

## Special Autonomy as Indonesia's National Policy to Improve the Welfare of the People of Papua

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### Abstract

Indonesia has applied special autonomy to make Papua pursue other provinces' development progress and end the separatist movement for 22 years since 2001. The policy has not been successful because separatism, terrorism, and insurgency against Indonesia in various remote areas and urban areas of Papua Province causing fatalities from civilians, Papuan Native, Indonesian National Armed Forces/Police, and Papuan Terrorist Separatist Groups themselves continue to emerge, precisely when Papua should focus on implementing their special autonomy policy. This study discusses how the special autonomy had been implemented as a national policy to improve the welfare of the people of Papua amidst the increasing intensity of the separatism, terrorism, and insurgency carried out by the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. This study uses a qualitative method and a descriptive analysis approach; data was obtained by literature study and deep interview techniques with various stakeholders. This study reveals that the state budget allocated for the special autonomy was not used properly based on the good governance principle as previously expected by the central Government. In contrast, the money was found illegally transferred to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group, supporters (active and passive), and sympathizers to operate their armed struggles, separatism, and propaganda activities, undermining the authority of the central Government and threatening the sovereignty of Indonesia. This study recommends the special autonomy policy be prolonged and strengthened for the next two decades with conditionalities that it should be prepared with detailed development planning and transparent and good supervision involving various stakeholders. Furthermore, the division of the Province in Papua from the current two into five provinces must be accelerated to bring the national development present in the Papuan Natives.

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## INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian Government has ratified Law Number 2 of 2021 concerning the second amendment to Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning special autonomy for the Provinces of Papua and West Papua for the next 20 years or the second period (2022 to 2042) by providing 2.25% of the allocated funds national general public or around 8.5 trillion rupiahs annually (Jayani, 2021). The policy aims to protect and affirm the fundamental rights of Indigenous Papuans in the economic, political, and socio-cultural fields to continue accelerating welfare development and improving the quality of life sustainable and sustainable public services in an accountable, efficient, effective, transparent, and appropriate manner target.

The Special Staff of the Minister of Finance of Indonesia, Yustinus Prastowo stated the first period of special autonomy funds, ministry, and agency spending, and transfer funds to the regions reached 1,092 trillion rupiahs from 2002 to 2022 (Kurniawan, 2022). However, The Coordinator Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of Indonesia, Mahfud MD said the enormous special autonomy fund was suspected to be corrupted because development in Papua has not been rapid, the people are still poor, and the officials are squandering (Kompas TV, 2022). Furthermore, The Chair of the Papuan Task Force at Gadjah Mada University (*Universitas Gadjah Mada* or UGM), Gabriel Lele also stated that the special autonomy funds had failed to be converted into significant achievements in Papua; Papua's political elite capitalized even the issue of Papuan independence to blackmail Jakarta (Bonasir, 2021). The Governor of Papua, Lukas Enembe has been named a suspect in corruption related to bribery and gratification involving special autonomy funds by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Sulistyo, Costa, & Martiar, 2023). This fact confirms the alleged misappropriation of massive special autonomy funds in Papua.

Various previous studies have discussed the implementation of poor development governance has led to the failure of the implementation of special autonomy in Papua (Rusdiarti & Pamungkas, 2017). Indicators of good governance can be seen in accountability, transparency, and law enforcement (Sedarmayanti, 2012). Nevertheless, there is no one has discussed how special autonomy in Papua relates to separatism, terrorism, and insurgency in Papua. This condition is proven by the ongoing security disturbances in Papua, acts of armed violence, and terror by the Papuan terrorist separatist group to voice independence (CNN Indonesia, 2021). Abroad, pro-Papua independence groups through non-state actors such as the leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), Benny Wenda continue to carry out negative propaganda (Nasution & Wiranto, 2020) and through state actors such as Vanuatu with international diplomacy that discredits the Indonesian Government in the eyes of international politics (Yanwardhana, 2021). It is also reinforced that propaganda is the only way for Benny Wenda to deceive the Papuan people and the international community (West Papua, 2022).

Since 2013, Papuan figure Freddy Numberi has been concerned that the special autonomy funds have been misused (Rachman, 2013). So, Freddy re-highlighted the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy by the Government (Hariyanto, 2019). Unfortunately, Assistant Operations Chief of the Indonesian Police, Inspector General of Police Imam Sugianto specifically found that the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group also enjoyed special autonomy funds to finance operational needs such as weapons, ammunition, and logistics to carry out terror and separatist activities. They continue to create security disturbances because the

Indonesian Government is trying to channel the special autonomy funds so they are right on target (Al Ayyubi, 2021).

The development of the domestic security situation and international politics that has not supported the Indonesian Government in recent years has put the future of Papua within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia at stake, even though the special autonomy policy for the second period has been granted. However, the situation will be more vulnerable if the mapping of conflicts and actions by the Central Government, especially those from the security forces, is inappropriate and ineffective, and it has the potential to become a boomerang or blunder for the Government. This study discusses and analyzes how the special autonomy had been implemented as a national policy to improve the welfare of the people of Papua amidst the increasing intensity of the separatism, terrorism, and insurgency carried out by the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. The novelty of this research is hoped can be used as information material for the Government to eliminate various forms of potential abuse and deviation of the state budget in the second period of special autonomy so that it does not repeat itself in the first period.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This study practices a qualitative method, according to Moleong (2018), it is utilized based on scientific settings to interpret phenomena that occur by involving various other methods. The researcher uses the descriptive analytical approach to explain, interpret, and analyze special autonomy as Indonesia's national policy to improve the welfare of the people of Papua. Data were collected utilizing a literature study and there were 8 informants in this study, namely the Chief of Staff of the Cendrawasih Military Command XVII, Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police, the Operations Executing Command in Nduga, the Former Regent of Tolikara, the Social Communications Assistance Officer XVII Cendrawasih Military Region Command, the Jayawijaya Police Chief, the Commander of the Fakfak Military District Command and the Head of the Fakfak Police. The researcher uses data triangulation by employing data from different times, areas, and people to discover and enhance the validity and credibility of the findings and mitigate any research biases (Sugiyono, 2014) when discussing the misappropriation of massive special autonomy funds in Papua and West Papua Province which violates the principles of good governance.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

Without improvement in the management of the special autonomy fund based on good governance principles, especially in planning, monitoring the implementation, and auditing the results, its usefulness will not be optimal and can be seen and felt by Papuans at lower stages. The reality shows that even though large amounts of special autonomy funds have been given to the Papua province, there is a narrow gap between the Papuan ruling elite/leaders and Papuans at the grassroots level. One of the realistic and relevant improvements in the allocation of special autonomy funds is to channel them to sectors that are more needed, namely health and education so that the way and quality of life of the Indigenous Papuans (*Orang Asli Papua* or OAP) can be improved. They are not increasingly extinct and marginalized by disease, poverty, and underdevelopment. However, planning and monitoring of its use and audit and evaluation steps are still required so that the special autonomy funds can achieve their targets effectively and optimally.

### **The Growth development of Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group activities**

Based on an interview with the Chief of Staff of the Cendrawasih Military Command XVII the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group can be divided into two groups, namely the Political Activities Group and the Armed Activities Group. He also stated, that there is no relationship between the Political Activities Group and the Armed Activities Group because the Political Activities Group is more likely to raise and develop among educated people, students, and university students, including those who receive scholarships and continue their education in Java. He also reasserts that its influence and activity are still seen in silence as a sleeping cell.

There are three aims form the basis of this group, namely (1) demands the fulfillment of basic rights that have never been completed, with the full implementation of customary law in the practice of governance and governance of the modern state of the Republic of Indonesia; (2) creating human rights violations by applying the latest modus operandi in various armed operations, attacking the security forces of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) and Indonesian National Police (*Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia* or Polri) by using civilians, especially mothers, and children, as shields in front of them; and (3) the importance of rectifying the history of the Papuan referendum, which has been completed at the United Nations. It is also explained by Ajara, Sorica, & Bynum (2022) that violence targeting Papuan civilians such as construction workers, miners, motorbike taxi drivers, teachers, and health workers by Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group has increased notably at high levels over the past two years to hinder the central government's development and infrastructure projects.

According interview with the Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police, the absence of police stations at the Resort Police and Sector Police levels in many districts in Papua has contributed to the emergence of the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group and their separatist actions. Of the 560 districts (sub-district level) in Papua, only 220 districts have the Sector Police because of the limitation of budget. Also, out of 29 municipal-level areas, only 23 have unit offices at the Resort Police. Of the 11 mountainous areas, the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group was more dominant and actively carried out their separatist actions in three districts, namely Nduga, Wamena, and Timika even though the Police posts had been built there.


In the interview, the Jayawijaya Police Chief explained that the origin of weapons used by the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group in Papua Province were obtained from buying in Papua New Guinea (PNG) through short-cut roads on the border with Indonesia in Papua Province. While the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group in West Papua Province mostly smuggled weapons originating from Ambon, remnants of the previous horizontal conflict and those from the Southern Philippines entered through ports, including Nabire Regency. The Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group also obtained weapons from looting and attacks on TNI posts, such as the Military District Command (Kodim) armory, moreover, there is the alleged involvement of officers in the selling of weapons to KKB. It made their weapons also have TNI standards, such as SS-1, SS-2, M-16, and sniper weapons.

Uday (2022) also supports the given arguments by informants that there are some main sources of the Papuan Separatist Terrorist Group. The first is collected from security forces following ambushes, the second is from Indonesian security forces selling arms and ammunition, and the third is from various past conflicts in Indonesia itself. Regrettably, for the past 20 years, the special autonomy policy and the use or disbursement of its large budget have never been evaluated and accounted for.


Furthermore, there is no comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable planning in the two provinces including all the districts under them.

### Papua Special Autonomy and Separatism Challenges

According to the *Badan Pusat Statistik* (2023) or Statistics Indonesia data release, in 2022, the Papua Province Human Development Index (HDI) is the lowest in Indonesia, while West Papua is the second lowest of 34 provinces in Indonesia. Papua and West Papua are the provinces with the highest poverty rates in Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2022). Papua is also the place of the highest malaria disease in Indonesia (Widi, 2022). Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police also mentioned in the interview that the increase in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), tuberculosis, and other epidemic diseases is an indication of the implementation of special autonomy which does not have much impact on the progress of the development of the education, health, and welfare sectors of the Papuan people. The failure of rural poverty is reliant economies on extractive industries rather than agriculture; rural areas lack education, health, and other public infrastructure resulting in low levels of educated people and employment generation; and lack of transparency in public finance management stimulating bureaucrats to act corruptly (Resosudarmo, Mollet, Raya, & Kaiwai, 2014).



**Figure 1.** The Graphic of the Five Highest Poverty Rates Provinces in Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2022)



**Figure 2.** The Graphic of the Five Highest Malaria Cases Provinces in Indonesia in 2021 (Widi, 2022)

Furthermore, the Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police explained Papua was getting worse without improvements in budget oversight, the special autonomy funds would continue to be misused to blackmail the central Government with intimidation, demands, and threats of separatism, even from Papua's political elite and local government leaders. Special autonomy is Indonesia's national policy for the long term; therefore, the success of special autonomy can be measured by the quality of life and progress of the Indigenous Papuans (*Orang Asli Papua* or OAP) through increasing the Human Development Index, decreasing armed actions, and decreasing demands for separatism. The allocation of special autonomy funds should be channeled to more needed sectors, such as health and education so that the way and quality of life of indigenous Papuans can be improved. They are not increasingly extinct and marginalized by disease, poverty, and underdevelopment. However, planning and monitoring of its use and audit and evaluation steps are urgently required so that the special autonomy funds can achieve their targets effectively and optimally.

The implementation of special autonomy in Papua and West Papua has many problems because the implementing regulations are not perfect and some have not been made (Suharno, 2021). Meanwhile, Institutions and powers should have been built to make welfare in terms of education, health, finance, and infrastructure in Papua and West Papua using special autonomy funds (Prabowo, Supriyono, Muluk, & Noor, 2020). The Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police stated that the use of special autonomy funds has been mostly for customary interests and is used jointly for traditional activities which are highly consumptive and unproductive. He added that traditional leaders often provoke their citizens to carry out acts of intimidation against civilian officials, especially those that become extensions of the center, which are usually accompanied by destructive acts of separatism. Meanwhile, the special autonomy funds should have not been given or disbursed and flow again because the mismanagement of Papua for decades has caused human rights violations; disrespect for the human dignity of the Papuans; and uncontrolled migration which caused the economic disparity between the migrant and indigenous people; exploitation of natural resources; rampant corruption; lack of law enforcement; and marginalization of some Papuans (Mutiarin, 2013).

The Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police explained that Lanny Jaya district is an example of a few districts that can still make progress from the special autonomy policy. In the meantime, the flow of special autonomy funds in Nduga Regency does not have any impact on the welfare of local people, resulting in the alleged area where the use of special autonomy funds is very bad, often violent action carried out by the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group threatening the security apparatus, especially the TNI, and Polri. He also stated, that apart from the problem of limited budget support from the central Government, the presence of security guards and law enforcement officers (as an extension of the Government's arm) in there can only be fulfilled by only about 40%. In addition, it is caused by difficult natural and topographical obstacles, as well as by the actions of the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group's attack. Thus, it is difficult for security, order, and law enforcement to be carried out in remote areas in the mountains, such as Nduga, Puncak Jaya, and others.

Uday (2022) stated that Papuan Politicians and the Papuan Government have been implicated as sympathetic sources of funding the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. Based on an interview with the Operations Executing Command in Nduga attested that the investigation results found the armed group led by Egianus Kegoya financed armed violence using village funds, which the Government disbursed through the special

autonomy to purchase weapons and ammunition. It is also testified by Paulus Waterpaw who acknowledges that the village funds were misused to assist Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group in Teluk Bintuni, West Papua by threatening the village government to get the funds. He also reiterated that it occurred not only in West Papua but also in Papua (Hantoro, 2019).

According to an interview with the former Regent of Tolikara, more than five regents in Papua could be arrested for the irresponsible use of Papuan special autonomy funds. In the findings of another violation case, the ex-regent of Tolikara who was eliminated, was defeated in the post-conflict local election whose votes were accused of having been transferred to the Regent of Gwijangge. In Nabire Regency, according to information from the Regent of Paniai, there are 1000 fictitious State Civil Apparatus (*Aparatur Sipil Negara* or ASN) procurements. In an interview with Social Communications Assistance Officer XVII Cendrawasih Military Region Command stated that the security forces acknowledged the special autonomy and social assistance funds were given or flowed to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group, including in the case of Nduga Regency, which was suspected of having been allocated by the incumbent Regent.

Nevertheless, in the interview with the Deputy Head of the Papuan Regional Police stated that the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group opposes the construction of roads and infrastructure in remote and mountainous areas, including those only built by the private sector, such as by Istaka Karya in Nduga Regency. They are afraid that it will open up access for security forces so that they can more easily pursue and eliminate them. Thus, it evidenced that the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group's motive was more than just economic and welfare problems because they did not care about the infrastructures built by the government.

The special autonomy fund is required as an affirmative effort to promote the welfare and security of Papua, but its implementation must innovatively be evaluated even though it has been decided to continue from 2021. For instance, it can adopt the utilization of solar energy to supply clean water in East Nusa Tenggara Province by water pumping systems from the reservoir available to make the adequate level of water distributed to the Village of Labuan Bajo (Sasongko et al., 2019). Furthermore, the disbursement and use of the budget still need to be monitored so that various forms of abuse and irregularities can be avoided and do not recur, as in the case of the first period. In planning a policy proposal in the form of a bill, it is necessary to be willing to accept input openly from various stakeholders.

Meanwhile, policies that deepen disintegration, such as physical development that is not conducive to the human resource capacity of indigenous Papuans (OAP), must be ended. They must make a plan in advance comprehensively, starting with development needs through community consultations from the village, such as sub-district, district, and municipal levels. It was necessary to be monitored by central supervision so that the targets for the future are clear, both in the short, medium, and long term, as well as integrated with national development planning prepared by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) of the Republic of Indonesia.

## **Lessons learned from Wamena, Nduga, and Fakfak Regencies**

### *Wamena Regency*

Wamena, especially the urban area, has grown rapidly in just five years. Like other cities, unfortunately, this city did not grow with good planning. Unfortunately, also, with the increasing number of infrastructure developments by the center and the opening of Wamena Regency, migrants can take advantage of and enjoy the progress of this region.

This can be seen from the emergence and rapid development of new buildings in the form of inns, hotels, shops of building materials and daily necessities, such as food vendors, restaurants, and large houses of worship from immigrants, and the business of transportation or public transportation.

Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of the Cendrawasih Military Command XVII stated that OAP is increasingly cornered or marginalized, only able to fill the informal sector, such as continuing their role in selling areca nut and other garden products in the market as well as being pedicab drivers, motorcycle taxi drivers, cleaners, security guards and other unskilled workers. The rest, those who are not absorbed in the modern job market, roam the streets, in front of airports and shops, or ask immigrants and pedestrians for money. At night, they fill the day with drunkenness, which tends to disturb public order and encourage criminal acts, such as larceny, muggings, robberies, house robberies, etc., making the migrant population worried.

The security forces find it difficult to prevent these criminal acts because they have to take a more 'humanist' approach and avoid violent responses to perpetrators of violent criminal acts. OAP seems increasingly marginalized by the development of the modern sector, which is less integrated and planned, because the development of the education sector to improve their mentality is inadequate, and the health sector does not change much OAP clean and healthy living behavior to help prevent them from being exposed to the spread of HIV Aids, Tuberculosis (TB), Polio, and other endemic diseases.

#### *Nduga Regency*

The Chief of Staff of the Cendrawasih Military Command XVII also revealed that there are negative behaviors of local government leaders at the provincial and district levels, such as often leaving their territory and responsibilities and traveling outside Papua, especially to big cities and tourist destinations in the country. They utilize and enjoy special autonomy funds for the benefit of personnel and families on the pretext of a comparative study and carrying out duties. Apart from misusing the special autonomy funds, according to The Jayawijaya Police Chief, this is also their justification for avoiding various proposals for special autonomy budget requests from traditional community leaders and Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group followers. Meanwhile, ironically, their main task and function were to build progress and develop the territory and welfare of the Papuan people, but they left.

The Chief of Staff of the Cendrawasih Military Command XVII added the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group also communicated with the local Government to obtain a share of the special autonomy funds and social assistance to support their activities. The method they often use is to go to local government leaders and community groups to ask for IDR 150-300 million, using pressure or various intimidation practices. This money can be used to spend on the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group logistics and contraband weapons. As a consequence, to avoid extortion attempts, various pressures, and intimidation of the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group, regional heads made excuses for frequently traveling outside the Papua Province and abroad.

The Jayawijaya Police Chief also warns about the leakage or flow of village funds and social assistance sourcing from special autonomy funds to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. It was influenced by the emergence of the Regent who has a family relationship or still has a relative with the leaders, members, and sympathizers of the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. It brought them significant growth under the new generation and consistently continued to carry out operations disturbing security and undermining the sovereignty of the country, which got wide coverage, especially from



the international community. This matter is urgently added as a requirement of the Regional Head in Papua that a person who has affiliated with the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group is prohibited from being a regional head in Indonesia. The clearance affiliation of every candidate can be assessed by the State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara* or BIN), Indonesian Strategic Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Strategis* or BAIS TNI), and the Intelligence and Security Agency (*Badan Intelijen dan Keamanan* or Baintelkam Polri).

#### *Fakfak Regency*

Based on an interview with the Commander of the Fakfak Military District Command, explained that special autonomy is an unfair affirmative action in terms of the large number of funds disbursed with the results of its implementation when compared to other parts of Indonesia. In the Java Island area, only village funds with a maximum budget of IDR 700 million must be divided equally to be distributed to residents in areas of hundreds of families (Head of Families), reaching thousands of residents. Meanwhile, in Fakfak, the special autonomy fund was given IDR 1.3 billion for 18 families, which was only there for a village with a population of only 35 to 45 people (orphans).

The party responsible for distributing the special autonomy funds in the Papua region is the village head, which was generated from the process of selecting tribal chiefs. The village head has a low level of education and knowledge in good governance to manage and use special autonomy funds accountable from legal aspects, modern financial management, and administrative audits. Thus, it is logical that without improvements through planning and direct supervision of the apparatus, special autonomy funds will be granted in vain. This is because the results are irrelevant to the national interest to prevent the earth and Papuans, especially OAP, from being left behind.

The Head of the Fakfak Police said that the absence of assistance from other independent parties and the weak supervision of the apparatus had made the disbursement and use of special autonomy funds in Papua aimless, as the village head wanted. This reality will not build the mentality of the Regional Government and OAP at any time in using and managing accountable special autonomy funds to develop their territory and catch up with other regions and Indonesian citizens. Meanwhile, the security forces, as law enforcers at the central and regional levels, should have the duty and responsibility for it, such as the Audit Board (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* or BPK), the Prosecutor's Office, the Judiciary, and even the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* or KPK) cannot reach remote areas in the mountains. Coordination between institutions and officials from the central and local Government did not work properly, including with other law enforcers and security forces from the TNI. In contrast, state apparatus must be actively protected in carrying out their duties so that they can reach districts in mountainous areas.

The implementation of the special autonomy policy be prolonged and strengthened for the next two decades with conditionalities that it should be prepared with detailed development planning and transparent and good supervision involving various stakeholders. The regional leaders as the implementers of special autonomy must socialize and communicate the plans and implementation of their development programs by creating a good monitoring system needed to successfully implement special autonomy in Papua in the following period. Furthermore, the division of the

Province in Papua from the current two into five provinces must be accelerated to bring the national development present in the Papuan Natives

### **Counterproductive Responses from the Security Apparatus**

Indonesian Amnesty International reported that from 2018 to 2022, there were 61 murder cases with a total of 199 victims who died outside the law, which the TNI and Polri allegedly carried out. Previously from 2010 to 2018, 69 murder cases with a total of 95 victims died outside the law (Amnesty International, 2022). Meanwhile, the TNI-Polri Task Force deployed in Papua was too focused on mapping and never arrested or prosecuted the leaders or members of the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group. On the other hand, funding for members of the TNI-Polri on duty is given special operational allowances, so the longer the operation is carried out without a clear target, the more costs will be incurred by the state. On the other hand, the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group has used a new tactic by using civilians, especially mothers and children, as their shield to provoke human rights violations if the TNI and Polri officers are provoked into repressive actions using their weapons.

Hoaxes are very effectively spread by followers and sympathizers of the separatist movement to provoke the masses into rioting and anarchic actions to deal with pressure from the security forces. In addition, propaganda carried out by non-state actors such as Benny Wenda and Veronica Koman, as well as state actors such as Vanuatu and the Melanesian Spearhead Group, continues to discredit the Indonesian Government in the eyes of international politics (Nasution & Nainggolan, 2021). Furthermore, Nasution & Nainggolan (2021) restated the termination of the internet channel is carried out for a limited time to prevent anarchic actions from spreading. This measure disrupts business and economic activities, schools, and citizens' daily activities using the Internet. Nevertheless, it is very effective in preventing the emergence of new provocations and the spread of riots, as has happened before.

The succession of community integration at the grassroots level is the key to the success of policy solutions to the problem of separatism in Papua. If this is not successful, especially through a natural process by which deep social communication can naturally occur, including marriage and cultural assimilation in Politics and Governance. Apart from improving education, frictions and conflicts between some indigenous people versus migrants or between Papuans vis a vis non-Papuans who continue to be considered as inhabiting their land or settlers will continue to exist.

### **CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS**

The special autonomy is not yet implemented properly, it is proven that the state budget allocated for the special autonomy was not used properly based on the good governance principle as previously expected by the Government of Indonesia in Jakarta. It also can be seen clearly from the current poor condition of poverty, welfare, disease, health, education, and infrastructure in Papua. In contrast, the money was found illegally transferred to the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group to operate armed struggles, separatism, terrorism, and violent activities against indigenous people, undermining the authority of the central Government and threatening the sovereignty of the Unitary State of Indonesia.

Finally, this study recommends various countermeasures about this matters, these are the special autonomy fund is required as an affirmative effort to promote the welfare and security of Papua, but its implementation must innovatively be evaluated; the allocation of special autonomy funds should be channeled to more needed sectors to

improve welfare the people of Papua; the urgency of adding as a requirement of the Regional Head that a person who has affiliated with the Papuan Terrorist Separatist Group is prohibited to be a regional head in Indonesia; the succession of community integration at the grassroots level; the disbursement and use of the budget still need to be monitored so that various forms of abuse and irregularities can be avoided and do not recur; and the regional leaders as the implementers of special autonomy must socialize and communicate the plans and implementation of their development programs by creating a good monitoring system needed to successfully implement special autonomy in Papua in the following period.

This research contributes to the advancement of a special autonomy policy that can accountably be implemented to improve the welfare of the people of Papua. Following that, it provides recommendations and enhances the point of view in the governance of special autonomy policy in Papua. The limits of researchers in processing data are also a drawback due to limitations in exploration in terms of searching data.

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