The Role of Intelligence in Addressing the Potential Threats of Identity Politics on Twitter Leading up to the 2024 Indonesian Election

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Article Info

Abstract

In our digital era, social media, particularly Twitter, has become a global phenomenon with 556 million monthly active users worldwide. In Indonesia, Twitter has 24 million active users and is ranked fifth globally. As Indonesia approaches the politically crucial year of 2024, marked by upcoming elections, the use of identity politics on platforms like Twitter poses a potential threat to the integrity of safe and democratic processes. This research aims to analyze the potential identity politics threats on Twitter social media leading up to the 2024 elections. The study also aims to analyze the role of intelligence in addressing potential identity politics threats on Twitter social media that may arise ahead of the 2024 elections. To address this concern, this research employs a qualitative approach, incorporating data collection techniques such as literature review, focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews with three key informants. The analysis is conducted through threat analysis methodologies. The central research question seeks to identify and understand the potential threats associated with identity politics on Twitter in the lead-up to the 2024 elections, and to delineate the role of intelligence agencies in countering these threats. The research findings have identified 12 potential threats related to identity politics on Twitter leading up to the 2024 elections, thereby offering actionable recommendations for intelligence agencies to consider in their efforts to safeguard the democratic process.

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary landscape, rapid advancements in information technology have transformed social media into a powerful and efficient mode of communication. Twitter, in particular, stands out as a leading global social media platform. As of January

2023, Twitter boasts an impressive monthly active user base of 556 million people, with individuals spending an average of 5.5 hours per month engaged with this dynamic social network. Notably, the influence of Twitter extends to Indonesia, where a substantial 24 million users actively participate, propelling the nation into the fifth position worldwide in terms of Twitter platform adoption, trailing only behind the United States, Japan, India, and Brazil (We Are Social, 2023)
.

Countries with the Most Twitter Users in the World (in millions)

Figure 1. Most Twitter Users in the World (We Are Social, 2023)

Twitter has evolved into a dynamic platform for interactive communication that captures the diverse spectrum of people's emotions, opinions, feedback, and reviews about the information circulating within this social network. This phenomenon has significantly broadened the utility of Twitter across a multitude of domains, spanning from business, marketing, and journalism, to politics and beyond. Notably, politics emerges as one of the most prominent and widely discussed subjects on Twitter, particularly among users in Indonesia. The platform thrives as a hub for fervent political discourse, and its influence extends from regional elections to national elections, setting the stage for discussions that shape the political landscape.

The prominence of political discussions on Twitter owes much to the active participation of politicians, political parties, political organizations, and community groups who leverage this social media service. These entities utilize Twitter as a novel medium for communicating with constituents, facilitating political engagement, seeking feedback on decision-making processes, promoting political events, conducting campaigns, and disseminating political messages. The continuous dialogue and discourse on political matters find a natural home on this dynamic platform, perpetuating its role as a critical arena for shaping political opinions and engaging the public (Musyoka, I. W., Mwendo, I. K., Maina, D. G., & Gikunda, K., 2022).

Amidst the excitement surrounding new media's role in Indonesian politics, it is essential to acknowledge the potential risks and threats that could undermine the democratic process of the "people's party" in Indonesia. Concerns and predictions regarding the rise and reinforcement of identity politics emerged during the 2019 General Election, particularly in the context of the Presidential Election. Twitter, as a prominent platform, witnessed supporters of presidential and vice-presidential candidates resorting to mockery, insults, and discrediting of their opponents. Notably, these supporters were sharply divided along derogatory labels, with *cebong* and *BuzzerRp* for Jokowi-Ma'ruf supporters and *kampret*" and *kadrun*" for Prabowo-Sandi supporters. The term *kampret* originates from a play on the acronym 'KMP.' Originally, KMP stands for *Koalisi Merah Putih* (Red and White Coalition), a coalition of political

parties supporting Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa in the 2014 presidential election. It includes Gerindra, PAN, PPP, PKS, PBB, and Golkar Party. Jokowi is supported by tadpole enthusiasts (*cebong*) due to his hobby of raising tadpoles (Damarjati, 2020). Identity issues frequently took center stage in political discourse, often intertwined with the dissemination of false information (hoaxes) and speech that incited hatred. In the 2019 Presidential Election, Center for Political Studies University of Indonesia (Pusat Kajian Politik Universitas Indonesia or Puskapol UI) found that the campaign teams of the opposing candidates exploited identity issues, particularly religious ones, to influence voter preferences, attack rival parties, and shape public opinion. Both candidate teams also enlisted the assistance of buzzers and political consultants to propagate and strengthen identity politics issues via Twitter (Center for Political Studies University of Indonesia, 2019). The efforts aimed at fostering a more robust and fair democratic system through electoral processes are jeopardized by incidents of violence or discrimination stemming from social disintegration induced by identity politics. To prevent these challenges from spreading and taking root within Indonesia's political system, early preventive measures must be undertaken. Such measures are imperative to thwart public apathy and skepticism, which could lead to decreased voter participation and ultimately erode the country's democratic foundations.

Early prevention can be done through the role of state intelligence, especially the State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara* or BIN) as a government agency that acts as policy support for users or the President by providing input, securing and making policies a success (Soekarno, 2014). The use of identity politics in the upcoming 2024 elections has the potential to threaten the integrity of a secure and democratic electoral process, demanding the collective attention of all stakeholders. This concern is underscored by the experiences from the 2019 General Election, particularly during the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, where political dynamics escalated dynamically, accompanied by a trend toward polarization, societal division, and the emergence of community conflicts.

The conduct of safe and democratic elections is a manifestation of national security, which squarely falls within the purview of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). This role is concretely realized through early detection and early warning of any potential threats, especially the potential threat of identity politics in the context of the 2024 Election, particularly on the social media platform Twitter. Consequently, based on Law Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, one of the roles of the BIN is also to play a role in supervising, securing and ensuring the success of the 2024 elections in Indonesia, being actively involved in early detection and early warning through a spectrum of intelligence functions, such as collection and information analysis, counterintelligence, and covert activities.

In light of the foregoing, the objective of this research is twofold, to analyze the potential threat of identity politics and to formulate actionable recommendations for intelligence agencies in effectively addressing the looming threats associated with identity politics on the Twitter social media platform in the lead-up to the 2024 elections.

Intelligence work, rooted in both quantitative and qualitative research, informs policymakers with nuanced solutions. While conclusions may carry uncertainties, efforts are made to mitigate them, defining boundaries for decision-makers' awareness of intelligence limitations. According to the classic view Kent (1966), intelligence involves knowledge, its producing organization, and related activities. Additionally, Warner (2008) suggests in "Intelligence as Risk Shifting" that intelligence reduces strategic uncertainty, aiding policy formulation for ideal outcomes. Saronto (2012) emphasizes

intelligence's role in safeguarding state sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity through continuous observation, including early threat detection. Understanding the intelligence role in policymaking involves the pivotal intelligence cycle. As outlined by Johnson (2007), the cycle comprises planning/direction, collection, processing, production/analysis, and dissemination stages. These stages, supported by essential tools, collectively contribute to generating actionable intelligence.

Identity politics, a recent concept in political science, involves biopolitics and the politics of difference. Biopolitics, rooted in bodily distinctions, gained prominence after its presentation at an international meeting in 1994. Heller & Punsher (1995) define it as a political concept emphasizing difference. In diverse landscapes, the politics of difference thrive, especially in multicultural societies. Mulgan (1994) advocates for prioritizing ethics and morality as grand narratives decline. Lippmann (1989) echoes this call for democratic politicians to uphold political morality, recognizing the need for a democratic ethical framework. Beyme (1996) analysis traces the identity movement from the premodern to the postmodern era. In the modern stage, it sought equitable power distribution through nuanced strategies. In the postmodern era, identity movements became decentralized, reflecting contemporary societal dynamics. The rise of ethnic politics stems from recognizing belonging to ethnic groups and relates to the politics of "ethnic groups" and "minorities." Various scholars contribute nuanced meanings to ethnic groups, illustrating the complexity of identity politics.

Chandrakirana (1989) offers a distinctive perspective on identity politics, delving into its practical manifestations and field dynamics. While acknowledging the significance of tribal affiliation as a cultural symbol and political strength, Chandrakirana's arguments may be prone to misinterpretation. Recognizing the implications, including demands for equal recognition and cultural preservation, highlights potential weaknesses in forming exclusive interest groups. This complexity underscores the diverse nature of identity politics, emphasizing the necessity for thorough study and debate.

Social media is an online media, where users can easily participate, share, and create content including blogs, social networks, wikis, forums, and virtual worlds. Blogs, social networks, and wikis are the most common forms of social media used by people throughout the world. Clow & Baack (2022) define social media as a digital device that allows everyone to socialize online. On the other hand, Kotler & Amstrong (2020) view social media as an independent commercial online social network where individuals can gather to socialize and share messages, images, videos, and various content. Furthermore, social media has evolved into a vital facet of digital marketing, encompassing services such as Social Media Maintenance, Social Media Endorsement, and Social Media Activation. Consequently, social media has become a fundamental service offered by Digital Agencies.

The spectrum of communication is delineated into several levels, including intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, public, and mass communication, each characterized by distinct features. Utari (2011), in her work "Komunikasi 2.0", posits that the advent of new media has precipitated a shift and transformation in mass communication theories. The familiar attributes of media, as traditionally understood, meld into the new media landscape due to the emergence of what can be termed as "mass self-communication". In this realm of new media, a synergy between interpersonal and mass communication is observed. Given its global outreach, it qualifies as mass communication, while concurrently, the content's creation, direction, and consumption on a personal level classifies it as interpersonal communication.

Interpersonal communication is understood as communication that involves two individuals or communication that, within its contextual framework, qualifies as interpersonal. In contrast, mass communication represents the broadest level of communication, reaching the most extensive target audience. Mass communication comprises messages transmitted to a large and widely dispersed audience, employing various mediums such as newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and the Internet (Adler, Rodman, & Kramer, 2006). This demarcation highlights the distinction between one-on-one interactions and the dissemination of information to a vast and diverse public, underlining the diverse nature of communication.

In the realm of social media, the lines between interpersonal communication and mass communication seamlessly converge. When an individual uploads content and garners responses from others, sparking interactions, this signifies the occurrence of interpersonal communication. Simultaneously, when someone shares something, and that content can be accessed and enjoyed by a large and diverse audience, it encapsulates the essence of mass communication. The unique characteristic of mass communication lies in its ability to disseminate information without requiring active involvement from all parties. This amalgamation of interpersonal and mass communication within the dynamic landscape of social media underscores the intricate interplay of personal interactions and widespread information sharing, redefining the traditional boundaries of communication.

While there have been prior research endeavors focusing on identity politics in electoral contexts, the exploration of the potential threats posed by identity politics on the social media platform Twitter in the lead-up to the Indonesia 2024 elections, particularly in connection to the role of intelligence agencies, remains largely uncharted territory. This unexplored realm offers a distinct and pivotal avenue for investigation, providing valuable insights into the evolving dynamics of political discourse and intelligence involvement in the context of contemporary elections. Therefore, this study conducted to analyze the potential identity politics threats on Twitter social media leading up to the 2024 elections and to analyze the role of intelligence in addressing potential identity politics threats on Twitter social media that may arise ahead of the 2024 elections.

METHODS

This study adopts a qualitative research approach to elucidate and unveil the role of intelligence agencies in addressing the potential challenges of identity politics on the Twitter social media platform leading up to the 2024 elections. Denzin and Lincoln explain that qualitative research involves an interpretative and naturalistic approach to the world (Creswell, 2007). In this qualitative inquiry, data in various forms, including nominal, ordinal, and interval scales, are employed, facilitating categorization to discern nuances, thus enabling a comprehensive response to the research questions at hand. This approach allows for a deeper exploration of the complex and multifaceted aspects of the intersection between intelligence agencies and the evolving landscape of identity politics on Twitter in the context of the forthcoming elections.

To address research questions and formulate the problem, this study utilizes various methodologies:
1. Literature Review. The researcher gathers data from diverse sources such as scientific journals, legislative regulations, books, and research reports to reinforce arguments and contribute to the problem-solving process.

2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Defined by Kreuger (1988), FGD involves structured discussions in a permissive environment. The researcher prepares a focused discussion guide, following Moleong's suggestion to keep questions under 12 for precision.

3. Delphi Method Interviews. Anonymous surveys are administered to coordinators working discreetly within the organization, ensuring equal significance for each respondent. This method aids long-term risk forecasting and is conducted 2-3 times, facilitated by modern technology through email and the Internet.

In this research, primary data sources encompass three participants in the Focus Group Discussion, including both Middle-Level Agents (Intermediate Intelligence Experts) and First-Level Agents (First-Level Intelligence Experts) from BIN, as well as researchers specializing in the field of intelligence. These individuals will respond to the author's inquiries directly related to the researched subject. Moreover, primary data in this study will be derived from insights shared by key informants who possess a profound understanding of the subject under investigation, particularly field-duty intelligence personnel. The informants consists of 6 people, the Executive Director of CISS, the Coordinator of Analysis and Evaluation at the Central Intelligence Committee, a researcher from the Lentera Research Institute, 2 people from the public relations of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of Indonesia, and public relations of General Election Supervisory Agency of Indonesia (Bawaslu RI). Concurrently, secondary data sources include a diverse range of reference materials, such as books, articles, journals, broadcast files, and other library resources that are relevant to and enhance the research findings.

During data collection, the researcher utilized three key tools:

1. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guidelines. Instrumental in maintaining focus, these guidelines included an open-ended question list to encourage multidimensional responses.

2. Delphi Interview Guidelines. Thoughtfully constructed with relevance to research objectives and foundational theories.

3. Recording Equipment. Valuable for uninterrupted data collection, allowing the researcher to focus on discussions without manual note-taking, ensuring accurate capture of subjects' responses.

In this study, data analysis was conducted using threat analysis, a technique developed by Prunckun (2010). This analytical method is typically employed in counterterrorism analysis. The resulting recommendations for action are derived from the threat analysis and serve as valuable considerations in the formulation of policies. Prunckun (2010) provides a comprehensive perspective on threat analysis, emphasizing its role in assessing a wide range of potential threats—physical, mental, and emotional. These threats can pertain to tangible elements like buildings or intangible factors like national security. Threat analysis involves evaluating the intentions and capabilities of threat agents, be they individuals, organizations, or nations, in terms of their capacity to pose risks to specific targets. To gain a nuanced understanding, examining distinct elements within each factor is essential, considering desire and expectation for intent and knowledge and resources for capability. This structured approach aids in identifying and comprehending potential threats and associated risks to targeted entities or interests.

The equation of threat is expressed as:
T (Threat) = (desire + expectation) + (knowledge + resources)
Source: Prunckun, 2010

Based on Prunckun's insight (2010), threat intent reflects the optimism of a threat agent regarding the success of an attack, while threat capability represents the strength exerted on a target. These factors, intent and capability, form a cause-and-effect relationship. Illustrating this interplay, a fishbone analysis diagram can be employed. In this context, the "head" of the fish represents the investigated issue—the concept of threat. The primary "bones" signify significant categories of information: desire, expectation, knowledge, and resources.


Figure 2. Fishbone Threat Analysis Diagram

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In the process of identifying the potential threats related to identity politics on the social media platform Twitter, the researcher conducted Delphi interviews with experts who possess a deep understanding of Twitter as a social media platform and are well-versed in the functions and roles of intelligence agencies in addressing potential threats related to identity politics on Twitter leading up to the 2024 elections. These interviews were conducted with three key informants, who are experts in the field of intelligence. Two rounds of interviews were conducted, in the first round questions were asked related to the mechanism of using Twitter social media, the motivation of Twitter social media users and ways of interacting that could influence the mindset of Twitter social media users' opinions. The second round asked the same questions to see the consistency of the interviewees' answers.

Based on the interviews with the experts, several potential threats related to identity politics on the social media platform Twitter have been identified. These threats include:

1. The ability to manipulate narratives and disseminate fake news/hoax. The manipulation of narratives and the spread of misinformation can have serious consequences, especially in the context of identity politics. It can exacerbate social divisions, fuel mistrust among communities, and hinder constructive dialogue. Building awareness about media literacy and critical thinking is crucial to mitigate the impact of fake news and hoaxes.

2. Social polarization as a result of social media Twitter's algorithms and filter bubbles. Social media algorithms and filter bubbles can create echo chambers where individuals are only exposed to information that aligns with their existing beliefs. This reinforces and sometimes amplifies pre-existing biases, contributing to social polarization. It's like being stuck in a feedback loop of one-sided information. It's essential for platforms to find a balance between personalized content and exposing

users to diverse perspectives. Encouraging open-mindedness and promoting diverse voices can help mitigate the negative effects of social media on identity politics.

3. The influence of trending topics on Twitter highlights hotly discussed topics both in real life and on the platform itself. The power of trending topics on Twitter can shape public discourse and influence perceptions on a massive scale. The challenge arises when these discussions become polarized or dominated by extreme views, reinforcing identity politics. It's crucial for users to critically engage with trending topics, and for platforms to ensure that the algorithms promoting these trends are transparent and considerate of the potential impact on societal divisions. Striking a balance between highlighting important discussions and preventing the spread of divisive content is key.

4. The use of hashtags (#) to link issues and topics for discussion. Hashtags can be a double-edged sword. While they can effectively link discussions and raise awareness about important issues, they can also contribute to the polarization of identity politics. Hashtags can be co-opted or weaponized to promote a particular narrative, making it challenging to have nuanced and constructive conversations.

5. The effective use of "Buzzer Teams" to promote, campaign for, or manipulate specific social-media agendas. These coordinated efforts to promote, campaign, or manipulate social-media agendas can amplify certain voices disproportionately, drown out diverse perspectives, and contribute to the polarization of identities. It's essential for platforms to be vigilant in detecting and addressing such manipulative activities to maintain a fair and open online environment.

6. Crafting threads or tweet series that provide additional context, updates, and supplementary points related to identity politics. While crafting threads or tweet series can be a powerful way to provide additional context and updates, it does come with some potential threats in the context of identity politics. One risk is that individuals might selectively engage with the parts of the thread that align with their pre-existing beliefs, reinforcing echo chambers and further polarizing discussions. Moreover, complex issues might be oversimplified or misrepresented in a thread, leading to a distorted understanding of the topic.

7. The importance of concise language is due to the character limitations in each tweet. The character limit on tweets not only demands brevity but can also amplify the risk of misinterpretation. In the realm of identity politics, where nuanced discussions are crucial, it becomes challenging to convey complex ideas in a limited space. The danger lies in the potential for misinterpretation. Without the space to fully explain a stance, people might not grasp the subtleties of the argument. This lack of nuance can lead to misunderstandings, and in the context of identity politics, where discussions often involve sensitive and deeply personal issues, it's crucial to communicate with precision and clarity. The character limit, while promoting brevity, also poses a risk of oversimplifying complex matters.

8. The virality of content or news is due to user responses such as comments, likes, dislikes, and views on Twitter and other social media platforms. The virality of content driven by user responses on social media can indeed be a potential threat in the context of identity politics. The algorithms that determine the visibility of content often prioritize engagement metrics, such as likes, shares, and comments. This can lead to the amplification of content that provokes strong emotional reactions, even if it's divisive or misleading.

9. The politicization of ethnicity, religion, and race (*suku, agama, ras, antar golongan* or SARA). The politicization of ethnicity, religion, and race is a significant threat when it

comes to identity politics. When these aspects of identity become tools for political manipulation, it can lead to the reinforcement of stereotypes, the marginalization of certain groups, and the exacerbation of social divisions. It's essential to foster inclusive political discourse that transcends these identity markers and focuses on shared values and common goals.

10. Fanaticism toward a particular figure, organization, ideology, or thought. Fanaticism towards a particular figure, organization, ideology, or thought is a significant threat in the realm of identity politics. When individuals become excessively devoted to a specific entity or idea, it can lead to a rigid and uncompromising stance. This kind of fervor often hinders open dialogue, fosters intolerance, and can contribute to the escalation of identity-based conflicts.

11. The negative exploitation of narratives creates a poor image for individuals, organizations, or government institutions. The negative exploitation of narratives can significantly damage the image of individuals, organizations, or government institutions. When narratives are manipulated to serve specific agendas, it not only distorts the truth but also erodes public trust. This can lead to a climate of suspicion, polarization, and a lack of confidence in the entities involved.

12. The amplification of narratives to obscure the objectivity of a particular viewpoint or mindset through Twitter and other social media channels can result in the formation of public opinions. The amplification of narratives to obscure objectivity on social media can indeed shape public opinions in a way that reinforces identity politics. When certain viewpoints are disproportionately highlighted or distorted, it can lead to a skewed perception of reality. This amplification effect can create echo chambers and contribute to the polarization of public opinions.

Based on the identifications of potential threats to identity politics on the social media Twitter mentioned above, the conclusion drew based on the results of interviews with sources. This study develops a fishbone diagram as part of the threat analysis. The fishbone diagram is a valuable tool used to identify and explore cause-and-effect relationships, as can be seen in Figure 3.


Figure 3. Fishbone Diagram for the Analysis of Identity Politics Threats on Twitter Leading up to the 2024 Election

The trend of identity politics in Indonesia, which began with the term *cebong*, actually reflects the complex and sometimes controversial dynamics of politics. This term

emerged during the presidential election campaign in Indonesia in 2014, where Prabowo Subianto competed against Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The term *cebong* itself was used by Prabowo's supporters to refer to Jokowi's supporters. Literally, *cebong* means a small frog or tadpole in Javanese. The use of this term is not positive and is intended to be demeaning. On the other hand, Jokowi's supporters responded with the term *kampret* to refer to Prabowo's supporters. *Kampret* is a type of bat considered to be a bad animal. In the context of identity politics, the use of these terms reflects political polarization in Indonesia, reinforcing differences and group identities, often surpassing substantive policy debates. Ultimately, this can exacerbate political tensions and complicate constructive dialogue between supporters of both candidates.

In April 2019, Indonesia held highly anticipated presidential elections (Pilpres). The campaign on social media, especially Twitter, reached its peak with high polarization and tension between supporters of Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo. The terms *cebong* and *kampret* stood out prominently in online conversations. Prabowo's supporters continued to use the term *cebong* to refer to Jokowi's supporters, while Jokowi's supporters responded by calling Prabowo's supporters *kampret*. This phenomenon reflects the intensity of political competition and arguments in the online world, which can ultimately escalate the overall political atmosphere. Twitter, as a platform that enables direct and fast communication, became a space where political identity rhetoric reached its peak. Hashtags and trends related to these terms may have dominated conversations on Twitter, creating an atmosphere that is not only polarized but also sometimes provocative.


Figure 5. Trends of Total Mentions in Twitter (Fahmi, 2022)

Meanwhile, the term *kadrun*" emerged after the 2019 presidential elections and gained popularity on Twitter after a user with the username @Dennysiregar7 referred to *kadal gurun* (desert lizard) in August 2019, which was later shortened to *kadrun* by his supporters. This term is used by those who refer to supporters of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in a derogatory manner. This phenomenon reflects the continuation of political polarization in Indonesia, where terms like *cebong* and *kampret* have built tension between supporters of both camps. The use of derogatory language on social media

platforms, especially Twitter, reflects the intensity and emotions involved in online political conversations.

The term *BuzzeRp* was first popularized in August 2019 by Twitter users with the usernames @Dandhy_Laksono and @HokGie_ in response to a buzzer attack related to the controversial "sexy killers" case. In this context, *BuzzeRp* is used to refer to buzzers who are perceived to work or be paid by oligarchs or economic-political elites. This term creates a negative connotation for online marketing practices conducted by individuals or groups that may have specific political or economic interests. The use of *BuzzeRp* and its variants may be intended to criticize or highlight the lack of transparency and potential manipulation of public opinion through buzzer campaigns considered non-independent.

Based on the outcomes of the discussions, several recommendations can be put forth. These recommendations primarily revolve around optimizing the Prevention, Preparation, Response, and Recovery Planning stages. By doing so, they can be harnessed as practical solutions and courses of action to address potential threats. Some of these recommendations include:

1. Prevention

Considering the articulated risks, there is a clear need for a continuous campaign of "positive propaganda" in the form of public literacy. This task should be undertaken routinely by intelligence agencies and relevant institutions such as the General Election Commission (KPU), the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kemenkominfo), and the State Cyber and Cryptography Agency (BSSN). This aims to enable effective amplification to the public regarding the consequences of domestic instability resulting from the emergence of identity politics practices during the 2024 elections. Additionally, the existence of the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (UU ITE) that governs internet user behavior in Indonesia can also be comprehensively disseminated to raise awareness among the public about the potential criminal repercussions for those who exploit provocative narratives or align with identity-based political ideologies that could incite unrest.

2. Preparedness

In line with Prunckun (2012), it is essential to recognize that despite the preventive measures in place, unforeseen events may still occur. Therefore, the implementation of cyber patrols and cyber surveillance is necessary, In many democratic societies, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, or specialized cybersecurity units under strict legal constraints might handle such tasks. However, it's crucial to approach this cautiously, ensuring that any surveillance activities are proportionate, transparent, and in compliance with human rights standards. Balancing security needs with the protection of civil liberties is essential in maintaining a democratic and open society.

3. Response

Counter-propaganda and narrative amplification are essential tools to foster a positive environment and create a conducive atmosphere within the Twitter social media sphere. This proactive approach aims to counteract and diminish the impact of negative narratives with potentially divisive elements, such as issues related to ethnicity, religion, or identity politics, which could pose a significant risk to the peaceful conduct of the 2024 election in Indonesia.

4. Recovery

This phase represents a critical step in preparing for the worst-case scenario, should the previously implemented measures prove ineffective. Therefore, it is essential to vividly illustrate to the public the potential adverse consequences resulting from identity politics-related threats.

This is accomplished by disseminating positive propaganda to raise public awareness regarding the adverse consequences of introducing identity politics into the democratic process. The aim is to make the public understand that promoting identity-based political ideas during a democratic event results in a collective loss, negatively impacting the lives of every individual and the nation as a whole. Consequently, by shedding light on the residual effects of identity politics that have already occurred, the goal is to minimize their long-term impact on society.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

The research on potential threats related to identity politics on Twitter leading up to the Indonesia 2024 elections involved in-depth delphi interviews with intelligence experts. Through these study various threats were identified, including the manipulation of narratives, social polarization, and the use of hashtags to influence political discussions. This study also highlighted the role of influencers, the impact of virality, and the politicization of ethnicity, religion, and race. To address these threats, recommendations were made in the areas of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery planning. Continuous positive propaganda campaigns and public literacy efforts were suggested for prevention. Preparedness involves cyber patrols and surveillance targeting accounts associated with opposition or conflicting national values. Response strategies include counter-propaganda and narrative amplification to foster a positive environment on Twitter. In the recovery phase, it is crucial to illustrate the potential adverse consequences of identity politics, emphasizing the collective loss and negative impact on individuals and the nation. The research provides valuable insights into the complex landscape of identity politics on Twitter and offers practical recommendations to mitigate potential threats and ensure a healthy democratic process in the 2024 election in Indonesia.

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Appendix

A. Interview and Elicitation Guideline

The researcher employed a list of questions during the interviews and elicitation with the informants. These questions were designed to explore topics related to Twitter and potential threats to identity politics that might arise and disrupt the 2024 election in Indonesia. It is anticipated that the answers gathered from each informant will be identified as potential threats to identity politics, in line with the analytical methods used in this study.

Question 1:
What steps can Twitter and the government take to address identity politics-related hoaxes on this platform?

Question 2:
How does the use of language and phrases related to identity politics in Twitter posts influence the polarization of public opinion?

Question 3:
How is identity politics reflected in the way Twitter users interact with political issues?

Question 4:
Do you perceive any deliberate efforts by specific entities to exploit identity politics in creating social tension on Twitter?

Question 5:
What role do Twitter's algorithms and filter bubbles play in shaping and reinforcing users' political identities?

Question 6:
Are there differences in identity politics behavior among users in different countries on Twitter? If so, what factors influence these differences?

Question 7:
Are there any positive aspects resulting from the virality of identity politics on Twitter?

Question 8:
How do political figures influence the political identities of their followers on Twitter?

Question 9:
Why do issues related to race, religion, ethnicity, and societal groups (*SARA*) often become the focus of debates on Twitter?

Question 10:
What is the impact of fanaticism associated with identity politics on the digital environment and society on Twitter?

Question 11:
How does the use of hashtags related to identity politics affect political issues and the 2024 elections?

Question 12:
Can the character limit in tweets lead to information truncation and manipulation of messages related to identity politics?

B. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Guideline

The researcher commenced the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) by delivering an introductory speech and introducing the FGD participants. The researcher presented the background and purpose of the discussion, emphasizing the critical role of social media platforms, especially Twitter, in the context of the 2024 election in Indonesia. The researcher also explained the process of identifying identity politics threats and the analytical results obtained through threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, and risk

analysis on Twitter in the lead-up to the 2024 elections. Subsequently, the researcher sought agreement from the participants, ensuring their understanding and approval of the identified identity politics threats and the analytical findings. With unanimous consent, the researcher proceeded with the FGD as outlined in the prepared guidelines.

The purpose of this guide is to discuss the role of intelligence in addressing the threats related to identity politics emerging on Twitter in the lead-up to the 2024 elections. The discussion is expected to enhance the understanding of how stakeholders in security and law enforcement can confront these challenges and prevent the spread of false, defamatory, and provocative information that could undermine the democratic process.

Discussion I: Public Education and Awareness of Identity Politics Threats on Social Media
1. Discussing the importance of public education and awareness regarding identity politics threats on the Twitter platform.
2. Exploring the steps that can be taken to enhance public awareness of the dangers of spreading false information (hoaxes, defamation, politicization of ethnicity, fanaticism, buzzers' teams, social polarization) and understanding how to recognize questionable content.

Discussion II: Policies and Regulations
1. Addressing the existing policies and regulations related to intelligence surveillance and actions against identity politics threats on social media (referring to the ITE Law).
2. Discussing the pros and cons of the enactment and enforcement of the ITE Law regarding social media surveillance policies.

Discussion III: Data Protection and Privacy
1. Discussing how intelligence agencies can work with social media data without violating individual privacy : intelligence activities should not violate the ITE Law (privacy protection articles).
2. Explaining the measures taken to ensure that the data collected and used in the intelligence process remains secure and protected.

Discussion IV: The Role of Intelligence in Confronting Threats
1. Describing the role of intelligence in cybersecurity and social media monitoring (account takedowns).
2. Discussing how intelligence can identify accounts and groups that disseminate identity politics content.
3. Addressing the challenges faced by intelligence in collecting and analyzing data from social media.

Discussion V: Collaboration Among Relevant Parties
1. Discuss how relevant parties such as intelligence, law enforcement, social media platforms, and political parties can collaborate to address these threats (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, district and city police, provincial governments).
2. Examining the benefits and obstacles of such collaboration.

Discussion VI: Prevention and Mitigation Efforts
1. Identifying concrete strategies and steps that can be taken by the government and relevant parties to prevent and mitigate identity politics threats on Twitter (regular and continuous horizontal coordination with relevant agencies).
2. Discussing ways to detect and respond quickly to potentially damaging content.