



Jurnal Pertahanan

Media Informasi tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan *Identity*, *Nationalism* dan *Integrity*
e-ISSN: 2549-9459

<http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal>



POLICIES AND SCENARIOS TO PREVENT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Winuhoro Hanumbhawono

Republic of Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810
winuhoro.h@idu.ac.id

Penny Radjendra

Republic of Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810
penny.radjendra@idu.ac.id

Suharto Ladjide

Republic of Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810
suharto@idu.ac.id

Article Info

Article history:

Received : March 22, 2022

Revised : April 18, 2022

Accepted : April 29, 2022

Keywords:

Analytical Hierarchy Process,
Analytical Network Process,
Nuclear Weapon,
Policy Strategy,
South China Sea Disputes

DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v8i1.1653>

Abstract

The issue of the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between the United States (U.S.) and China, which has not abated, has caused concern for countries in the region to escalate and lead to war from both sides. The thing that becomes the biggest threat when there is a nuclear war between the U.S. and China where will have an impact on several countries, one of them is Indonesia. This study tries to provide an overview of how to determine Indonesia's strategic policy from the hypothesis of existing policy options based on possible scenarios by formulating a strategic thinking framework to prevent the use of nuclear weapons as a result of the U.S.-China dispute in the SCS, using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Analytic Network Process (ANP) methods to determine the right policy strategy. The results of AHP and ANP methods show the same results, where ASEAN-SEANWFZ (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) Multilateral Diplomacy is the Policy Choice that gets the biggest priority, and Peaceful Solutions become the Scenario that gets the highest priority.

© 2022 Published by Indonesia Defense University

INTRODUCTION

The Asia Pacific region said as a new center of gravity of global security, and this region

become the most strategic region in the world. International security in general is largely determined by how the dynamics

and security interactions in the region are. The Asia Pacific region is also the region with the most dynamic economic growth. This strategic position makes the Asia Pacific an important center of activity in the global political arena (Planifolia, 2017). This strategic position will certainly result in a constellation of conflicts and cooperation that will not only involve countries in the region but also superpower countries outside the region.

So far, the United States of America (U.S.) is the established power in the world (Manyin et al., 2012). Post-Cold War, U.S. security policy seems to focus a lot on the Middle East region, and the U.S. seems to be 'forgotten' the Asia Pacific region. The emergence of the People's Republic of China (China) with its economic and military power in recent decades, seems to have made the U.S. aware of the meaning of geopolitics and geostrategy in the Asia Pacific (Wibowo, 2018). The rivalry between the U.S. and China could become the most important regional issue in the next few years.

At present, China can be said to have become the new center of gravity in the region. The maritime territorial issue of the South China Sea has implications for the possibility of a confrontation with U.S. interests because China's main national interest is the territorial claims of the South and East China Seas that are contrary to the maritime boundaries of U.S. alliance countries. Although China's foreign policy demonstrates a 'play well' strategy and does not directly challenge U.S. power, it still seeks to divert U.S. power in the region. It is in China's interest that it wants to establish a new political and security order in Asia, at least at one point it will have an equal 'voice' with the U.S. on regional issues.

A new dilemma arises if the U.S. cannot properly intervene in efforts to deter China from imposing its territorial claims. A regional arms race may begin in response to the U.S. incompetence. However, if the U.S. decides to adopt tougher measures

against China, this could also lead to a potential conflict that jeopardizes regional security stability. The U.S. clearly will not recognize China in proclaiming sovereignty over the islands in question. The question then is whether these claims will be met with concrete action from the U.S. China is likely to strengthen its military strongholds in the claimed territory, or put pressure on claimants such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, or the Philippines to test the U.S. commitment to helping its allies. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. commitment to ensuring its naval power and protecting the interests of its military allies constitutes a long-term military engagement or is simply a bluff to protect its security partners.

Table 1. World Nuclear Power 2020

Country	First Nuclear Test (Yr)	Total Inventory (Warhead)
United States (U.S.)	1945	5,800
Rusia	1949	6,375
United Kingdom	1952	215
France	1960	290
China	1964	320
India	1974	150
Pakistan	1998	160
Israel	NA	90
North Korea	2006	30 - 40

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020b

The development of the strategic environment of the South China Sea dispute between the U.S. and China which has not abated has caused concern for countries in the region to escalate and lead to war from both sides. Worries arise when each uses nuclear weapons in the war that will occur. U.S. has a nuclear arsenal ahead of nuclear-producing China starting in 1964 (Ghosh, 2011; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Data from (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020b) states that the U.S. has a

total arsenal of 5,800 nuclear missiles, while China has 320 nuclear missiles.

If the use of nuclear weapons occurs in a disputed area in the South China Sea between the U.S. and China, it will be very dangerous for countries in the region, including Indonesia. Indonesia as one of the founders of ASEAN on November 27, 1971, signed the Zone of Peace Free and Neutral (ZOPFAN) which consisted of 5 countries (Hamid & Jmaan, 2015). Then on December 15, 1995, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was signed, namely an agreement between Southeast Asian countries consisting of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (ASEAN Treaty Division, 2020).

As a country that adheres to the principle of a free-active foreign policy, the government should take a stand to deal with disputes that occur between the two great powers that can endanger countries in the region. if nuclear weapons are used. Therefore, as a regional leader, preventing the use of nuclear weapons needs to be Indonesia's strategic policy, although at present it is still a hypothetical condition.

This hypothetical condition is important to consider because the superpowers still

find it difficult to understand each other's intentions. In addition, the superpower country's ability to think strategically as a Great Power did not decrease with the end of the Cold War (Muhammad Najeri Al Syahrin, 2018). Therefore, the possibility of using nuclear weapons will always exist. This study tries to provide an overview of how to determine Indonesia's strategic policy priorities from the hypothesis of existing policy options based on possible scenarios by formulating a strategic thinking framework to prevent the use of nuclear weapons as a result of the U.S.-China strategic battle in the South China Sea.

METHODS

The policy choice hypothesis as Indonesia's strategic policy is developed by formulating a strategic thinking framework by considering Current Conditions, Expected Conditions, Future projections, and Desired Future. (Figure 1). The strategic thinking framework was developed into a model that becomes the analytical framework for the hypothesis of the policy choice based on Possible Scenarios, Activities, Strategic Considerations, and Actors involved (Figure 2).




Figure 1. Strategic Thinking Framework
 Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021




Figure 2. Development of Strategic Thinking Framework
Source: Processed by Authors, 2021




Figure 3. Analytical Model
Source: Processed by Authors, 2021

The model from Figure 2 becomes a reference for further analysis using the ANP and AHP for Policies and Scenarios as alternatives (Figure 3). The analysis was carried out using the Analytical Network Process (ANP) and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), as well as a comparison between the results of the two analyzes. Therefore, the analysis consists of:

1. analysis of Policies as the alternatives using AHP and ANP, and a comparison between the two methods; and
2. analysis of Scenarios as the alternatives using AHP and ANP, and comparisons between the two methods; and
3. validity and reliability analysis of ANP methods.

Current Condition: Disputes in the South China Sea Develop into U.S.-China Rivalry

Rivalry for geopolitical influence shows an increasing trend in the Indo-Pacific region. China's efforts to expand its influence in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific have been challenged by the U.S., India, and Australia (Miller, 2017). China Coast Guard presence in the disputed area and its presence in the South China Sea is a form of implementing China's unilateral claims to the disputed areas and forcing the recognition that the South China Sea is under Chinese jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the U.S. considered that China's behavior could threaten security stability in the South China Sea region so the U.S. and its allies held military forces and carried out exercises around the South China Sea (Aljazeera, 2021). By China, U.S. military maneuvers and exercises in SCS waters and Pacific waters involving countries that have conflicting interests with China are considered provocative actions and can be disruptive (Aljazeera, 2021).

Expected Condition: Disputes in The South China Sea does not Develop into the Use of Nuclear Weapons

In classic war theory, three main factors are driving a country to invade, namely

economic capacity, military capability, and motives. So far, China already has strong economic capabilities and military capabilities that cannot be underestimated. China has grown to become the second most powerful economy in the world with the largest military power in Asia. China's defense spending continued to increase to 261 billion U.S. dollars in 2015 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020a), second to the U.S. China has prepared strong points in the South China Sea by establishing bases on several atolls on the islands it claims. China is also building a force that allows it to project military power outward with the operation of the Liaoning aircraft carrier. Strategic air defense systems are also strengthened. China also has a nuclear arsenal (Ghosh, 2011). So far, China already has strong economic capabilities and military capabilities that cannot be underestimated. China has grown to become the second most powerful economy in the world with the largest military power in Asia. China's defense spending continued to increase to 261 billion U.S. dollars in 2015, second only to the U.S. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020a).

Future Projection: Escalation of Disputes in the South China Sea

The increasing escalation of disputes in the South China Sea is mainly seen by the large deployment of U.S. and allied military assets as well as Chinese military assets. Based on information from Center for Defense Strategic Information of Defense Strategic Installation Agency, Ministry of Defense of Republic of Indonesia (Pusinfostrahan Bainstrahan, Kemhan RI), the presence of the U.S. Navy elements around the South China Sea was seen by the presence of the U.S. Navy ships USS John Paul Jones and USS Paul Hamilton which stopped in Singapore. On September 22, 2020. USS John Paul Jones DDG-53 docked at the wharf/Berth 5, Changi Naval Base at 11.00 LT to re-stock fuel. The destroyer departed from Pearl Harbor base

in early September 2020 and moved towards Middle East waters via the Malacca Strait on 23 September 2020. Then on the evening of 23 September 2020, the USS Paul Hamilton DDG-60 docked at the wharf/Berth 5, Changi Naval Base for refueling. The destroyer previously sailed from the Indian Ocean and on September 24, 2020, moved back towards the Pearl Harbor Naval Base via the South China Sea.

Elements of the military forces of U.S. allies operating in the South China Sea and the surrounding area include the Australian Navy (RAN), Singapore Navy (RSN), and the Japanese Navy (JMSDF). The marine element of the Australian Navy (RAN) which is known to be operating in the South China Sea on September 21, 2020, HMAS Hobart DDG-39 departed from the Sembawang pier, Singapore at 16.00 LT (UTC+8), transiting through the Singapore Strait and the Malacca Strait quickly about 17 knots, heading towards the Indian Ocean. On September 22, 2020, HMAS Sirius O-266 departed from the Sembawang pier, Singapore at 10.00 LT (UTC+8), transiting through the Singapore Strait and the Malacca Strait at a speed of 12 knots to the Indian Ocean.

The marine element of the Singapore Navy (RSN) which is known to have operated in the South China Sea on 26 s.d. 28 September 2020, as many as 4 marine elements including RSS Tenacious, RSS Dauntless, RSS Valour, RSS Valiant, and 3 air elements from Singapore including Fokker 50 MPA and 2 F-16s carrying out bilateral exercises in Exercise Singaroo 2020 with 2 marine elements of the Australian Navy (RAN) in the Southern part of the South China Sea, where a strong suspicion was made in the ex-Military Training Area (MTA) Alpha-2, Natuna Sea.

The marine elements of the Japanese Navy (JMSDF) which are known to operate in the South China Sea on 26-28 September 2020, a bilateral maritime exercise (JIMEX 20) was held between the Japanese marine elements (JS Kaga DDH-184 and JS Ikazuchi DD-107) and the Indian Navy

(INS Chennai D65, INS Tarkash F50, and INS Deepak A50) in western Indian waters. Previously, on September 18, 2020, JS Kaga DDH-184 and JS Ikazuchi DD 107 carried out bilateral maritime exercises with 2 elements of the Australian Navy (RAN), namely HMAS Hobart DDG-39 and HMAS Sirius O-266 in the South China Sea.

The increase in the intensity of the Chinese Navy's military exercises (PLAN) in several areas spread from the Bohay Bay, the Yellow Sea to the northern waters of the South China Sea Paracel, as well as the maneuvers of Chinese Air Force fighter aircraft (PLAAF) entering Taiwan's ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) was assessed by several parties, as Beijing's reaction to all maneuvers of the U.S. and partner countries of the U.S. such as Australia, India, and Japan (Quad) which are considered to be threatening China. Although the U.S. also considers all Chinese military maneuvers and exercises to disrupt peace and stability in the region and are not by the slogan "a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" promoted by the U.S. efforts to find a compromise point or deal between the U.S. and China are considered by some to be the best way to prevent conflicts in the region.

Chinese air elements estimated to be at several Chinese military airbases in the South China Sea (Fiery Cross, Subi, Mischief, and Woody) include J-10, J-11B, JH-7 and Su-30 fighters, H bombers -6J, Y-8 spy reconnaissance aircraft and KJ-200 MPA and Y-8 military transport aircraft.

Desired Future: Settlement of Disputes in the South China Sea

In the future, we all hope that there is a settlement of the dispute in the South China sea. Disputes in the South China Sea area will be easier to resolve if the U.S. as one of the major powers involved ratifies the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Budiwinarto, 2020). Hasjim Djalal, an expert on the international law of the sea, argues that all countries in the region have ratified

UNCLOS so they should be subject to the agreement, while the U.S. has not ratified it until now and this has become a problem (Sunyoto, 2020).

Actors

United States of America (U.S.)

The U.S. is a strategic and important partner in the Indo-Pacific region. Since the U.S. victory in World War 2 defeating Japan and its allies, as well as against Germany in Europe, the facts show that the U.S. is a security provider for security in the Asia Pacific for almost 6 decades. A stable and secure situation in the Asia Pacific region at that time resulted in an economic powerhouse such as countries in East Asia (South Korea, Japan, and China), steady stability and security also occurred in the Southeast Asian region (Al Syahrin, 2018). However, the current situation has tended to change after the U.S. made a greater distribution of power and influence to the Middle East in the 2010s era. Because of this, the Asia Pacific region gets more influence than China. However, the U.S. pivoted to Asia during the Obama administration. Since then, the U.S. as an established power has faced major challenges from China, which is seen as an emerging power (Manyin et al., 2012). The importance of Asia Pacific for the U.S. is shown by the presence of U.S. Pacom which has now changed to U.S. Indo-Pacom, which has changed since 2018 to cover a wider area, namely the area between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean (Planifolia, 2017). U.S. investment in ASEAN this year increased by 110%, from USD 11.65 billion to USD 24.5 billion, while the volume of U.S. trade with ASEAN increased by 39 percent from USD 211.8 billion to USD 294.6 billion. U.S. dollar (Media Indonesia, 2020).

People's Republic of China (T)

China is currently the only country capable of dealing with the U.S. in terms of economy, technology, as well as in military. However, unlike the U.S., China's military

bases outside the country still cannot match the U.S. Currently, ASEAN has become China's largest trading partner in the first quarter of 2020. In the first five to six months of 2020, ASEAN-China trade reached 240 million U.S. dollars, an increase of about 4.2 percent over the same period last year (Vazza, 2020). China's exports to Southeast Asia increased 2.8 percent to reach 936.62 billion yuan. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian imports from China jumped by six percent to 759.86 billion yuan. These figures were recorded as higher than the average growth of China's foreign trade in the same period. China and ASEAN trade is equivalent to 15 percent of China and the world's trade.

China is very active in building artificial islands in the Spratly and Paracel islands which are disputed by several countries in Southeast Asia (Putra, Samekto, & Hardiwinoto, 2016). Moreover, the development also includes development for strategic (military) purposes, namely the construction of a 3000 m long airstrip on Titu Island, infrastructure development for guided missiles, and other related equipment. China's presence in the South China Sea region has also resulted in an escalation of conflict in the South China Sea, in connection with the title of military assets and war games (show of force), which in this case the U.S. and its allies have also responded by holding FONOP (Freedom of Navigation Operations) operations. Currently other actors such as Australia, Japan, England, France, Germany, and Canada. China is currently a world power, especially economically, the military is also starting to develop, as well as advanced technologies such as quantum computing, 6G, and defense technology.

Strategic Considerations

Long Term Future Stability (PS1)

Development in one country will have a positive impact on its prosperity, peace, and security stability if the surrounding environment has steady security and stability. That is where countries can

coexist peacefully, further enhancing cooperation in achieving the goals of each country. Therefore, for the development of a country to have a positive impact on its people, long-term future stability is a very important strategic consideration that must be maintained.

Regional Resilience (PS2)

Regional resilience can be said as a dynamic condition between countries in the region (regional), especially in such cooperation, in this case, ASEAN, which can develop regional strengths to be able to face all kinds of threats, challenges, obstacles, and disturbances both from internal regional and from external. Increasing regional resilience is expected to guarantee regional stability, security, and peace, as the main prerequisite for development in the region for prosperity.

Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights (PS3)

There are six countries involved in disputes in the South China Sea, namely China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei using different versions of history to support their assertion of sovereignty. China bases its claim on the so-called nine-dash line that stretches nearly 2,000 kilometers from mainland China to several hundred kilometers from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. While this line only first appeared on official maps in 1948, China maintains that it is a confirmation of China's rights, not the creation of new claims, debating sovereignty based on historical invention and use. Malaysia and Brunei argue that the territory they claim falls within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines contests China's claims to most of the South China Sea and is taking its case to international arbitration under UNCLOS. In 2016, the Philippines won the case. The International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled that China had no legal basis for

claiming historic rights to the South China Sea and that it had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights. However, China did not budge. The situation in the South China Sea will be calm if each party, especially China, can recognize the sovereignty and sovereign rights of each party.

Activities

Reference for activities uses the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy) framework which is the U.S.' strategic framework in achieving national goals and national interests to maintain its national strength (Farlin, 2014), in this case, it is assumed that the same framework can be used by actors consistently, namely:

1. Diplomacy (D), activities related to negotiations and communication between countries
2. Information (I), information-gathering activities (intelligence)
3. Military (M), the activity of using military force
4. Economy (E), economic activities, such as trade, and so on.

Scenarios

Scenarios are developed based on various possible events that can occur, namely:

1. Peaceful solution (S1), there is a peaceful solution and the South China Sea Disputes are resolved
2. Develop as it is today (S2), conflict develops without a peaceful solution.
3. China's full claims (S3), China can finally claim the South China Sea territory.
4. U.S. uses nuclear weapons (S4), a war broke out and the U.S. used nuclear weapons

Policies

Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)

National Defense Strategy is formulated by considering national, regional, and global strategic environmental conditions. In addition, it must also reflect the geopolitical concept that the government wants to develop (Sisriadi, 2016). In this regard, the

doctrine of the World Maritime Axis should give color to the formulation of a national defense strategy that will be used as a guide for the deployment and use of national defense forces to ward off and deal with threats. From the understanding of the World Maritime Axis as a geopolitical concept, the conception of the development of national defense forces must be in line with a comprehensive-integral national development framework (Sisriadi, 2016). Strategic military strength is needed to increase the strength of the deterrent force. Indonesia needs to increase the deterrence effect by transforming its development strategy and use of its military forces to be more outward-looking and implementing an anticipatory forward defense system against military threats and new models of conventional warfare. This strategic power must be able to have a more flexible degree of freedom to be able to face various forms of threats to Indonesia, especially in anticipating the spillover of the U.S.-China rivalry.

Strengthening ASEAN Centrality And Neutrality (P2)

ASEAN's centrality and neutrality are contained in the ASEAN Charter (Kanan & Nuradhawati, 2020). Currently, there are three main challenges in the Southeast Asia region, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, security dynamics in the South China Sea, and economic cooperation in the region and globally. Amid this situation, the role of organizations in the region becomes very important. In the context of the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN is determined to maintain its peace, stability, and neutrality. ASEAN remains consistent in stating its principles and is committed to making the region a peaceful, stable, and secure region.

ASEAN-SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)

The idea of establishing a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) began on November 27, 1971, when 5 members of the ASEAN met in Kuala

Lumpur and signed the declaration of the ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality or ZOPFAN (Hamid & Jmaan, 2015). The main component of ZOPFAN that ASEAN is aiming for is the establishment of SEANWFZ (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2013). However, due to the unfavorable political atmosphere in the region, the official proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone was delayed until the mid-1980s. After negotiations and drafting by an ASEAN working group on ZOPFAN, the SEANWFZ treaty was finally signed by the heads of government from 10 ASEAN member countries in Bangkok on December 15, 1995 (Treaty On The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, n.d.).

The key points of SEANWFZ are: the Member States are obliged to:

1. not develop, produce, or purchase, possess, or control nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons bases, or conduct tests or use nuclear weapons anywhere, either inside or outside the Southeast Asian region;
2. not requesting or receiving assistance concerning nuclear;
3. does not carry out any activities to provide assistance or support the manufacture or takeover of any nuclear equipment by any country;
4. not provide resources or special materials or equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state, or nuclear weapons state unless the country has complied with a safety agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency;
5. prevent the operation or deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of its members and prevent nuclear tests from being carried out; and
6. prevent the sea area of Southeast Asia from dumping radioactive waste and or other radioactive materials by anyone.

ANP is a development of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) by Thomas L. Saaty in the 1970s, where according to the

developer, is a general theory of measurement, as an analytical tool allows to determine the priority of several alternatives when several criteria must be considered and allow to organize complex problems into an integrated network form.

ANP and AHP are part of the Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), which is a decision-making method to determine the best alternative from several alternatives based on certain criteria. MCDM has two categories, namely Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM) and Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM), ANP/AHP falls into the category of MADM as a method by taking many criteria as the basis for decision making, with a subjective assessment of the problem of selection, where mathematical analysis is not too much and is used for the selection of alternatives in small numbers (Rao, 2013; Fazlollahtabar & Saidi-Mehrabad, 2015).

In Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky (1988), it is explained that the theories relating to decisions in general can be categorized into three categories, namely descriptive decision theory, normative decision theory, and prescriptive decisions theory. Descriptive decision theory is concerned with decisions that are made and how they are made. Normative decision theory is concerned with how to make a logically consistent decision and decision-making procedure. While prescriptive decision theory is concerned with how to help someone make a good decision and how to train people to make better decisions.

ANP/AHP is an implementation of descriptive decision theory when used as a way to learn something by making comparisons, ANP/AHP becomes part of prescriptive decision theory when what is learned from the results of measurements using ANP/AHP is used as a guide to help make good decisions. ANP/AHP can be used for various decision contexts, descriptive or prescriptive (but not normative), depending on what the purpose or intent of using the method is.

The main principles of ANP/AHP

consist of five principles, namely Decomposition, Comparative Judgment, Synthesis of Priority, Logical Consistency, and Sensitivity Analysis (Brodjonegoro, 1992); (Saaty, 2017); Saaty, 2008). Decomposition is breaking down whole problems into their elements, including three sequential and interconnected processes, namely element identification, concept definition, and question formulation (Brodjonegoro, 1992).

Table 2. Pairwise Comparison Scales

Scale	Definition	Description
1	Equal Importance	Two elements contribute equally
3	Moderate Importance of One Over Another	Experience and judgment favor one element a little more than the others
5	Strong or Essential Importance	Experience and judgment strongly favor favoring one element over another
7	Very Strong or Demonstrate d Importance	An element is strongly supported, and its dominance has been seen in practice
9	Extreme Importance	The evidence in favor of one element over the other has the highest possible degree of affirmation to corroborate
2, 4, 6, 8	Intermediate Values	When a compromise is required between two considerations
1/3, 1/5, 1/9	Reciprocals for Inverse Comparison	ie. A compared to B is 3 so B compare to A is 1/3

Source: Saaty, 2008

Comparative Judgment means assessing the relative importance or influence of two elements on a particular element and their relationship to other elements. The assessment is presented in the form of a

Table 3. ANP/AHP Pairwise Comparison Matrix

Criteria	Alternative 1	Alternative 2	Alternative i	Alternative n
Alternative 1	1	A ₁₂	A _{1i}	A _{1n}
Alternative 2	A ₂₁ = 1 / A ₁₂	1	A _{2i}	A _{2n}
.....	1
Alternative j	A _{j1} = 1 / A _{1j}	A _{j2} = 1 / A _{2j}	1	A _{jn}
Alternative n	A _{n1} = 1 / A _{1n}	A _{n2} = 1 / A _{2n}	A _{nj} = 1 / A _{in}	1

Source: Saaty and Vargas, 2013; Saaty, 2008

Table 4. Paired Comparison Questionnaire Format in ANP/AHP

	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Alternative 1																		Alternative i
Alternative 2																	
Alternative 3																		Alternative n
.....																	
Alternative i																		Alternative i+1
.....																	
Alternative n - 1																		Alternative n

Source: Saaty and Vargas, 2013; Saaty, 2008

matrix called a pairwise comparison matrix with a comparison scale as shown in Table 2. If there are n alternatives in a criterion, a pairwise comparison matrix is arranged as shown in Table 3, where n is the number of alternatives and A_{ij} is the comparison value of alternative i and alternative j. The value on the diagonal entity matrix is 1 because logically comparing the same alternatives will have the same value. If alternative i is compared with alternative j with the value A_{ij}, then the comparison value of alternative 2 when compared to alternative 1 is $A_{ji} = \frac{1}{A_{ij}}$.

To complete the questionnaire, the matrix can be transformed into the form shown in Table 4, where, for several n alternatives, the number of entries that must be done can be calculated using equation 1.

$$\text{Number of Entry} = \frac{n \cdot (n-1)}{2} \tag{1}$$

ANP/AHP model in this study requires one view in one comparison, from these n views, one view must be produced that represents the views of all respondents or an aggregate assessment.

In the ANP/AHP model that uses the assessment of expert respondents as primary data, there may be one or more respondents or groups of respondents

whose assessments are considered to have a significant influence on the aggregate assessment because one or more respondents or groups of respondents have higher importance than another. If this is the case, to obtain an aggregate assessment carried out using an average, it is necessary to include the weight of the respondent's interests with a weight depending on the level of importance. Saaty (1999) explained that the mathematical function to calculate the aggregate rating, $\bar{u} = F(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$ where u is the rating scale and n is the number of respondents or ratings, as shown in equation 2.

$$\bar{u} = u_1^{w_1} \cdot u_2^{w_2} \dots u_n^{w_n} \tag{2}$$

where ,
 $w_1 + w_2 + \dots + w_n = 1$ dan $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n > 0$

Synthesis of Priority is done by calculating the Local Priority of each paired assessment and then calculating the synthesis of priorities for the entire network. The method that is considered the most accurate and considers all interactions between elements and matrices in calculating local priority is to find the root and priority vector of the pairwise comparison matrix, namely the eigenvalues

and eigenvectors of the paired matrix.

A vector or matrix has several k eigenvalues and eigenvectors, which are equal to the number of rows in the vector or matrix. The local priority of a paired matrix is the eigenvector with the maximum eigenvalue of the paired matrix.

$$A \cdot \omega = \lambda_{\max} \cdot \omega \tag{3}$$

where,

A = Pairwise Matrix

λ_{\max} = Eigenvalue

ω = Eigenvector

Calculate the global priority, it is done by compiling a Supermatrix construction with entities consisting of a local priority matrix for each element. For example, in the network there are n elements C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n , then the Supermatrix is arranged as equation 4.

$$\begin{matrix} & C_1 & \dots & C_n \\ C_1 & [W_{11} & \dots & W_{1n}] \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ C_n & [W_{n1} & \dots & W_{nn}] \end{matrix} \tag{4}$$

Entities in Supermatrix, $W_{11}, W_{12}, \dots, W_{nn}$, referred to as Block of Super Matrix, which formed according to equation 5. Column entities in Block of Super Matrix, are Eigenvectors of each sub-element in the network element. This supermatrix is called the Unweighted Super matrix (equation 5).

$$\begin{bmatrix} \omega_{11} & \omega_{12} & \dots & \omega_{1j} \\ \omega_{21} & \omega_{22} & \dots & \omega_{2j} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \omega_{i1} & \omega_{i2} & \dots & \omega_{ij} \end{bmatrix} \tag{5}$$

The next step is to calculate the Weighted Super matrix by multiplying it by the Cluster Matrix which is an assessment of the influence between clusters and making it column stochastic (the sum of column entities is equal to 1).

After the Weighted Super matrix is obtained, the next step is to calculate the Limiting Super matrix by multiplying the Weighted Super matrix by the matrix. itself repeatedly until a constant or unchanging

entity is obtained. The entities in the Limiting Super matrix are the results of the Synthesis of Priority from the entire network which can then be analyzed according to the objectives and problems.

Logical Consistency means that the choice must be logically consistent. This Logical Consistency can explain the validity of the assessment results. As already explained, each number in the comparison matrix is a ratio because the number or scale that arises is based on a comparison between two elements. To meet the consistent requirements on a comparison matrix A of size $n \times n$:

$$a_{ij} = \frac{w_i}{w_j} \text{ dan } a_{ji} = \frac{1}{a_{ij}} = \frac{w_j}{w_i}, \text{ so} \tag{6}$$

$$a_{ij} \cdot w_j = w_i \tag{6}$$

$$a_{in} = \frac{w_i}{w_n} \text{ and } a_{ni} = \frac{1}{a_{in}} = \frac{w_n}{w_i}, \text{ then} \tag{7}$$

$$a_{in} \cdot w_n = w_i \tag{7}$$

$$a_{ii} = a_{jj} = a_{nn} = \frac{w_i}{w_i} = \frac{w_j}{w_j} = \frac{w_n}{w_n} = 1 \tag{8}$$

Through the substitution of equations 6, 7, and 8, we form a complete matrix as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1j} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{i1} & \dots & a_{ij} & \dots & a_{in} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & \dots & a_{nj} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_j \\ \vdots \\ w_n \end{bmatrix} =$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11}w_1 + \dots + a_{1j}w_j + \dots + a_{1n}w_n \\ \vdots \\ a_{i1}w_1 + \dots + a_{ij}w_j + \dots + a_{in}w_n \\ \vdots \\ a_{n1}w_1 + \dots + a_{nj}w_j + \dots + a_{nn}w_n \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1j} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{i1} & \dots & a_{ij} & \dots & a_{in} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & \dots & a_{nj} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_j \\ \vdots \\ w_n \end{bmatrix} = n \cdot \begin{bmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_j \\ \vdots \\ w_n \end{bmatrix} \tag{9}$$

The matrix A of size n x n will be consistent if $A \cdot \omega = n \cdot \omega$, where equation 3 is identical to equation 9 above. It can be seen that if the eigenvalues are equal to the magnitude of the matrix ($\lambda = n$), the more consistent the matrix is and if the eigenvalues are equal, the matrix is 100% consistent or 0% inconsistent. In (Saaty, 2017) it is explained that consistency in a comparison matrix is sought or measured through the amount of the Consistency Index (CI) obtained from:

$$CI = \frac{(\lambda_{max} - n)}{(n - 1)} \tag{9}$$

From the amount of the Consistency Index (CI), the Consistency Ratio (CR) can be obtained from equation 10:

$$CR = \frac{CI}{RI} \tag{10}$$

where CR represents the Consistency Ratio, CI represents the Consistency Index, and RI represents the Random Index. The Random Index (RI) represents the average consistency of the comparison matrices measuring 1 to 10 as in Table 5 obtained from an experiment by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and then continued by the Wharton School. The results show that the larger the matrix size, the higher the level of inconsistency produced (Brodjonegoro, 1992; Saaty & Vargas, 2013; Saaty, 2008).

Table 5. Random Indeks Up To 10 Alternatives

n	1	2	3	4	5
RI	0	0	0.58	0.9	1.12

n	6	7	8	9	10
RI	1.24	1.32	1.41	1.45	1.49

Sources : Brodjonegoro, 1992; Saaty & Vargas, 2013; Saaty, 2008

Sensitivity Analysis was conducted to answer the question of how sensitive the priority is if there is a slight change in the assessment. What is expected is a priority

that does not fluctuate too much if there is a small change in the rating. Sensitivity analysis can also be used to predict the situation in the event of significant change. In a network system, one element can be viewed as an exogenous variable while the other elements are endogenous variables. The sensitivity analysis of the network is to see the effect of changes in one variable on another variable.

When associated with a period, it can be said that sensitivity analysis is a dynamic element of a network. That is, the assessment made the first time is maintained for a certain period and any change in policy or action is sufficient to carry out a sensitivity analysis to see the effects that occur. This sensitivity analysis will also determine whether or not a network/hierarchical model is stable. The greater the deviation or priority change that occurs the more unstable the network model. Even so, a network model that is made must still have sufficient sensitivity, meaning that if there is a change in one variable, at least there is a change in the weight of the influence on the other variables. The larger and more detailed form of the network/hierarchical model to the problem is likely to lose its sensitivity. Sensitivity, however, is important for policy implementation because the decision-maker can anticipate when something unexpected happens (Brodjonegoro, 1992).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

For this study, the process of element identification and concept definition is shown in Figure 2 and the explanation. The formulation of the questions and the number of pairwise comparisons based on the identification of the elements and the definition of the concept referred to are shown in Table 6. The formulation of the questions was constructed into a paired comparison instrument with the format as shown in Table 4.

The assessment was given by six respondents who came from a representative of the Republic of Indonesia

Defense University Doctoral Students, Pusinfostrahan Bainstrahan Ministry of the Defense Republic of Indonesia, and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of which are given the same weight.

The aggregate of the assessments of all respondents is carried out using Equation 2, by also calculating the Consistency Ratio (CR) value of each paired assessment aggregate to determine whether the assessment made can be said to be valid. From the calculation, the maximum Consistency Ratio (CR) value is 0.0779 or 7.79%, and this value is still below 10% so it can be said to be consistent.

Furthermore, the Synthesis of Priority is calculated, where this process is carried out on the ANP and AHP models as shown in Figure 3. Then a Sensitivity Analysis is carried out by simulating changes in the

assessment of the Actor and Scenario components and seeing whether there is a change in the priority weights of Policies.

The calculation results for the analytical model as shown in Figure 3 are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. From the calculation, it is found that the priority order of Policies calculated using AHP and ANP shows the same results, ASEAN Multilateral Diplomacy-SEANWFZ (P3) is the preferred Policy Choice, followed by Building Strategic Military Strength (P1), and Strengthening ASEAN Centrality and Neutrality (P2) Likewise, the order of priority Scenarios calculated using AHP and ANP also show the same results, where Peaceful Solutions (S1) became the Scenario that received the highest priority, followed by Developing As It Is (S2), China Full Claim (S3), and U.S. using Nuclear Weapons (S4).

Table 6. Questions Formulation

Num	Questions Formulation	PB
1	The most influential Actor in nuclear war is when the conflict escalation increases	1
2	Scenarios deemed most relevant to each Strategic Considerations	3
3	Scenarios deemed most relevant to each Activity	4
4	The most likely scenario occurs when the conflict escalates.	1
5	Activities deemed to affect the Scenarios	4
6	Strategic Considerations that are considered to affect the Scenarios	4
7	Actors deemed most influential for each Strategic Consideration	3
8	The most influential Actor for each Activity	4
9	Policy choices deemed influential by each actor	2
10	Strategic Considerations that are seen as influencing Policy choices	3
11	Activities saw as influencing Policy choices	3
12	Activities that are considered the most influential by each actor	2
13	Strategic Considerations that are considered the most influential by each actor	2
Number of Paired Comparisons (PB)		36

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021

Table 7. Consistency Rasio (CR)

ID	n	λ	RI	CI	CR
1.1	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
2.1	4	4.0150	0.9000	0.0050	0.0056
2.2	4	4.0051	0.9000	0.0017	0.0019
2.3	4	4.0039	0.9000	0.0013	0.0015
3.1	4	4.1678	0.9000	0.0559	0.0621
3.2	4	4.0801	0.9000	0.0267	0.0297
3.3	4	4.0450	0.9000	0.0150	0.0167
3.4	4	4.2102	0.9000	0.0701	0.0779
4.1	4	4.0299	0.9000	0.0100	0.0111
5.1	4	4.1069	0.9000	0.0356	0.0396
5.2	4	4.1430	0.9000	0.0477	0.0530
5.3	4	4.0545	0.9000	0.0182	0.0202
5.4	4	4.0471	0.9000	0.0157	0.0174
6.1	3	3.0054	0.5800	0.0027	0.0047
6.2	3	3.0375	0.5800	0.0187	0.0323
6.3	3	3.0148	0.5800	0.0074	0.0127
6.4	3	3.0000	0.5800	0.0000	0.0000
7.1	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
7.2	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
7.3	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
8.1	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
8.2	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
8.3	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
8.4	2	2.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
9.1	3	3.0080	0.5800	0.0040	0.0069
9.2	3	3.0099	0.5800	0.0050	0.0085
10.1	3	3.0021	0.5800	0.0011	0.0018
10.2	3	3.0000	0.5800	0.0000	0.0000
10.3	3	3.0026	0.5800	0.0013	0.0022
11.1	4	4.0783	0.9000	0.0261	0.0290
11.2	4	4.0452	0.9000	0.0151	0.0167
11.3	4	4.0717	0.9000	0.0239	0.0266
12.1	4	4.0375	0.9000	0.0125	0.0139
12.2	4	4.0861	0.9000	0.0287	0.0319
13.1	3	3.0102	0.5800	0.0051	0.0088
13.2	3	3.0003	0.5800	0.0001	0.0002

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021

Table 8. Calculation Result - ANP

		ANP	
		Network	Cluster
Actors	U.S. (AS)	0.1201	0.5206
	China (T)	0.1106	0.4794
Strategic Considerations	Long Term Future Stability (PS1)	0.0702	0.3040
	Regional Resilience (PS2)	0.0583	0.2525
	Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights (PS3)	0.1023	0.4434

Activities	Diplomacy (D)	0.0720	0.3119
	Information (I)	0.0396	0.1718
	Military (M)	0.0645	0.2795
	Economy (E)	0.0546	0.2368
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions (S1)	0.0914	0.3959
	Developing As It Is Today (S2)	0.0679	0.2940
	China Full Claims (S3)	0.0411	0.1779
	U.S. uses Nuclear Weapons (S4)	0.0305	0.1322
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)	0.0283	0.3684 (2)
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality and Neutrality (P2)	0.0198	0.2576 (3)
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)	0.0288	0.3739 (1)

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021

Table 9. Calculation Result - AHP

		AHP	
		1*	2**
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions (S1)	0.3925 (1)	
	Developing As It Is Today (S2)	0.2939 (2)	
	China Full Claims (S3)	0.1809 (3)	
	U.S. uses Nuclear Weapons (S4)	0.1326 (4)	
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)		0.3694 (2)
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality And Neutrality (P2)		0.2573 (3)
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)		0.3733 (1)

* Goal: Future Projection

** Goal: Desired Future

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021

The results of the Sensitivity Analysis carried out by simulating changes in the assessment of the Actor and Scenario and seeing whether there is a change in the priority weights of Policies, are shown in Table 10. Simulation 1 is carried out by making changes to the priority weights of Actors, Simulation 2 is carried out by making changes to the priority weights. of Scenarios, while Simulation 3 is done by making changes to the priority weights of Actors and Scenarios together.

The results of Simulation 1 show that changes in the priority weights of Actors, cause the global priority order of Actor to also change, but does not affect the priority weight order of Policy choices. The results

of Simulation 2 show that the change in the priority weight of the Scenario, causes the global priority order of the Scenario to also change, but has no effect on the priority weight order of the Policy choices. Then, the results from Simulation 3 show that changes in the priority weights of Actors and Scenarios, cause the global priority order of Actors and Scenarios to also change, but do not affect the priority weighting order of Policy choices.

The results of this sensitivity analysis show the reliability of the assessment, where ASEAN-SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy can be said to be a policy choice that is given top priority.

Table 10. Sensitivity Analysis

		ANP	
		Calc.	Sim 1
Actors	U.S. (AS)	0.5206	0.4804
	China (T)	0.4794	0.5196
Strategic Considerations	Long Term Future Stability (PS1)	0.3040	0.3000
	Regional Resilience (PS2)	0.2525	0.2528
	Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights (PS3)	0.4434	0.4473
Activities	Diplomacy (D)	0.3119	0.3125
	Information (I)	0.1718	0.1714
	Military (M)	0.2795	0.2775
	Economy (E)	0.2368	0.2386
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions (S1)	0.3959	0.3960
	Developing as it is today (S2)	0.2940	0.2940
	China Full Claims (S3)	0.1779	0.1778
	U.S. uses Nuclear Weapons (S4)	0.1322	0.1322
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)	0.3684	0.3635
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality and Neutrality (P2)	0.2576	0.2595
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)	0.3739	0.3770
		ANP	
		Calc.	Sim 2
Actors	U.S. (AS)	0.5206	0.5282
	China (T)	0.4794	0.4718
Strategic Considerations	Long Term Future Stability (PS1)	0.3040	0.3041
	Regional Resilience (PS2)	0.2525	0.2450
	Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights (PS3)	0.4434	0.4508
Activities	Diplomacy (D)	0.3119	0.2523
	Information (I)	0.1718	0.1787
	Military (M)	0.2795	0.3382
	Economy (E)	0.2368	0.2308
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions (S1)	0.3959	0.1347
	Developing as it is today (S2)	0.2940	0.1842
	China Full Claims (S3)	0.1779	0.2942
	U.S. uses Nuclear Weapons (S4)	0.1322	0.3869
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)	0.3684	0.3694
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality And Neutrality (P2)	0.2576	0.2573
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)	0.3739	0.3734

		ANP	
		Calc.	Sim 3
Actors	U.S. (AS)	0.5206	0.4732
	China (T)	0.4794	0.5268
Strategic Considerations	Long Term Future Stability (PS1)	0.3040	0.2986
	Regional Resilience (PS2)	0.2525	0.2453
	Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights (PS3)	0.4434	0.4561
Activities	Diplomacy (D)	0.3119	0.2530
	Information (I)	0.1718	0.1782
	Military (M)	0.2795	0.3355
	Economy (E)	0.2368	0.2332
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions (S1)	0.3959	0.1348
	Developing As It Is Today (S2)	0.2940	0.1840
	China Full Claims (S3)	0.1779	0.2941
	U.S. uses Nuclear Weapons (S4)	0.1322	0.3871
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength (P1)	0.3684	0.3626
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality And Neutrality (P2)	0.2576	0.2598
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3)	0.3739	0.3775

Source: Processed by the Authors, 2021

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATION

The priority order of Policies calculated using AHP and ANP shows the same results, where ASEAN-SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy (P3) is the Policy choice that gets the highest priority, followed by Building Strategic Military Strength (P1) and Strengthening Centrality and Neutrality ASEAN (P2). The priority order of Scenarios calculated using AHP and ANP also shows the same results, where Peaceful Solutions (S1) is the Scenario that gets the highest priority, followed by Developing as it is (S2), China Full Claim (S3), and the U.S. using Nuclear Weapons (S4). The validity showed from the consistency of a good assessment (CR max <10%) indicates that the respondent provides a logical comparison assessment so that the assessment can be said to be valid. The reliability shown from the results of the Sensitivity Analysis in which the priority order of Policies does not change if

there is a change in the assessment indicates that the policy for Building Strategic Military Strength (P1) is reliable enough so that it can be considered for implementation.

In strategic studies, the term strategic military force is a military force that has nuclear capabilities consisting of a launcher system (short-range, medium-range, or long-range missiles), and a payload in this case a warhead. If it is related to this, the policy of building strategic military strength is one thing that has limitations due to regulations in ASEAN (SEANWFZ), because of technology that has not been achieved, and because of the inadequate economic conditions faced by the current national development system.

The policy of building strategic military forces that are carried out independently can also cause resistance in the region and also the challenges of increasing security dilemmas. This means the emergence of an arms race. So that means some risks need to be taken into

account from the policy. If so, then the policy of multilateral diplomacy (P3) is precisely a policy that is very likely to be implemented to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the region.

The respondent (respondent's knowledge) is also very decisive about the available policy options. The results shown are very possible in that direction because it is very likely that respondents' backgrounds (realism) dominate the answers to the questionnaire. Another meaning is that these results need to be re-examined qualitatively to be able to take a policy that truly best suits the needs of the required strategic environment. Or, choose again with respondents who are more objective in seeing the situation/scenario faced with the available policy options.

The analysis is carried out on the hypothetical conditions in the strategic thinking flow based on the results of a study of the current developing situation, with the analysis components being kept to a minimum, so that in the future it can be developed by incorporating other components or elements that are considered also influential, for example, actors involved in analysis is not only the U.S. and China. Respondents who gave an assessment were only six persons who came from a representative of the Republic of Indonesia Defense University Doctoral Students, the Ministry of Defense (Center for Defense Strategic Information), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the future, it can be developed by incorporating assessments from other elements and/or increasing the number of respondents, as well as being given a difference in the weight of the assessment. The analysis is carried out using AHP and ANP, where in the future it can be analyzed by combining various methods, for example by combining Game Theory with AHP/ANP.

This study was carried out before the formation of AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States so the possibility of Australia becoming a country

that has nuclear weapons technology is not considered in the assessment and analysis. The establishment of AUKUS needs to be considered in further studies.

REFERENCES

- Al Syahrin, M. Najeri. (2018). China versus Amerika Serikat: Interpretasi Rivalitas Keamanan Negara Adidaya Di Kawasan Asia Pasifik. *Global & Strategis*, 12(1), 145–163. Retrieved from <https://e-journal.unair.ac.id/JGS/article/view/8153/4838>
- Al Syahrin, Muhammad Najeri. (2018). *Keamanan Asia Timur: Realitas, Kompleksitas dan Rivalitas*. Sleman: Komoyo Press. <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/E2BM4>
- Aljazeera. (2021, February 20). US Wary China's New Coast Guard Law Could Escalate Sea Disputes. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/20/us-wary-chinas-new-coast-guard-law-could-escalate-sea>
- Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H., & Tversky, A. (1988). *Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598951>
- Brodjonegoro, B. P. S. (1992). *AHP (Analitical Hierarchy Process)*. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Pusat Antar Universitas – Studi Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia.
- Budiwinarto, A. (2020, August 20). Konflik Laut China Selatan Lebih Mudah Diselesaikan Jika AS Ratifikasi UNCLOS. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from <https://www.inews.id/news/internasional/konflik-laut-china-selatan-lebih-mudah-diselesaikan-jika-as->

- ratifikasi-unclos
- Farlin, J. (2014). *Instruments of National Power: How America Earned Independence*. Carlisle: United States Army War College. Retrieved from <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/87.pdf>
- Fazlollahtabar, H., & Saidi-Mehrabad, M. (2015). Optimizing Multi-Objective Decision Making Having Qualitative Evaluation. *Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization*, 11(3), 762. <https://doi.org/10.3934/JIMO.2015.11.747>
- Ghosh, P. (2011). Security Challenges from Non-State Actors in the Indian Ocean. *Strategic Trends Observer Research Foundation*, 1(3). Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/st_issue3.pdf
- Hamid, L., & Jmaan, A. (2015). Sikap Rusia terhadap Protokol Perjanjian Seanwz (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone). *Jurnal Online Mahasiswa Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 2(2). Retrieved from <https://jom.unri.ac.id/index.php/JOMFSIP/article/view/7545>
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (2013). *Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok)*. Retrieved from <https://cils.ui.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Southeast-Asian-Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone-Treaty.pdf>
- Kanan, N. N., & Nuradhawati, R. (2020). Optimalisasi Sentralitas ASEAN dalam Rangka Menghadapi Isu Keamanan Kawasan Saat Ini dan di Masa Depan. *Jurnal Academia Praja*, 3(2), 305–321. Retrieved from <https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/jurnal-academia-praja/article/view/171/148>
- Manyin, M. E., Daggett, S., Dolven, B., Lawrence, S. V., Martin, M. F., O'Rourke, R., & Vaughn, B. (2012). *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia*. Washington D.C. Retrieved from www.crs.gov
- Media Indonesia. (2020, November 14). Menlu: Amerika Serikat, Mitra Strategis ASEAN di Kawasan. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from <https://mediaindonesia.com/ekonomi/360934/menlu-amerika-serikat-mitra-strategis-asean-di-kawasan>
- Miller, J. (2017). The U.S.-Japan-India Relationship: Trilateral Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Retrieved from <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/backnumber/pdf/20171108.pdf>
- Planifolia, V. (2017). Strategi Rebalancing Amerika Serikat di Kawasan Asia-Pasifik. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 6(1), 16–26. Retrieved from <https://journal.umy.ac.id/index.php/jhi/article/view/2939/2997>
- Putra, T. S. I., Samekto, F. X. A., & Hardiwinoto, S. (2016). Reklamasi Pulau Republik Rakyat Tiongkok di Laut Cina Selatan: Suatu Analisis terhadap Status Penambahan Wilayah dan Dampak terhadap Jalur Pelayaran Internasional. *Diponegoro Law Review*, 5(2). Retrieved from <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/dlr/article/view/11221/10883>
- Rao, R. V. (2013). *Decision Making in Manufacturing Environment Using Graph Theory and Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making Methods*. London: Springer London. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4375-8>
- Saaty, T. L. (2008). Decision Making with the Analytic Hierarchy Process. *International Journal of Services Sciences*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSSCI.2008.017590>
- Saaty, T. L. (2017). Basic Theory Of The Analytic Hierarchy Process: How To Make A Decision.

- Rev.R.Acad.Cienc.Exact.Fis. Nat. (Esp)*, 93(4), 395–423.
- Saaty, T. L., & Vargas, L. G. (2013). *Decision Making with the Analytic Network Process: Economic, Political, Social and Technological Applications with Benefits, Opportunities, Costs and Risks* (2nd ed.). New York: Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7279-7>
- Sisriadi. (2016). Pengembangan Postur Pertahanan Militer guna Mendukung Terwujudnya Poros Maritim Dunia. *Wira: Media Informasi Kementerian Pertahanan*, 59(43), 6–17.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020a). SIPRI Databases. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from <https://www.sipri.org/databases>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020b). World Nuclear Forces. Retrieved April 18, 2021, from <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/10>
- Sunyoto, M. (2020, August 19). Pakar: Konflik LCS Lebih Mudah Diselesaikan Jika AS Ratifikasi UNCLOS. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from <https://www.antaraneews.com/berita/1678162/pakar-konflik-lcs-lebih-mudah-diselesaikan-jika-as-ratifikasi-unclos>
- Treaty On The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.* , Pub. L. No. Agreement ASEAN.
- Vazza, A. P. (2020, July 4). Menggapai Kesetaraan ASEAN-Cina. Retrieved April 19, 2021, from <https://www.republika.id/posts/8213/menggapai-kesetaraan-asean-cina>
- Wibowo, R. (2018). Asia Pasifik dalam Pusaran Kekuatan-Kekuatan Global - The Global Review. Retrieved April 19, 2021, from <https://theglobalreview.com/asia-pasifik-dalam-pusaran-kekuatan-kekuatan-global/>

Appendix

Unweighted Supermatrix – ANP

		GOAL	Actors		Strategic Considerations			Activities				Scenarios				Policies		
			AS	T	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	S1	S2	S3	S4	P1	P2	P3
GOAL		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.5332	0.0000	0.0000	0.6847	0.6354	0.3830	0.4663	0.5784	0.7199	0.2400	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.4668	0.0000	0.0000	0.3153	0.3646	0.6170	0.5337	0.4216	0.2801	0.7600	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.4815	0.1771	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2708	0.2887	0.2538	0.2813	0.3130	0.3130	0.3576	
	PS2	0.0000	0.2319	0.2465	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3170	0.2163	0.2089	0.2644	0.2496	0.2496	0.2609	
	PS3	0.0000	0.2866	0.5764	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.4122	0.4950	0.5374	0.4543	0.4374	0.4374	0.3815	
Activities	D	0.0000	0.2023	0.2217	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.5392	0.3085	0.1504	0.1499	0.1773	0.5150	0.5300	
	I	0.0000	0.1699	0.1414	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1567	0.1965	0.1655	0.2236	0.1611	0.1964	0.1917	
	M	0.0000	0.3952	0.2676	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0860	0.2733	0.4680	0.4505	0.4553	0.1081	0.1116	
	E	0.0000	0.2326	0.3693	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2181	0.2217	0.2161	0.1760	0.2063	0.1805	0.1666	
Scenarios	S1	0.1575	0.0000	0.0000	0.4494	0.3491	0.3353	0.5067	0.3750	0.2246	0.5619	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	S2	0.2092	0.0000	0.0000	0.3298	0.3037	0.3108	0.2642	0.3208	0.2620	0.2640	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	S3	0.3995	0.0000	0.0000	0.1228	0.1857	0.1885	0.1306	0.1864	0.3330	0.0935	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	S4	0.2339	0.0000	0.0000	0.0979	0.1615	0.1653	0.0985	0.1178	0.1804	0.0806	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
Policies	P1	0.0000	0.4271	0.3047	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	P2	0.0000	0.2352	0.2820	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	P3	0.0000	0.3377	0.4133	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	

Cluster Matrix – ANP

	Goal	Actors	Strategic Considerations	Activities	Scenarios	Policies
Goal	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	0.5000	0.0000	0.5000	0.5000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	0.0000	0.3333	0.0000	0.0000	0.5000	0.5000
Activities	0.0000	0.3333	0.0000	0.0000	0.5000	0.5000
Scenarios	0.5000	0.0000	0.5000	0.5000	0.0000	0.0000
Policies	0.0000	0.3333	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Weighted Supermatrix - ANP

	GOAL	Actors		Strategic Considerations			Activities				Scenarios				Policies		
		AS	T	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	S1	S2	S3	S4	P1	P2	P3
GOAL	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.2666	0.0000	0.0000	0.3424	0.3177	0.1915	0.2331	0.2892	0.3599	0.1200	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.2334	0.0000	0.0000	0.1576	0.1823	0.3085	0.2669	0.2108	0.1401	0.3800	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.1605	0.0590	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1354	0.1443	0.1269	0.1406	0.1565	0.1565	0.1788
	PS2	0.0000	0.0773	0.0822	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1585	0.1082	0.1044	0.1322	0.1248	0.1248	0.1305
	PS3	0.0000	0.0955	0.1921	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2061	0.2475	0.2687	0.2272	0.2187	0.2187	0.1907
Activities	D	0.0000	0.0674	0.0739	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2696	0.1542	0.0752	0.0750	0.0886	0.2575	0.2650
	I	0.0000	0.0566	0.0471	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0784	0.0983	0.0828	0.1118	0.0805	0.0982	0.0959
	M	0.0000	0.1317	0.0892	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0430	0.1366	0.2340	0.2253	0.2276	0.0541	0.0558
	E	0.0000	0.0775	0.1231	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1090	0.1109	0.1080	0.0880	0.1032	0.0902	0.0833
Scenarios	S1	0.0787	0.0000	0.0000	0.2247	0.1745	0.1677	0.2534	0.1875	0.1123	0.2810	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S2	0.1046	0.0000	0.0000	0.1649	0.1519	0.1554	0.1321	0.1604	0.1310	0.1320	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S3	0.1997	0.0000	0.0000	0.0614	0.0929	0.0943	0.0653	0.0932	0.1665	0.0467	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S4	0.1169	0.0000	0.0000	0.0490	0.0807	0.0827	0.0492	0.0589	0.0902	0.0403	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Policies	P1	0.0000	0.1424	0.1016	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	P2	0.0000	0.0784	0.0940	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	P3	0.0000	0.1126	0.1378	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Limiting Supermatrix - ANP

	GOAL	Actors		Strategic Considerations			Activities				Scenarios				Policies		
		AS	T	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	S1	S2	S3	S4	P1	P2	P3
GOAL	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201	0.1201
	T	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106	0.1106
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702
	PS2	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583	0.0583
	PS3	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023	0.1023
Activities	D	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720	0.0720
	I	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396
	M	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645	0.0645
	E	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546	0.0546
Scenarios	S1	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914	0.0914
	S2	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679	0.0679
	S3	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411	0.0411
	S4	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305	0.0305
Policies	P1	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283	0.0283
	P2	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198	0.0198
	P3	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288	0.0288

Unweighted Supermatrix – AHP (Goal: Future Projection)

		GOAL	Actors		Strategic Considerations			Activities				Scenarios			
			AS	T	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	S1	S2	S3	S4
GOAL		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.5332	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.4668	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.4815	0.1771	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS2	0.0000	0.2319	0.2465	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS3	0.0000	0.2866	0.5764	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Activities	D	0.0000	0.2023	0.2217	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	I	0.0000	0.1699	0.1414	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	M	0.0000	0.3952	0.2676	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	E	0.0000	0.2326	0.3693	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Scenarios	S1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.4494	0.3491	0.3353	0.5067	0.3750	0.2246	0.5619	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3298	0.3037	0.3108	0.2642	0.3208	0.2620	0.2640	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1228	0.1857	0.1885	0.1306	0.1864	0.3330	0.0935	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000
	S4	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0979	0.1615	0.1653	0.0985	0.1178	0.1804	0.0806	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000

Limiting Supermatrix – AHP (Goal: Future Projection)

		GOAL	Actors		Strategic Considerations			Activities				Scenarios			
			AS	T	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	S1	S2	S3	S4
GOAL		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Activities	D	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	I	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	M	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	E	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Scenarios	S1	0.3925	0.3896	0.3960	0.4494	0.3491	0.3353	0.5067	0.3750	0.2246	0.5619	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S2	0.2939	0.2956	0.2920	0.3298	0.3037	0.3108	0.2642	0.3208	0.2620	0.2640	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S3	0.1809	0.1839	0.1776	0.1228	0.1857	0.1885	0.1306	0.1864	0.3330	0.0935	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000
	S4	0.1326	0.1310	0.1345	0.0979	0.1615	0.1653	0.0985	0.1178	0.1804	0.0806	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000

Unweighted Supermatrix – AHP (Goal: Desired Future)

	GOAL	Scenarios				Strategic Considerations			Activities				Actors		Policies			
		S1	S2	S3	S4	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	AS	T	P1	P2	P3	
GOAL	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Scenarios	S1	0.1575	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S2	0.2092	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S3	0.3995	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S4	0.2339	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.2708	0.2887	0.2538	0.2813	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS2	0.0000	0.3170	0.2163	0.2089	0.2644	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS3	0.0000	0.4122	0.4950	0.5374	0.4543	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Activities	D	0.0000	0.5392	0.3085	0.1504	0.1499	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	I	0.0000	0.1567	0.1965	0.1655	0.2236	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	M	0.0000	0.0860	0.2733	0.4680	0.4505	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	E	0.0000	0.2181	0.2217	0.2161	0.1760	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.6847	0.6354	0.3830	0.4663	0.5784	0.7199	0.2400	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3153	0.3646	0.6170	0.5337	0.4216	0.2801	0.7600	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Policies	P1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.4271	0.3047	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	P2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2352	0.2820	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000
	P3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3377	0.4133	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000

Limiting Supermatrix – AHP (Goal: Desired Future)

	GOAL	Scenarios				Strategic Considerations			Activities				Actors		Policies			
		S1	S2	S3	S4	PS1	PS2	PS3	D	I	M	E	AS	T	P1	P2	P3	
GOAL	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Scenarios	S1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	S4	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Strategic Considerations	PS1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	PS3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Activities	D	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	I	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	M	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	E	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Actors	AS	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	T	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Policies	P1	0.3694	0.3660	0.3679	0.3700	0.3721	0.3885	0.3825	0.3516	0.3618	0.3755	0.3928	0.3341	0.4271	0.3047	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	P2	0.2573	0.2586	0.2578	0.2570	0.2562	0.2499	0.2522	0.2641	0.2602	0.2549	0.2483	0.2708	0.2352	0.2820	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000
	P3	0.3733	0.3755	0.3743	0.3730	0.3717	0.3615	0.3653	0.3844	0.3781	0.3696	0.3589	0.3952	0.3377	0.4133	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000

Calculation Result ANP-AHP

			ANP		AHP		
			Global (Network)	Global (Cluster)	Goal : Future Projection	Goal : Desired Future	
Actors	US	AS	0.1201	0.5206			
	China	T	0.1106	0.4794			
Strategic Considerations	Long Term Future Stability	PS1	0.0702	0.3040			
	Regional Resilience	PS2	0.0583	0.2525			
	Recognition of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights	PS3	0.1023	0.4434			
Activities	Diplomacy	D	0.0720	0.3119			
	Information	I	0.0396	0.1718			
	Military	M	0.0645	0.2795			
	Economy	E	0.0546	0.2368			
Scenarios	Peaceful Solutions	S1	0.0914	0.3959			0.3925
	Developing As It Is Today	S2	0.0679	0.2940			0.2939
	China Full Claims	S3	0.0411	0.1779			0.1809
	US Uses Nuclear Weapons	S4	0.0305	0.1322			0.1326
Policies	Building Strategic Military Strength	P1	0.0283	0.3684			
	Strengthening ASEAN Centrality And Neutrality	P2	0.0198	0.2576	0.2573		
	ASEAN -SEANWFZ Multilateral Diplomacy	P3	0.0288	0.3739	0.3733		