



Lessons Learned from the Battle in the Java Sea between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the American, British, Dutch & Australian Command Navies to Develop the Indonesian Maritime Defense

Aziz Ali Haerulloh^{1*}, Lukman Yudho Prakoso², Rudi Sutanto³

^{1,2,3}Program Studi Strategi Pertahanan Laut, Universitas Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Indonesia

aziz.alihaerulloh30@gmail.com^{1*}, lukman.prakoso@outlook.com², rudi.sutanto071@gmail.com³

*Corresponding Author

Article Info

Article history:

Received: October 31, 2022

Revised: February 26, 2023

Accepted: April 27, 2023

Keywords:

ABDACOM,
Dutch East Indies,
Japan,
Java Sea,
Pacific War

DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v9i1.1887>

Abstract

This study aims to dissect the battle in the Java Sea between Japan and the Allies as a lesson learned in developing Indonesia's maritime defense. The research method is a descriptive qualitative approach to historical methods and thematic phenomenology. The results of this study show the weakening of maritime culture and changes in the cultural perspective of the people and the Dutch East Indies colonial government, which resulted in a massive and fast defeat process in sea battles that determined one of them, namely in the Java Sea. This event became a lesson for Indonesia to rebuild a maritime culture towards a world maritime axis country. Maritime Culture is the foundation for strengthening Indonesia's layered maritime defense system but with the availability of a fleet that has yet to reach the current Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) target.

2549-9459/Published by Indonesia Defense University. This is an open-access article under the CC BY-NC license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>).

INTRODUCTION

The Asia-Pacific War will be more apparent if you look at the map of competition in the Asia-Pacific since 1900. Japan was born and transformed into a new power in Asia. When the Empire of Japan started the Meiji Restoration, the contact between Japan and the West was intensive and continuous. Many students from Japan were sent to England, France, Germany, the United States (the U.S.), and other developed countries to continue their studies according to their respective fields of expertise. Several decades later, the Pacific War became evidence of Japanese expansionism in the 1930s to 1945, marked by the spread of *Hakko Ichi-u* ideology in various circles of the Japanese Government, which was dominated by the military. *Hakko Ichi-u* is Japanese efforts to expand its ideology by

establishing a great East Asia co-prosperity sphere during World War II (1931-1945). The expansive ideology above comes from ancient Japanese teachings, which mean “eight threads under one roof” (Oktorino, 2016). The implementation of *Hakko Ichi-u* is forming a Greater East Asia region or the Commonwealth of Japan. Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria, and China were core areas, while Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies were protectorate territories. According to international law, a protectorate is a country or region controlled and protected, not owned by another, a stronger country. Usually, the country's foreign relations and defense are left to the protecting/ruler state, like Christmas Island belongs to Australia (Burhanuddin, 2015). Implementing *Hakko Ichi-u* and the Japanese war campaign in the Java Sea fulfilled Japan's efforts to build a Greater East Asia Commonwealth under Japan's hegemony.

Discussing the geopolitics of Japan and the East-Southeast Asia region before World War II will be more apparent if referring to previous literature by Oktorino (2016). Several things are not discussed specifically, one of which is the Japanese military campaign to conquer Java Island as the center of gravity of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government. Agung (2020) specifically discussed the Battle of the Java Sea (Japanese Octopus Grips the Archipelago). However, there is a reason why the Allied fleet was so weak during the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and especially the Dutch East Indies, including the split in the concentration of the fleet between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which is trying to be explained as the reason for Japan's quick and relatively easy victory. Military operations as part of a strategy can be studied by Joesoef (2014). Joesoef tries to explain the Dutch Colonial Government's inability to consolidate the colony's citizens to carry out a total war. Furthermore, Shipping and Commerce of the Archipelago of the 16th and 17th Century dissecting the archipelago of Indonesia as an international trade hub by Lapian (2017), this article emphasizes Indonesia's strategic function in World War II as a heart sea region in the Indo-Pacific. The next is Nazis in Indonesia: a Forgotten History Explaining the Involvement of the Nazis in the War in the Pacific Theater by Oktorino (2015) which explains the significance of the Gruppe Monsoon in assisting the Japanese war in the Pacific. The last is The Art of War by Machiavelli (2015) which describes the military's role in shaping civil society and fills in the increasingly complex and dynamic treasures of sea warfare.

The concepts and theories used in this study are ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command), Greater East Asia Commonwealth, Colonialism, Heartland (Sir Halford Mackinder), Sea Control (Sir Julian Stafford Corbett), and Sea Power (Alfred Thayer Mahan). This research has an essential value on how Indonesia is currently a country that aims to become the world's maritime axis, able to defend every inch of its territory from the possibility of an invasion by sea by an aggressor country, both rising power and ruling power. This study aims to dissect the battle in the Java Sea between Japan and the Allies as a lesson learned in developing Indonesia's maritime defense.

METHODS

This study uses the historical method, which has four stages of work. First, heuristics is the process of gathering sources (primary, secondary, and tertiary). Second, internal and external criticism. Third, interpretation of the source. Fourth, is historiography (historical writing) (Herlina, 2020). The sources include research results, scientific and popular articles, books, maps, online sources (websites), and digital archives. The research approach used is qualitative with a chronological-thematic arrangement to make it easier for readers to follow the flow of historical events that occurred.

As a process of collecting historical sources, heuristics are available online and offline in the form of writing, videos, and infographics, which are primary sources such as the propaganda archives of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government, which are owned by the Australian War Memorial Collection, secondary sources such as popular historical articles and films/videos resulting from popular historical reconstructions. Internal and external criticism is testing the credibility and reliability of historical sources and ensuring the authenticity of sources in physical/digital form (Herlina, 2020). For example, identifying the source of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government's propaganda when it ran the emergency government of Australia so that the archive is in the Australian War Memorial.

Source interpretation is a stage of work that explains that one of the sources is ABDACOM's photo archive, after the meeting on the final preparations for evacuating the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government to Australia and ABDACOM Navies' sea denial efforts in the Java Sea. Historiography is the final step in writing down historical sources in a coherent narrative and following the rules of historical writing that apply in *Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia* (MSI) or the Indonesian Society of Historians.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Japan is an area in East Asia that has almost always experienced civil wars for centuries. Daimyos, the name for warlords in Japan, attack each other. Daimyo unified Japan under one flag from the Oda clan (House of Owari) (Scott, 2021). Under the leadership of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Japan managed to unite and carry out a collective movement to invade China under the Ming Dynasty. As a result of the protracted war, which resulted in Japan's defeat, the most influential general, Tokugawa Ieyasu, they have finally carried out a coup against Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Tokugawa Ieyasu withdrew Japanese troops still stuck on the Korean Peninsula (China's satellite area) back to Japan. Japan began to enter the reign of the shoguns. The Shogun is a warlord who rules over Japan. Military leadership lasted approximately three centuries from 17-19 Anno Domini (AD). Machiavelli (2015) believes that military power is the basis for the life of civil society.

The beginning of Japan's introduction to the United States (the U.S.) was marked by the arrival of a U.S. Navy fleet under the leadership of Commodore Matthew Perry, who forced the shogun to open ports in Japan to trade with the outside world, especially

the U.S., on March 31, 1854 (Oktorino, 2016). Matthew Perry represented the U.S. in the Kanagawa trade agreement with the Empire of Japan (Susanto, 2016).



Figure 1. The arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry at the Port of Yokohama, Japan (Susanto, 2016)

Since the era of openness in Japan began sometime later, the shogun government was overthrown by disgruntled people and returned the Emperor as the leader of Japan. The Emperor then used a parliamentary system of government and a cabinet system (Susanto, 2016). Since Emperor Mutsuhito (Meiji) carried out a reform called the "Meiji Restoration". Japan held conscription to modernize its armed forces. The army was modeled on the Prussian military (now Germany), and the Navy imitated the Royal Navy (Britain) (Oktorino, 2016). In his book "The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783", Mahan describes the sea as an economic, political, and military domain. According to Mahan, to popularize the theory of sea power, strong determination and will is needed to optimize power and political control in the sea. In this context, the Asia-Pacific region is dominated by Western imperialist powers (Yadav, 2022). At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan seeks to counter Western hegemony in Asia.

Japanese Invasion

Japan started a series of invasions in East Asia in the second half of the 19th century. The *Hakko Ichi-u* ideology became one of the reasons Japan was very aggressive in expanding its territory. Japan considers itself the center of the Greater East Asia region with the claim that the Emperor is the descendant of a God, so it becomes legitimate that the Japanese have the right to lead the Asian nation. Japan then transformed from the dominant land power into the sea because Japan had separate territory from the area it was about to conquer. The sea is a means to speed up territorial conquest and apply sea control in Asia, dominated by the Royal Navy fleet under the British India Command (Agung, 2020). The peak was HMS *Repulse* and HMS *Prince of Wales*, which were sunk by the Japanese in Singapore (Subiakto, 2015).

The Japanese invasion that began in 1894 was carried out in stages. The Japanese army attacked the Russian Empire's territory. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 succeeded in making Russia submit by surrendering Sakhalin Island and Port Arthur (1905). Then the two vassal regions of China, namely Korea (1910) and Manchuria

(1931) (Agung, 2020). In addition, Japan controlled Formosa (now Taiwan) and invaded and controlled part of the eastern Chinese mainland. When entering World War I, Japan, which was on the Allied side, succeeded in winning and obtaining the colonies of the losing parties, including former German colonies in China and the Pacific Ocean (Oktorino, 2016). After World War I, Japan was known as "The Big Five" of them. This success made the position of the militarists (pro-expansionists) even stronger in parliament and the armed forces.



Figure 2. Map of the Japanese Invasion of the Republic of China in World War II (Susanto, 2016)

Tensions in various regions initiated the arms race. After World War I, it became a world economic problem to stop this competition because it needed to be more manageable for the state budget. So on November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922, the international Naval Conference held in Washington D.C. made the decision (Susanto, 2016):

1. all countries must limit their combat fleet (combat ship tonnage), and
2. the United States, Britain, and Japan are limited to 525, 525, and 315 thousand tons, respectively (5:5:3).

The Japanese invasion since the conference's existence has remained strong. However, it has been increasingly active in carrying out a sea control strategy so that the East Asia region is effectively under the shadow of the Kaigun (Imperial Japanese Navy). The sea control strategy being developed is to increase the number of bases to support military campaigns in Greater East Asia. Japan's actions were based on the theory of sea control (Sir Julian S. Corbett). Japan invaded to show Japanese supremacy in various ways compared to other Asian countries. This study argues the concept of the heartland in Asia-Pacific because various valuable natural resources are found in this region, such as oil and gas, and abundant human resources.

Sea control, in general, can mean the ability of the fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a sea area for a limited period (Sutanto, Priyanto, & Adriyanto, 2022). Japan can carry out sea control because its naval fleet dominates compared to other Asian countries. China at that time had a land (continental) orientation. Only Thailand in Indochina was not colonized and had a relatively weak navy because it was under the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale/La Royale (France) domination.

“...oil from the South (Southeast Asia), especially from the Dutch East Indies, is an absolute requirement. In this case, oil is the beginning and end of the politics of expansion to the South of Japan “Aiko and Sumio Tanabe” (Agung, 2020)

A Japanese puppet state is established in Manchuria (1931). The U.S. embargoed Japan due to aggressive and provocative actions in East Asia. Japan's oil resources significantly depended on the U.S. when an embargo occurred. It made Japan invade the South (Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies), rich in mineral resources. The Kaigun invaded the South after obtaining the approval of the Japanese parliament and armed forces. The invasion was carried out after Japan sent a trade note to the Dutch East Indies to fulfill its need for mining products, which the Dutch East Indies eventually met except for oil (Agung, 2020).



Figure 3. The track of the Japanese Invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1941 (National Resilience Institute of Indonesia, 2022)

Road to the South

Japan won against Russia in (1904-1905). However, instead, in 1937 & 1938, Japan lost when there were several battles between the Japanese Elite Troops from the 23rd (Kwantung) Division and the Soviet Union Troops under the command of Marshal Zhukov, Japan lost a total of ± 45,500 soldiers killed (Oktorino, 2016). The defeat at the top became a clear answer to the Rikugun (Japanese Army) that the invasion of the north was a stalemate. Finally, the Japanese Government and military (Kaigun & Rikugun) agreed to invade the south, which was possible and urgently needed to achieve

the goals of the Greater East Asian Commonwealth with Japan as its leader. The fall of France in 1940 into German hands made Japan's move south much easier because Indochina, a French colony, was now controlled by the pro-German Vichy regime. It prompted Japan to finally be invited to establish the headquarters of the southern Japanese army in Dalat, southern Vietnam.

To assault allied convoys and collect goods that were difficult to come by in Europe, such as raw rubber, copra, palm oil, tea, coffee, opium, quinine, and non-ferrous metal materials in the Indian Ocean, Japan obtained assistance from the "Gruppe Monsun" combat fleet. Moreover, Japanese bases in Kobe, Japan, Penang, Malaya, Jakarta, Surabaya, Dutch East Indies were accessible to the German U-boat force (Oktorino, 2015). After Indochina submitted to Japan, it was Malaya's turn, a British colony, to fall through land and sea invasions from the north of the Malay peninsula. Furthermore, the Philippines, a U.S. colony, surrendered relatively quickly thanks to Japan's lightning attack with its octopus strategy. After a series of conquest events above, the Allied base automatically had to move to the Dutch East Indies as the last Allied bastion in the Asia-Pacific.

"33 ships totaling 191,860 Gross Register Tons (GRT) were sunk by the eight initial U-boats of Gruppe Monsun and the sixteen "Second Wave" U-boats." (Keimer, 2019)



Figure 4. Dutch East Indies Government Propaganda Poster (Dutch Government, 1944)

The success of the southern Japanese war fleet in controlling the region in Southeast Asia in a short time made the Allied position in the Western Pacific increasingly pressured by the Allied leadership in Manila, Philippines, namely General Douglas MacArthur informed ABDACOM leader Admiral Hart that he would flee to Surabaya, Dutch East Indies (Agung, 2020).



Figure 5. Supreme Commander ABDACOM, KNIL, and Lieutenant Governor General of the Dutch East Indies (Adryamarthanino, 2022)

From left to right, HJ van Mook (Lieutenant Governor General of the Dutch East Indies), General Sir Archibald Percival Wavell (Supreme Commander of ABDACOM and Governor General of India), and Major General Hein ter Poorten (Commander of the KNIL) in Jakarta. The three of them were making final preparations before the Japanese invasion of Java. The decline of the Allies in the West Pacific did not occur solely because of Japanese superiority but was due to internal conflicts within ABDACOM. Admiral Hart's leadership as head of the navy at ABDACOM was unpopular. Dutch military officers dominated ABDACOM as its main element, while its leadership was under an American general then. It created disharmony on the part of the Allies so that in the end, Admiral Hart resigned and was replaced by Admiral Helfrich (Netherlands) (Agung, 2020). Since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Hawaii, U.S.), the morale level of the Japanese army was so high that their country could attack even a superior country like the U.S. This event became a lesson for the Allies in dealing with the enemy if it is necessary to form a stable alliance and joint training to maintain the soldiers' readiness during peacetime.

Japanese Octopus Clutching the Dutch East Indies

Japanese troop positions in Davao, Philippines, quickly moved towards the Dutch East Indies. The main target is an area with oil-producing installations such as Tarakan and Balikpapan, Kalimantan. After controlling essential areas that supported the needs of the Japanese combat fleet, the next attack was directed towards the Allies' last stronghold in Southeast Asia, namely Java Island, which also served as the center of the Dutch East Indies government. Governor General AWS Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer made preparations by sending a combat fleet to intercept a convoy of Japanese combat fleets entering Java Island. Admiral Helfrich appointed Rear Admiral Karel Doorman with the combat group he led based in Surabaya.

According to Agung (2020), the Japanese planned to occupy Java from two directions, west and east; the western fleet departed from around Bangka to Batavia, while the eastern fleet departed from Bali and Bawean to immediately penetrate the Allied internal defense lines in Surabaya and its surroundings. Japan had exercised sea control over the Dutch East Indies since Malaya and the Philippines fell, and

communication and logistics lines were automatically cut off. Reinforcements were hampered, and the only way to get to Java was through the port of Cilacap.

The last ABDACOM Sea Denial in the Java Sea was the De Ruyter and Java (Netherlands) Explorers, HMAS Perth (Australia), and two heavy cruisers, HMS Exeter (England) and Houston (the U.S.). They were supported by 11 Destroyer Kortenaer, Eversten, Witte de With, Electra, Jupiter, Encounter, Ford, Pope, Paul Jones, John Edwards, and Alden (Agung, 2020). The Java Sea became the most significant and last counteroffensive for the Allies against Japan in 1942 in the Dutch East Indies. ABDACOM could no longer defend Southeast Asia and left the Netherlands to hand over the Dutch East Indies to Japan. Corbett (2004) stated that victory could not be separated from the ability of sea control or command of the sea from Japan in making it easier for its fleet to invade the south by creating a base in South Vietnam which was strategic because it was very close to the battlefield as Corbett's theory of mastery of the sea in the surrounding area allows the enemy to alienate and forces him to fight decisive battles even if he is not in an advantageous position.

ABDACOM's failure to defend Southeast Asia from Dai Nippon. They were making ABDACOM experience a crisis of strategic leadership due to the resignation of Sir Archibald Percival Wavell on 25 February 1942. Wavell then ceded and suggested control of ABDACOM to the Netherlands and created two Allied commands to replace ABDACOM with the Southwest Pacific Command and the British India Command based in India (Agung, 2020).




Figure 6. Infographics of Java Sea Battle Victims (Matanasi, 2020)

Fall of the Dutch East Indies

Referring to Oktorino (2016) the division of the Japanese military administration in the Dutch East Indies was divided into three:

1. the islands of Java and Madura under Osamu Shudan (Rikugun's 16th Army) are based in Jakarta, led by Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura;
2. Sumatera Island under Tomi Shudan (25th Rikugun Army). Initially, the administrative center was in Singapore, then shifted to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, led by Lieutenant General Akira Muto; and
3. Kalimantan and the rest of eastern Indonesia are under Dai Ni Nankenkantai (2nd Kaigun Southern Fleet), headquartered in Makassar, led by Vice Admiral Kazutaka Shiraishi.

To support Greater East Asia/Asia-Pacific military operations, they often recruited Heiho or Japanese military auxiliaries in any region under Japanese control. The development of *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (BKR) in land, sea, and air dimensions will be preceded by Heiho/Peta/Keibodan/Seinendan and other paramilitary formations (Wardani, 2016). It was the main reason Indonesia chose to support Japan over the Netherlands.

The reasons for the fall of the Dutch East Indies were an accumulation process that lasted long since the era of oceanic exploration. Dutch trading companies then formed the VOC (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*), making the Netherlands a solid and influential maritime country because of its sea power capabilities. The strategic geographical position of the Dutch East Indies is a large area of VOC monopoly, fertile land and beaches, and rich natural resources. Supported by the number of people who descended to the sea in the Netherlands, the majority of livelihoods, national character, and the Dutch government encouraged exploration of the oceans to find the East Indies or the Dutch East Indies. It explains the concept of Dutch sea power as bottom-up, not top-down (Mulya, 2013).

“Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery of Alamein had reminded how “from the days when humans first began to use the seas, the great lesson of history is that the enemy who is confined to land strategy is in the end defeated” (Joesoef, 2014)

Mahan's concept of sea power shows that a maritime country that colonizes maritime areas will weaken if there is a cultural change in the colonized society from a maritime culture to an agrarian culture, such as the Dutch East Indies, which since 1799 when the VOC collapsed the Dutch took over and focused on the agricultural industry (land-based) to fulfill European market needs. The reasons above reinforce that the Dutch East Indies naval combat fleet in the 20th century was less harsh and modern than the Japanese. The Netherlands needed to prepare for the threat of a sea war on a massive scale in the Asia-Pacific after World War I.

Building Indonesian Maritime Defense

Alfred T. Mahan stated several essential variables in building sea power include (1) Geographical Position; (2) Physical Conformation including, as connected in addition to that, natural productions and climate; (3) Extent Territories; (4) Number of Population;

(5) The character of the People; and (6) The government's character is included in the national institutions (Mahan, 1987). Indonesia has most of these criteria; it is just that Indonesia has a defense-active state defense system, which means it does not intend to become an aggressor country. The final point is that the character of the government and national institutions that led to the development of the maritime sector in Indonesia has only been established in the last decade or so, developed extensively by President Joko Widodo (2014-2019 & 2019-2024). Indonesia has Bakamla RI (Indonesia Coast Guard), which will become a coordinating institution based on Bakamla RI Regulation Number 19 of 2021 in maintaining security, safety, and law enforcement in the territorial sea, additional zones, exclusive economic zones, and the continental shelf (Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, 2023). Indonesia is currently concerned about dividing the mandala of war, which may become a potential threat in Indonesia's jurisdiction through the Joint Defense Area Commands I, II, and III. Things like this were not developed by the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government then. They were more dominant in developing a commercial fleet not accompanied by a combat fleet that should be tasked with guarding SLOC/T. At that time, the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands directed the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (KNIL) and supervised Koninklijk Marine (KM) had no interest in building a defense alliance with Britain and, in the event of war, chose to be neutral.

“From the beginning of the 19th century, free trade and aloofness on the one hand and determination to defend the Dutch colonial empire, on the other hand, were the major components of this foreign policy. Involvement in international power struggles could complicate Dutch trade and colonial design” (Van Den Berg, 2013).

The ABDACOM defense alliance, because it was formed during the war, was very ineffective in deterring Japanese attacks, which were structured with clear lines of command. At the same time, ABDACOM cooperated partially, and there was internal conflict. At the same time, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Colonial Government of the Netherlands East Indies adhered to the principle of inward-looking, namely focusing on facing the threat of local royal resistance, not outward looking at the strategic environment in East Asia, which was growing. According to Van Den Burg in his thesis entitled "Patterns of Innovation: a Historical Case Study of Military Innovation in the Netherlands East Indies Navy from 1900-1942", the East Indies produced 90 percent of the world's quinine, 70 percent of the kapok, 38 percent of the rubber, and 4 percent of the world's oil production. The potential for this wealth that escaped the attention of the colonial government at that time was that it would be the potential for its colonies to be controlled by the aggressor country of Japan.

Indonesia also must be more vigilant with the potential for natural resources that have yet to be explored. If the superpower knows the certainty, it will become a kind of early warning system for the Indonesian Military (TNI) to fortify every inch of the country's territory regarding the threat of the current occupancy of other countries, China in South China adjacent to the North Natuna Sea. The lesson that Indonesia can apply at this time is Japanese naval strategy applied in Southeast Asia, including the octopus attack strategy (offensive-active), which makes the enemy surround both island

and mainland countries so that it will reduce the fighting power of the enemy who is surrounded (sea blockade) near, medium, and far (loose). When an archipelagic country is cut off, inter-island communication will automatically weaken the defense of defensive countries in stages because they usually have a high dependence on one another. Indonesia must continue to strive for an inter-island defense system that is independent and self-sufficient. On the other hand, ABDACOM was formed based on the urgency of potential expansion from Japan, so several allied countries with colonies in Southeast Asia urgently formed a defense alliance in the Indo-Pacific region in January 1942 (Agung, 2020).

Indonesia has widely spread islands. This will create a very large sea and coastal defense line, so a government policy is needed to increase the budget for the Indonesian Navy to become the most dominant, for example, the United Kingdom. The amount of the budget may be in the following percentages: the Indonesian Navy or TNI AL is 40 percent, the Indonesian Army or TNI AD is 30 percent, and the Indonesian Airforce or TNI AU is 30 percent. In addition to the dominant budget, the number of personnel and defense equipment must be directly proportional to the aspirations of becoming the world's maritime axis country and golden Indonesia in 2045.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

The Battle of the Java Sea was the final point and proof of the long journey of Japanese military transformation from the very traditional to the modern. The fall of the Dutch East Indies proved the speed and integration (Blitzkrieg) (Rikugun and Kaigun) of implementing their Sea Power (decisive battle)-Sea Control strategy (sea denial and blockade), projection of power to center of gravity, octopus scheme operations, and implementing the Hakko Ichi-u ideology accompanied by the spirit of bushido a la Samurai, which made Dai Nippon's troops have a high fighting spirit. Through this research, it seeks to position the theories of sea power (Alfred T. Mahan), sea control (Sir Julian S. Corbett), and heartland (Sir Halford Mackinder) with the suitability of the 20th-century geopolitical paradigm, which was dominated by the struggle for the critical maritime domain as the Sea Lines of Communication/Trade (SLOC/T). The research offers a heart sea concept/theory which explains that the Asia-Pacific is a hotspot and an inflection point in the potential for war in the future.

As a country with a strategic location, Indonesia must become a balancing force with the precondition of realizing the ideals of becoming a world maritime axis country through the development of maritime culture. Maritime culture is a foundation for strengthening Indonesia's layered maritime defense system but with the availability of a fleet that has not yet reached the current Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) target. The Indonesian government should prioritize increasing the budget to increase and rejuvenate the Indonesian Navy's main weaponry system to protect the boundaries of Indonesia's maritime jurisdiction bordering other countries such as China, the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), AUKUS (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and Quad Cooperation as Indonesia's potential enemies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Future research is expected to be able to fill in the gaps in this research to complement knowledge in sea battles in the Dutch East Indies which have significance for the study of maritime defense strategies, for example, the Japanese occupation of the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other eastern regions.

REFERENCES

- Adryamarthanino, V. (2022, March 25). ABDACOM: Latar Belakang, Tujuan, Anggota, Tugas, dan Kegagalan. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from <https://www.kompas.com/stori/read/2022/03/25/150000479/abdacom-latar-belakang-tujuan-anggota-tugas-dan-kegagalan>
- Agung, A. (2020). *Pertempuran Laut Jawa: Gurita Jepang Mencengkram Nusantara*. Yogyakarta: Matapadi Presindo.
- Burhanuddin. (2015). Dinamika Negara-Negara Teritori Asing di Kawasan Pasifik Barat Daya. *KRITIS: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Hasanuddin*, 1(2), 239–260.
- Corbett, J. S. (2004). *Principles of Maritime Strategy*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Dutch Government. (1944). *Indie Moet Vrij! (Indie Must Be Free! Work and Fight for it!)*. London.
- Herlina, N. (2020). *Metode Sejarah*. Bandung: Satya Historika.
- Indonesian Maritime Security Agency. (2023). *Bahan Paparan Pusat Komando dan Pengendalian*. Jakarta: Center for Command and Control of the Maritime Security Agency of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Joesoef, D. (2014). *Studi Strategi: Logika Ketahanan dan Pembangunan Nasional*. Jakarta: Kompas.
- Keimer, C. (2019). *Gruppe Monsun – the U-Boat Operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans during World War II*. Charles Town: American Military University.
- Lapian, A. B. (2017). *Pelayaran dan Perniagaan Nusantara Abad ke-16 dan 17*. Depok: Komunitas Bambu.
- Machiavelli, N. (2015). *The Art Of War* (Translated). Yogyakarta: Narasi.
- Mahan, A. T. (1987). *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Matanasi, P. (2020, October 12). Orang-orang Indonesia yang Gugur dalam Pertempuran Laut Jawa. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from <https://tirto.id/orang-orang-indonesia-yang-gugur-dalam-pertempuran-laut-jawa-f5Cr>
- Mulya, L. (2013). Postur Maritim Indonesia: Pengukuran melalui Teori Mahan. *Lembaran Sejarah*, 10(2), 127–134.
- National Resilience Institute of Indonesia. (2022, May 25). “Geo V” Orasi Ilmiah Gubernur Lemhannas RI Andi Widjajanto. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2R9nuYwUHdw>
- Oktorino, N. (2015). *Nazi di Indonesia: Sebuah Sejarah yang Terlupakan*. Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo.
- Oktorino, N. (2016). *Di Bawah Matahari Terbit*. Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo.
- Scott, S. (2021). *Watch Age of Samurai: Battle for Japan*. Retrieved from <https://www.netflix.com/id-en/title/80237990>
- Subiakto, A. (2015). *Kriegsmarine Battelships: Kehancuran Kapal-Kapal Tempur Jerman dalam Perang Dunia II*. Yogyakarta: Mata Padi Pressindo.
- Susanto, M. (2016, November 30). Latar Belakang Keterlibatan Jepang pada Perang Dunia II. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from <https://www.zenius.net/blog/perang->

dunia-ii-jepang

- Sutanto, R., Priyanto, & Adriyanto, A. (2022). *Naval and Maritime Strategy*. Bogor: Unhan RI Press.
- Van Den Berg, R. W. A. (2013). *Patterns of Innovation: A Historical Case Study of Military Innovation in the Netherlands East Indies Navy from 1900-1942*. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas.
- Wardani, N. K. (2016). Tentara Laut dalam Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia (1945-1950). *Ilmu Sejarah*, 1(4), 1-18.
- Yadav, A. S. (2022). *Indo-Pasifik: Sebuah Konstruksi Geopolitik*. Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo.