency during World War II, where the need for a readily deployable infantry force outweighed the need for advanced technical or academic training. This approach highlights Japan's pragmatic focus on operational readiness over academic qualifications in its colonial forces.

Apart from recruitment issues, differences in training technicalities are also evident in training classification. Initial education for KNIL officer candidates at KMA Bandung has an equal level of classification equivalence. Officer cadets entering KMA Bandung must undergo training at the same level, and upon graduation, they start their service as the lowest-ranking officers, Second Lieutenants. The equivalence system in KNIL training differs from the system applied in recruiting PETA officer candidates. Training for PETA officer candidates uses a classification system established from the beginning of recruitment. Before entering training, PETA officer candidates are already divided into three different levels of training: training for *shodancho*, *chudancho*, and *daidancho*. This different training approach results in officers having predetermined rank differences.

Having discussed the recruitment and training classification regulations, the following discussion will address issues related to the comparison of training materials and the duration of training. PETA military training materials are adjusted to the unit's role, which is no more than a battalion; thus, no PETA officer receives training in command and staff functions to coordinate elements or units more significantly than a battalion. Compared to KNIL, PETA training is more specifically designed to combat guerrilla warfare using small units and light infantry tactics; therefore, real professional military education is not received at the operational level for maneuvering on a large and complex scale (Lee, 2013). Notably, the highest-ranking native KNIL officer held the rank of major, never having led a unit higher than a battalion. However, these KNIL officer personnel have learned and become part of higher-level units. This situation has made former KNIL officers, at least for the first decade of the formation of the TNI, the backbone of senior staff leadership and command, coordinating matters related to military structure and strategy at the central level.

The delivery of training material in PETA is unique. Training for PETA soldiers shows that those in the *shodancho* category, responsible for leading the minor units, receive more comprehensive and longer training than those with higher ranks, namely *chudancho* and *daidancho*. The training for *shodancho* includes instruction on the use of

various primary weapons, ranging from grenades, pistols, rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns (*keikikandju*), heavy machine guns (*djuki-kandju*), to mortars. With the acquired training, *shodancho* candidates are considered sufficiently qualified to lead the minor platoon units. This resulted in *shodancho* having better skills, and many later became leaders in the Indonesian national military.

Compared to the duration of KNIL officer training at KMA Bandung, the training period for prospective PETA officers in Bogor is relatively shorter. PETA officer candidate training duration ranges from two to four months, depending on the category, whether *shodancho*, *chudancho*, or *daidancho*. Besides being differentiated by rank groups, PETA officer education also has differences in the duration of each training generation, namely in the *renseitai* training, the first *kyoikutai* generation, and the second *kyoikutai* generation. For *renseitai* training, the duration is two months for *daidancho* and three months for *chudancho* and *shodancho*. Then, for *kyoikutai* training, both for the first and second generations, it must be completed over two months for *daidancho*, three months for *chudancho*, and four months for *shodancho*.

The relatively shorter training period for PETA officers in Bogor can be attributed to Japan's pressing need to quickly mobilize local forces during World War II. Given the rapid pace of the war and the urgency to establish an effective local defense force, Japan designed a more condensed training program to meet immediate operational demands. Although the training duration was shorter compared to KNIL officer training, it was structured to meet the minimal necessary standards for leadership and battlefield effectiveness. The focus on rapid, practical training over extended education reflects the wartime exigencies and the need for quick deployment.

Considering this situation, the duration of training for KNIL and PETA officer candidates cannot be generalized. The training period for KNIL officers at KMA Bandung varies, with some lasting for 18 months, such as for cadets in the second generation (nine months in CORO and nine months in KMA) and five months for cadets in the third generation. When comparing these figures with PETA officers' training duration, the difference is quite significant for the second generation. However, for the third generation, which undergoes training for about five months, the difference is only around one month compared to the training duration for *Shodancho* PETA officers. Additionally, among PETA personnel, some underwent extra training, including *Kato Kyoiku*, a leadership course in Bogor lasting one month in September 1944, and *Kendo Syugo Kyoiku*, a three-week combat and martial arts training in Surabaya, bringing the total training period to five and a half months (Dinas et al., 2015).

The comparison of military training between KNIL and PETA units cannot be solely viewed through technical comparison, encompassing training schedules, training materials, teaching programs, and related field training models. Examining training also requires an analysis of the training culture, such as what training culture is applied or instilled in soldiers. It should be noted that the technical training material covering the military sciences studied in KNIL and PETA units is not significantly different because, fundamentally, Japanese military science mainly imported ideas from Western military science. The Japanese military technical handbook applied in PETA training is also based on Western military teachings. This is because Japan has never produced a standard work on military science (Huntington, 2003). Regarding this matter, the technical manuals of KNIL, *Voorschrift omtrent de Politik Politieele Taak van het Leger*, and PETA, *hohei soten kaisei riyu*, share many references. Therefore, the most distinguishing factor in KNIL and PETA training is the cultural or ideological aspects applied in training.

KNIL, as a military unit formed by the Netherlands, possesses a Western military training culture that differs from the PETA military training culture, which adopts Japanese cultural values. Even though Japan adopted Western military thought in technical terms, the cultural and ideological values of Japanese military personnel still embody the traditions of Shinto and Bushido. Shinto is the indigenous spirituality of Japan, centered around the worship of *kami* (spirits or deities) and emphasizing harmony with nature and ancestral reverence. The spiritual development of the Japanese in the PETA army, which is related to these spiritual values, is then adapted to Javanese traditions, specifically *Wayang*. The values taught in *Bushido*, such as honesty, courage, kindness, courtesy, love for truth, sincerity, honor, and the duty to remain loyal, are exemplified through depictions of *Wayang* characters (Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, 2016).

The training culture in PETA follows a Japanese doctrine regarding the tradition of *death before surrender*. This tradition rejects the idea that retreat is an acceptable alternative.

“Retreat and surrender are not allowed in our armed forces (...) becoming an enemy prisoner by surrendering after doing one’s best is considered an acceptable attitude. However, according to our bushido tradition, retreating and surrendering is the greatest shame and an inappropriate act for a Japanese soldier.” – General Araki

The doctrine introduced by Japan differs from the doctrine in KNIL, which adopts a realistic and professionally oriented Western military thought. In KNIL, retreat is introduced as a military necessity, and consequently, it is expected to be implemented (Huntington, 2003). The Japanese military doctrine emphasizing *death before surrender* and the realistic, professional Western military thought applied by KNIL influenced the development of the combat philosophy within the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), particularly during its early formation. During the Indonesian National Revolution, from August 17, 1945, to the recognition of Indonesia's independence by the Netherlands in December 1949, TNI incorporated elements from both doctrines. PETA contributed to the spirit of resilience and bravery, while KNIL introduced a more flexible and strategic approach. This combination shaped TNI doctrine by blending a fighting spirit with the need for adaptable strategies. Further analysis may be needed to understand how these influences were concretely applied in field tactics and strategies.

Training in PETA also instills a Japanese military idea of *nation-in-arms*, a view that states the military not only relies on strength based on a large number of troops or fully equipped technical attributes but also encompasses the concept of a Remarkable Trinity. This involves achieving harmony between the government, the military, and the people, where each aspect must be able to contribute and collaborate (Lee, 2013). This notion also underlies the collaboration of the Indonesian military, especially those from PETA personnel, involving the people as a military support aspect. This has led to a perception of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as a people’s Army.

Compared to the PETA training that instills spiritual values, KNIL training adheres more to the ideology of military professionalism that has grown in Western Europe. Military professionalism is evident in the view that military and civilian powers should be separated. The professionalism and military expertise of Western Europe have no place in PETA. In the Indonesian national military, those trained in PETA are more numerous and often have significant sympathies for political matters. Military officers trained by Japan are not taught to distance themselves from political issues, which differs from those trained by the Dutch, who are taught the European military ideology that military power should be separate from that in political institutions (Crouch, 2007).

The presented facts indicate that KNIL received more comprehensive military training with a longer and more complex duration. Meanwhile, although PETA's training is considered less intense, it has its advantages, particularly regarding knowledge about small-scale military operations related to guerrilla warfare. The analysis also shows that KNIL training can only partially be compared with PETA unit training. This is because other divisions of KNIL, such as artillery and engineering, are absent from the PETA unit. The focus of the military training comparison is then centered on the infantry category. The military condition of the PETA combat division, which only consists of the infantry division, has also revealed weaknesses or deficiencies in this unit. The military situation of PETA can be noted, and whether this unit can be categorized as a complete military unit can be noted.

However, despite these circumstances, both KNIL and PETA units have been trained by professional armies following military guidelines that adhere to professional military standards. The KNIL military training manual at KMA Bandung, *Voorschrift omtrent de Politik Politieele Taak van het Leger* (VTPL), is similar to the military training manual of the Royal Netherlands Army, although adjusted for military knowledge in tropical regions. Similarly, the PETA training manual has been adapted from the Japanese infantry professional Army's military manual, *Hohei Soten*. Although both units have adopted the same military manuals, it cannot be denied that the training time for both units has been drastically shortened. Therefore, specific knowledge cannot be conveyed completely, and military skills cannot be directly equated with the professional military personnel of the Royal Netherlands Army and Japan.

Military training doctrines, particularly those implemented by PETA with an emphasis on infantry and ground forces, appear to have had a significant impact on the structure and culture of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to this day. PETA, which adopted Japanese infantry doctrines focusing on resilience and land combat strategies, has left a profound mark on the philosophy and structure of the TNI. This influence is still evident in the current culture and priorities of the TNI. For instance, the Indonesian Army (TNI AD), as the direct inheritor of PETA's military training and philosophy, continues to play a dominant role in Indonesia's military framework despite Indonesia being an archipelagic nation that should also prioritize its naval and air forces. This indicates that the legacy of past military training remains crucial in shaping the strategies and policies of the TNI today.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Based on the analysis above, this study provides significant contributions by comparing the military training received by KNIL and PETA soldiers as the precursors to the Indonesian military. The analysis highlights that KNIL training was more comprehensive with a broader range of categories, while PETA training focused more on infantry. Despite the shorter and less intensive duration of PETA training, PETA excelled in small-scale military operations and guerrilla warfare. The fundamental differences between the two training programs also lie in cultural and ideological aspects, with KNIL adopting a professional Western military culture and PETA embracing Bushido and Wayang values, focusing on spirituality and nationalism. This creates significant differences in military approaches and implementation in Indonesia, with KNIL oriented towards Western military professionalism and PETA towards high morale and nationalism.

The recommendations drawn involve reflecting on the military training practices of both forces. The implications of these differences are crucial in understanding the

evolution of the Indonesian military. KNIL's more structured and professionalism-oriented training created a framework for more stable and effective military leadership. In contrast, PETA's focus on spirituality and nationalism fostered soldiers with high fighting spirit. Integrating both approaches can provide a strong foundation for the identity of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI).

This study faces challenges in accurately measuring the skill differences between KNIL and PETA soldiers despite a comparative analysis of their training. It is important to note that the collaboration between KNIL and PETA personnel within the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) has led to the development of new skills and knowledge. Additionally, many Indonesian military personnel received further training post-independence, which enhanced their competence. The study also has limitations in evaluating how KNIL and PETA training was directly applied in various combat situations. Further research is needed to explore how the cultural legacies of KNIL and PETA training influence current TNI policies and structures.

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