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STRATEGY TO PREVENT MASSIVE RECRUITMENT OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN INDONESIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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Abstract

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the movement of the terrorist groups or the radical groups, which should have been "dead" or remained silent during the pandemic, still takes place. Such a situation has compelled the researcher to conduct a study since the aim of the study is to explore the potential threats and objectives of terrorism in Indonesia during the pandemic. In conducting the study, terrorist recruitment theory and strategy theory are implemented along with the hierarchy of human needs to describe the reasons behind the active terrorist recruitment during the pandemic. The relevant data for the study are gathered through the implementation of interviews for collecting the primary data and library study for gathering the secondary data. After the data have been gathered, the data are analyzed using qualitative data analysis so that the case of active terrorist recruitment during the pandemic can be better described. Then, the results of the study conclude that massive recruitment is a new threat to efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism because radical groups can mobilize many resources, especially human resources, to achieve their agenda and goals without being directly involved in executions in the field and the most accessible means to use in this massive recruitment effort is mass media because social media has anonymity, a broad spectrum, and low cost as a means of mass communication. Therefore, to stem the influence of radical groups on social media, security forces need to become social media as the main battlefield with several strategies such as increasing cyber patrols, blocking access to websites of radical groups, developing a critical understanding of cyberspace content or information, and empowering counter-opinions

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INTRODUCTION

Many countries in the world define terrorism in various ways, depending on the level of urgency in a country. The word terrorist or terrorism itself comes from the Latin word, *terrere*, which means more or less to shake or interpret terror to cause horror (Sandhu, 2012). The term terrorism is a concept with a sensitive connotation because terrorism causes victims in innocent civilians. Furthermore, in general, terrorism can be defined as using violence or intimidation to cause fear and feelings of insecurity towards a person or group of people in a particular area to attain political or ideological goals (UNODC, 2018). According to the general definition, three factors that need to be considered carefully were: (1) essence (violence and threats of use of violence); (2) targets (civilians or persons not participating in war operations); and (3) goals (achieving victory or gaining political power through the use of fear or imposing some social and political change using violence) (Mensur, 2019).

The United States Department defines terrorism as politically motivated, planned violence directed at unarmed targets by splinter groups or underground agents (Hudson, 1999). By these two definitions, terrorism is a social phenomenon that has undergone many developments and human civilization development. Various ways are also used to commit violence and fear by using the sophistication of modern technology (Al Adziem, 2003). The supporting factors are the process of globalization and the culture of the (modern) society, which has become fertile ground for the development of terrorism. The ease of creating fear with high technology (adequate facilities) and the development of information through easily accessible media, then making networks. After that, it is easier for acts of terror to achieve their goals.

Terrorism has existed for thousands of years. In the history of Ancient Greece, Xenophon (430–349 BC) used

psychological warfare in an attempt to weaken the opponent (Lendon, 1999). Finally, in the mid-19th century, terrorism emerged from adherents of anarchy in Western Europe, Russia, and the United States. They believe that the most effective way to carry out a political and social revolution is by killing influential people or those in power at that time with guns or bombs. In the 19th century and before World War I, terrorism had occurred in almost all parts of the world (UNODC, 2018).

Behavior in terror can be seen from several components, such as often using violence, always justifying the means for the terrorist group's mission or terrorist group, using underground movements, terrorist groups are too militant and fanatical. Apart from these four components, there are also supporters in their behavior, such as unequal socio-political life situations. Usually, this creates frustration and despair that drive people to become aggressive and commit terror. On the other hand, few also use terror as a weapon of struggle to pursue political goals. The acts of terror most often encountered in this era of globalization fight for ideology and religious beliefs.

After 9/11, the United States focused its attention on terrorism which was considered a significant threat to the existence and security of its country and international security. Because of this tragedy, the U.S. began to campaign internationally to support the fight against terrorism, and its networks spread almost worldwide. The U.S. campaign against terrorism at that time triggered tensions between the Islamic world and the West. They were judging from the U.S. military policies, especially towards the people of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Middle East regions, which have claimed countless civilian casualties from Muslims. In addition, Muslims are significantly disadvantaged by campaigns that are always associated with Islamic movements, from this situation at that time is called

Islamophobia. Moreover, the Western world has even created an opinion that Islam is synonymous with terrorism.

It is emphasized by understanding the fiqh of jihad in Islam as the jihad movement. However, the journey of terrorism throughout the post-9/11 period proves that terror movements carried out by individuals, groups, or individuals had often occurred long before developing the issue of terrorism against Islam. For example, about ten years after 9/11, Europe, especially Norway, was shaken by a single attack that came to be known as lone-wolf terrorism. The perpetrator of this single attack was Anders Behring Breivik, or better known as Anders Breivik (Asne, 2015). Breivik detonated a bomb in a car parked near Government Building in Oslo when he launched his attack, and there was a concentration of security there. Then, a few hours after the bombing, Breivik moved to Utoya Island, where a group of young people, mostly the children of Norwegian government officials, were attending a youth camp.

Due to the long travel time between Oslo and Utoya Island and the bombing in Oslo, Breivik had more than enough time to launch a single attack on Utoya Island with a total of 77 casualties. Before launching his action, Breivik compiled a 1,500-page political manifesto and uploaded it on the Internet. The political manifesto essentially stated that his actions aimed to trigger a revolution to end the Islamic colonization in Europe that had lasted for several centuries (BBC News Indonesia, 2011). From this example, it can be observed that terrorist attacks, especially single terrorist attacks, are not solely related to the religion of Islam. As in the Breivik case example, the single episode that was carried out was directed at the religion of Islam. Ironically, in the next few years, Breivik's lone-wolf terrorism pattern will become the basic pattern for similar actions.

During this one year, Indonesia was the country that recorded the most victims from the COVID-19 pandemic in the Southeast

Asia region (CNN Indonesia, 2021d). As of July 2021 alone, Indonesia reported the highest death toll since the pandemic with 1,566 people, which put Indonesia in the top position in the world regarding deaths from the pandemic. At this time, the condition is already worrying because of the spread of the virus that comes in with various variants in the future and medical facilities in some areas that cannot meet health standards for COVID-19 patients.

In the meantime, amidst the pandemic outbreak, each country has a different level of handling the pandemic. Until today (as of September 2021), several countries have allowed foreign nationals to travel in and out of their lands and or allow their people to carry out daily activities (including crowding) under health protocols, especially for people who have been vaccinated. Indonesia has its challenges. As of September 2021, Indonesia faces challenges during a pandemic related to democratic life. It is not a new thing either; the downward trend in Indonesia's democracy index has continued since 2015 (Taufiqurrohmah, 2016). That is indicated by the level of civil liberties that has decreased to become increasingly narrowed due to the government's many physical and social restrictions rules. So, democracy is not functioning well as the pandemic progresses.

It causes extremist groups to surface and become a threat to Indonesia because these groups take advantage of the crisis and build a narrative that the pandemic is the right momentum to increase recruitment and other activities such as carrying out attacks. The reason is also that most of the government's resources are allocated to deal with the pandemic. The case is well described by the arrest of three social media terrorist suspects. The three terrorist suspects were arrested in three different places and yet all of these suspects have had a direct affiliation with ISIS (Persada, 2022). These suspects have benefitted from the leniency caused by the pandemic to glorify and justify what ISIS has done.

Through the propaganda texts, these suspects try to fuel people to commit lone-wolf terror attacks on the enemies of ISIS. It is known that the government has reallocated the budget, including the Special Allocation Fund (*Dana Alokasi Khusus*), which aims at seeking national economic recovery. So, the fund must also be right on target and their use must be in the realm of accountability, stated in Presidential Regulation No. 123 of 2020 concerning Technical Guidelines for Physical Special Allocation Funds (Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia, 2021).

In this case, Indonesia itself was not prepared for a pandemic attack and other things strategically until operational issues exposed Covid-19 were increasing at that time. Then the sectoral responses in the field tend to overlap and without coordination, plus there is central and regional coordination which also hinders the handling of the pandemic. The policies of each region, such as restrictions on various aspects of community activities, also impact, such as decreasing public participation. Therefore, it is this tendency that causes the downward trend in the democracy index in Indonesia. This pattern has resulted in radical and extremist groups appearing on the surface silently in Indonesia by conducting massive recruitment at various meetings, especially in cyberspace or on social media. This group has a pattern and exposes the issue of the socio-economic crisis triggered by the pandemic by spreading the narrative that the pandemic is God's punishment. In addition, they also said the pandemic was the right time to carry out attacks on the government and security forces.

This threat has become a challenge for the Indonesian government during the pandemic; besides, the government is also busy with other radical and extremist activities. Radical groups always take advantage of online activities, actively carry out propaganda, and recruit members, even regarding the funding of these groups.

Massive recruitment during a pandemic through social media or online is very effective in indoctrinating the younger generation to support their ideology and participate in terrorist acts (Amar, 2021). In this case, massive recruitment can be defined as the process of recruiting a large number of members within a specific time (Work Service, 2021). This massive recruitment needs to consider three factors: experience, motivation, and conformity to corporate culture. When related to the context of radicalism, these three factors correspond to the things that inspire the perpetrators of a single terrorist attack because they develop a similar understanding based on experience, motivation, and also the same culture, namely the knowledge of radicalism.

For example, in the case of a young woman who attacked the National Police Headquarters, the investigation results showed that the woman was allegedly exposed to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ideology on the Internet (CNN Indonesia, 2021c). Radical groups also carry out activities on the Internet, which are unlimited to provide funding to support their acts of terrorism. Suspicious financial transactions also increased by 10% during the pandemic. Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (*PPATK, Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan*) received information on reports of financial transactions suspected of being related to terrorist activities, as many as 4,093 transactions known from 2016 to 2021 (Habibie, 2021). The flow of funds on average comes from several donations and transactions to help someone who is considered in need or a fictitious mosque.

Departing from the above explanations, through the study the researchers would like to propose two problem formulations: (1) how are the terrorists recruited during the pandemic; and (2) what are the strategies that should be implemented to break down the terrorist recruitment during the pandemic. By proposing the two problem

formulations, this study would like to: (1) identify the way the terrorists are recruited during the pandemic; and (2) define the strategies for breaking down terrorist recruitment during the pandemic. Thus, it is expected that the devising of the strategy can break down the terrorism recruitment during the pandemic so that the order and security of the society can be maintained and restored.

METHODS

In this study, the qualitative approach had been selected. The qualitative approach refers to the descriptive approach toward a phenomenon with the support of data analysis (Leavy, 2017). To support the data analysis, the relevant data were gathered using interviews and library studies. Interview refers to the data-gathering technique that involves a question and answers session with the data sources, while library study refers to the activities of collecting and taking notes on several secondary data sources to support the analysis of a study (Leavy, 2017).

The interview was conducted with the primary data source, namely the Director of Prevention of the National Counterterrorism Agency. Meanwhile, the library study was conducted the secondary data sources, namely the data from books, journal articles, and online news related to terrorism. The data analysis was conducted through the following sequence: (1) gathering the primary data from the interview session with the primary data sources; (2) gathering the secondary data from books, journal articles, and online news articles to support the data analysis; (3) analyzing the data based on the theories that have been selected namely terrorist recruitment theory, strategy theory, and human motivation theory in a descriptive manner; (4) presenting the results of data analysis; and (5) drawing conclusions based on the given findings and analysis. The target of the analysis itself was all terrorism data during the COVID-19 period that occurred in Indonesia from early 2020 to

September 2021. In Indonesia itself, several acts of terrorism have not only emerged recently but have happened since the beginning of Indonesia's independence due to several background problems. For example, factors originating both from within and from abroad (Ulya, 2016), specifically that in Indonesia, the idea of forming a caliphate has created problems that cause the phenomenon of terrorism (Usman, 2014). In studying the state's response to the movement of radical organizations, whether ISIS entered Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, and other radical groups, the most important thing is how to counter terrorism itself, such as how practical activities are in tackling this radical group.

Three theories have been selected to support the data analysis in the study. The first theory is terrorist recruitment, which has been based on the staircase to terrorism by Moghaddam (Moghaddam, 2005). According to this theory, the individual becomes radicalized and prone to be recruited into the terrorist organization through six sequences namely: (a) ground floor; (b) first floor; (c) second floor; (d) third floor; (e) fourth floor; and (f) sixth floor. On the ground floor, the individual perceives some kind of injustice and frustration within his or her community. Then, as the individual moves forward, he or she starts looking for the solutions that favor his or her idealism. This situation brings the individual to the second floor, where he or he has developed some kind of preparation for aggression. Furthermore, after the preparation for aggression, the individual moves up to the third floor, where he or she encounters the terrorist group that shares the same idealism and thus the individual will be recruited. After the recruitment, the individual leads to the fourth floor, where the individual will be put into some kind of "cell," waiting to perpetrate an attack. Eventually, the individual comes to the fifth floor, where the individual has been psychologically

prepared and committed to perpetuating an attack of terrorism.

Then, the second theory is the strategy theory. As part of military strategy, terrorism is close to the concept of stratagem – several tactics that involve trickery, disinformation, betrayal, deception, ambush, feigned attacks and retreats, sophistic treaties, and alike (Zulaika, 2016). In warfare, such a strategy proves to be effective in causing terror and increasing the deterrent effect so that the mentality of the enemy force can be broken down. As a result, the more the enemy force becomes weaker, the stronger the impact of terrorism will be. This statement is in line with that of Xenophon, who gains triumph through the exact use of psychological warfare within his campaign (Lendon, 1999). In the present day, a similar situation has always been found in any act of terrorism since the terrorists make use of the response to their actions so that they can persuade the political situation in their favor (Zulaika, 2016). Therefore, it is no wonder that people can be very subjected to the act of terrorism since the terrorists deploy fear to assert their cause and voice their idealism.

This theory is based on the Hierarchy of Human Needs, where human behavior is closely related to their needs (Maslow A. H., 1943). In his hierarchy, Maslow identifies five significant types that can be prioritized, where the scale produces several factors that strongly motivate human behavior. This hierarchy forms the assumption that beings always want something.

In the lowest pyramid category, psychological needs are biological needs in human survival, such as air, food, drink, shelter, clothing, warmth, and sleep. In this psychological need, the followers of radical groups or terrorism usually do not have much effect. Then, at the next pyramid level is the need for security in terms of elemental protection, security, order, law, stability, and freedom from fear. It is usually associated with fear of losing a job, home,

and declining health. Followers in this level of the pyramid typically pay close attention to this. We saw that when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in Indonesia, many lines of society lost their jobs, and some were even evicted from their homes because they could not pay their arrears.




Figure 1. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Source: Maslow, 1987

The need for comfort and belonging is one of the physiological and safety needs that are met. Usually, human needs at this third level are social needs and involve feelings of belonging that motivate interpersonal relationship behavior, for example, friendship, trust, acceptance, and affection. These affiliations become part of a group (family, friends, and work). In this section, of course, recruiters from terrorist groups bring this physiological need to their followers to feel that they are being cared for by the terrorist group (the recruiter). It could be that the recruiters are groups who pay attention to their followers because they share the same fate and share the same future even though there is no financial assistance. In addition, the need for esteem is classified into two categories: self-esteem (dignity, achievement, mastery, independence) and the desire for recognition of reputation or respect from others (e.g., status and prestige). Maslow said that respecting or acknowledging one's importance is more important for children, especially teenagers, than prioritizing self-esteem or basic dignity. In this case, recruiters of terrorism groups usually appreciate and acknowledge the advantages

of their recruitment targets among teenagers whose family circles do not have much recognition. Finally, the need for self-actualization is the same as the need for esteem in individuals because, in this section, the recruiter realizes the personal potential of the follower, and the recruiter tries to fulfill the recruiter's needs or support his success in the future. Although later, the real goal is not aimed at the personal potential of the follower (Maslow A., 1987).

After conducting analysis using the theory of human motivation where the hierarchy of Human Needs is the benchmark, the authors can conclude several indicators included in the threat to the massive recruitment of terrorist groups in Indonesia during the COVID-19 pandemic. The threat itself can be defined as a person's decision to cause harm to another party (Prunckun, Scientific Methods of Inquiry For Intelligence Analysis, 2015). In other words, disturbances from natural disasters or other matters of a force majeure nature can only be categorized as hazards considering that humans can only cause threats. In this regard, there is a need to conduct a threat analysis to identify problems with a minimum or maximum probability level. State actors usually use the theory from Hank Prunckun to determine how significant a threat a country will face in dealing with threats from non-state actors. In the case that the researcher analyzes, it is very suitable for examples of non-state actors such as terrorists or other criminals; besides that, it can also be in the form of threats that come from threats of invasion and other forms of attacks (can spread the virus or other pandemics).

Threat analysis in Prunckun states that threat is a desire by the actions of one party to harm another party. Individuals who are accustomed to posing a threat usually need an intention. The intention usually consists of two elements, such as desire and hope. From these desires and hopes, two aspects emerge, including resources and

knowledge. In addition, the capability is always defined as the ability or strength to attack or damage the target. Meanwhile, desire is defined as the enthusiasm of a party or individual to cause damage to the target in achieving a goal, and hope (expectation) is defined more as a person's belief that it will succeed if the plan has been implemented. Meanwhile, knowledge is all information owned by a party to use or build tools or carry out the processes needed to achieve goals and resources usually owned by a party, including skills and experience, and materials required to carry out the plan against the target (Prunckun, 2012).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The first example of massive recruitment has been briefly described in the introductory section of this paper. In this case, a young woman with the initials ZA carried out a single attack on the National Police Headquarters on Wednesday, January 3, 2021, at 16:30 WIB (CNN Indonesia, 2021b). The perpetrator entered the National Police Headquarters through the back door opposite the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. When they arrived at the place, they asked about the location of the service post, and at the same time, the officers directed the perpetrators directly to the location in question. Then, the perpetrator headed to the area in question, and a few minutes later, the perpetrator attacked the officer who was on guard. The results of the profiling of the perpetrators show that the perpetrators are affiliated with ISIS ideology. It is evidenced by the perpetrator's social media and the uploads on the perpetrator's social media before carrying out the single attack.

A few months later, a single attack also occurred in Makassar. This single attack happened at the Makassar Cathedral Church, and the perpetrators were a husband and wife who had just married a few months earlier (Azanella, 2021). The two perpetrators arrived at the location at around 10:28 Central Indonesian Time or

shortly after the second mass, for access to the cathedral is not centralized at one point, so when the perpetrators arrive at the location and carry out their actions, the people who attended Sunday Service have gone home, and those who will attend the next group are still waiting. As for the movements of the perpetrators, the security officers were on standby so that the officers concerned detained the perpetrators at the entrance, and then they blew themselves up. As a result of this single attack incident, the two perpetrators died on the spot, and 20 others were injured. The investigations showed that the two perpetrators had an ideological affiliation with ISIS considering that they were among the 20 members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, which had been disclosed sometime before.

The emergence of COVID-19 did not only attack Indonesia but could be felt in other countries. So, there are several aspects, including politics and defense, that are no longer considered significant in terms of the policy. It is because the world focuses on health and food security and rebuilding the economic sector. When COVID-19 was rampant, several aspects were discussed, such as the economic recession destroyed by many countries becoming poor and rebuilding their economies due to COVID-19. It is said, the unemployment rate at that time increased dramatically, and the gap was getting bigger. Currently, the world community is living in a new normal condition, which sees air and cross-country travel getting minor in scope, plus social distancing and cleanliness are also a priority in life. All work is done at home (work from home) and has become a new alternative in several areas of life, especially school and office work.

The impact of this situation is an increase in traffic or traffic in the cyber world. Almost all activities that were previously carried out offline have now been carried out online. The clearest example, of course, is schooling done from home, which has been done since the beginning of the

pandemic. Not only that, almost all meetings held by the private sector and the government have begun to use video conferencing to prevent the transmission of the COVID-19 virus. Obviously, on the one hand, this kind of initiative provides substantial time savings because the meeting participants do not have to leave their places so the meetings can be more effective and efficient.

For people who have been radicalized online especially, getting themselves into action is very easy. The transnational group will only need to share their propaganda online and supply the propaganda with the manual on how to get funds and weapons for carrying out their attack. The cases of lone-wolf attacks which have been previously mentioned are solid evidence for this situation. Since they have been radicalized, these people, who later can be lone-wolf attackers, the presence of both the manual and the propaganda will make them more motivated and eager in launching their attacks. Their pure motivation becomes nothing but self-assertion or existence. They do not mind themselves if they die within the action because, in their opinion, it is right and just to die for the cause of their religion.

In addition, the coordination carried out can also be more effective and efficient because everything can carry everything out in real-time simultaneously to maximize the discussion of problems. However, on the other hand, this move from offline to online also has impacts that cannot be underestimated. For example, in education, the material presented to participants was not achieved optimally, considering that not all regions in Indonesia have good connection coverage. In addition, the massive use of online systems has also increased Internet costs, especially data packages and Wi-Fi services.

Concerning the context of this study, the situation described above did not influence radical groups to carry out their actions. Instead, this radical group took advantage of the pandemic by launching massive

recruitment through existing means, especially social media, to achieve their goals. This radical group sees a gap created by the government's security system in connection with the outbreak of the COVID-19 attack. It happened because most of the security forces were maximized in efforts to handle COVID-19 such as implementing security during the Community Activities Restrictions Enforcement (*Pemberlakuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat* or PPKM), monitoring during holidays, and implementing vaccinations throughout Indonesia to break the COVID-19 chain. This radicalism group understands very well that the COVID-19 pandemic situation has loosened efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism, which in most cases is linked to radicalism. With this leeway, they have a wider gap between launching their actions. It has been proven by several attacks on security forces carried out by several single actors. The results of the investigations show that the perpetrators of this single attack were incited by radical content spread on social media so it can be concluded that the transnational groups have successfully "recruited" the lone-wolf attack perpetrators only by using the social media.

In addition to the above findings, long before the pandemic, there had been a series of single terrorist attacks as follows: (1) suicide bombing at the Metropolitan Police Headquarters of Solo (*Markas Kepolisian Kota Besar* or Mapolrestabes Solo); (2) suicide bombing at Mapolrestabes Surabaya; (3) the attack by the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* or NII) group against the Riau Police Headquarters; and (4) a suicide bombing at the Medan Police Headquarters (Maharani, 2021). Based on the findings, it is found that those radical groups have built their power and spread their beliefs through the internet. This statement itself was also emphasized by BNPT, which stated that terrorism activities, which are closely related to radicalism during the COVID-19 pandemic,

are increasing through the Internet (R.Natawigena, 2021). BNPT noted that terrorism radicalism groups maximized propaganda, recruitment, and funding activities during this pandemic through online facilities. At the same time, Special Detachment 88 (*Densus 88*) also stated that the pandemic was an opportunity to recruit more, support, and sympathize to attack harder, as asserted by ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi (CNN Indonesia, 2021a). This situation is dangerous for the Indonesian people, especially the younger generation looking for their identity. This young generation, especially the millennial generation, is at a crossroads concerning their self-actualization, so it can easily persuade them to do something in the name of existence. He has been demonstrated in the case of ZA, who attacked the National Police Headquarters alone.

As previously described, this pandemic has provided space for terrorist radicalism groups to carry out their actions. It is effortless to do considering that this group only needs to rely on the Internet to carry out recruitment (National Security Council, 2021; Ozkaya, 2022) and not spend large amounts of money on funding their actions. Through such recruitment, there are at least some benefits that can be obtained by terrorism radicalism groups as follows:

1. Obtaining resources voluntarily
2. Mobilizing resources to carry out attacks without being directly involved
3. Removing traces after the action is launched
4. Showing existence without having to be directly involved
5. Carry out attacks sporadically through mass mobilization to confuse the security forces while preparing the main agenda

It is, of course, very dangerous to the national security situation, especially in the midst of the government's efforts to break the chain of the spread of COVID-19. Therefore, moving on from the previous explanation, it is believed that the main field

to fight radicalism through the Internet is access to Internet services and media related to it, especially social media. Once again, the case of ZA's attack on the National Police Headquarters shows that social media plays a significant role in spreading radicalism among the younger generation. With the nature of anonymity, broad-spectrum, and low cost as a means of mass communication, social media offers several conveniences for terrorism radicalism groups to promote their understanding. To counter their movement in the realm of social media, security forces, in this case, the National Police, for example, can take the following steps: (1) increase cyber patrols to prevent the dissemination of content containing radicalism; (2) blocking access to websites to limit the movement of radicalism groups; (3) the development of critical understanding in the community towards information or content from cyberspace, especially those related to the notion of radicalism; and (4) empowering the capacity of the community and security forces in building counter-opinions against information and propaganda of radical groups (Aisy, Ibrahim, Intang, & Tindage, 2019).

The Police have carried out the first and second steps. The National Police Headquarters has carried out cyber patrols to control websites and social media that smell radicalism through the Cyber Crime Division. In carrying out this task, the National Police Headquarters carries out three crucial steps, namely: (1) counter, (2) takedown, and (3) block (Habibie, 2021). Through the first step, namely the counter, the National Police Headquarters will enter into social media conversations while investigating the spread of radicalism. If the investigation results find radicalism content on the relevant social media account, the National Police Headquarters will urge not to continue the spread of radicalism.

Furthermore, if this appeal is not heeded or implemented, the National Police Headquarters will take the second step, takedown. Through this step, the National

Police Headquarters will disable the social media account in question so that the account cannot continue the spread of radicalism further. If there is still no change after the second step is taken, the National Police Headquarters will take the third step, namely blocking. The relevant social media account sites that spread radicalism will be blocked to prevent the spread of radicalism. However, this third step has its obstacles: the social media account site cannot be blocked at all, so sometime after being stopped, will reactivate the site. This patrol step has been effective and efficient but still leaves obstacles in the form that the website or social media account that has been blocked can reactivate. It is related to website governance which has its provisions.

So, to match this situation, the researcher argues that the ability to think critically about content obtained from cyberspace, plus the existence of counter opinions in the community, needs to be improved again. Concerning this question, it can put an example case forward to serve as a role model. This case example relates to several social media activists who are vocal and loud in reminding Indonesians about the threat of radicalism and intolerance in Indonesia, such as Denny Siregar, Ade Armando, and Eko Kuntadhi (Metro TV News, 2021). These three activities have voiced out loud the dangers of radicalism, and they have always been able to build counter opinions against radicalism content that spreads in cyberspace. This kind of critical thinking ability will undoubtedly be very beneficial. Third, society empowers people to have adequate critical thinking power whenever they encounter radicalism content from the cyber world. However, this must be supported by a good literacy level so that the public has a solid foundation of thinking before criticizing any content of radicalism obtained through cyberspace. In other words, the literacy level in the community must be strengthened first so that the community has a solid thinking base to build the necessary

counter-opinions to deal with and criticize the content of radicalism.

Building critical thinking skills in society is not easy, considering that Indonesian people have very diverse citizens, especially in terms of abilities and educational backgrounds. When faced with this situation, the National Police can play a leading role as a channel of information about the content of radicalism. In the Industrial Revolution 4.0 era, the National Police launched a program called the Precision Police. Part of the Precision Police is Polri TV or known as Polri Radio TV. The goal is the National Police's effort to provide the latest information to the public through a live streaming form presented by the Police Public Relations Division to strengthen public communication. Where public communication is one of the priority programs of the National Police Chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo (Divisi Humas Polri, 2021). All information presented in this media is guided by the principles of Precision, namely Predictiveness, Responsibility, Transparency, and Fairness.

Regarding Police TV, one program is already quite popular on one of the social media platforms, namely YouTube. This program is known as Mr. Bhabin. Mr. Bhabin is a member of the People's Security and Order Supervising Office (*Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat* or Bhabinkamtibmas) of the Purworejo Police and a very creative person because Mr. Bhabin can straightforwardly convey information in easy-to-understand language to the public (Rasyid, 2020). When linked to counter-opinion efforts against radicalism content, this program can be maximized as an information channel to provide counter-opinions based on the critical abilities of the community. This counter-opinion will undoubtedly be maximized if the National Police Headquarters is supported by qualified human resources in the field of counter-opinion through the critical thinking

conveyed earlier. In turn, the content of this radicalism can be handled with maximum efforts to prevent massive recruitment as early as possible, and in turn, can mitigate terrorism efforts from the start.

CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION, AND LIMITATIONS

Based on the discussion above, the writer can draw several conclusions. First, massive recruitment is a new threat to efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism because radical groups can mobilize many resources, especially human resources, to achieve their agenda and goals without being directly involved in executions in the field. The most accessible means to use in this massive recruitment effort is mass media because social media has anonymity, a broad spectrum, and low cost as a means of mass communication. In addition, there are several other benefits obtained by radicalism groups when they use social media as a forum for massive recruitment, as follows:

1. Obtaining resources voluntarily
2. Mobilizing resources to carry out attacks without being directly involved
3. Removing the traces after committing the acts
4. Showing existence without having to be directly involved
5. Carry out attacks sporadically through mass mobilization to confuse the security forces while preparing the main agenda

Second, to stem the influence of radical groups on social media, security forces need to become social media as the main battlefield with several strategies that can be carried out as follows:

1. Increasing cyber patrols to prevent the dissemination of content containing radicalism
2. Blocking access to websites to limit the movement of radicalism groups
3. The development of critical understanding in the community towards information or content from cyberspace,

especially those related to the notion of radicalism

4. Empowering the capacity of the community and security forces in building counter-opinions against news and propaganda of radical groups

Based on the conclusions drawn, several suggestions can be proposed. First, cyber patrols should be intensified considering the ongoing pandemic situation. The purpose of intensifying the cyber patrol is to carry out early detection and early prevention of acts of terrorism that may carry out due to exposure to massive recruitment, especially with single attacks or lone-wolf terrorism. Second, the security forces can cooperate with several ministry institutions, such as the Ministry of Communication and Information, to screen and take action against website managers or social media that smells of radicalism to maximize efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism. Lastly, security forces can cooperate with BNPT as the leading sector in preventing and eradicating terrorism by formulating and making policies and strategies to combat radicalism. In turn, it can handle the threat in the form of massive recruitment as much as possible, and the impact of radicalism content that leads to acts of terrorism can be detected and prevented as early as possible.

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