




Jurnal Pertahanan

Media Informasi tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan *Identity*, *Nationalism* dan *Integrity*

e-ISSN: 2549-9459

<http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal>



TOTAL WAR IMPLEMENTED IN DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: CASE STUDY OF THE RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE (DCA INDONESIA-SINGAPORE)

Kurniawan Firmuzi Syarifuddin

International Defence Cooperation Directorate, Indonesia Ministry of Defence
Medan Merdeka Barat 13, Central Jakarta, DKI Jakarta, Indonesia 10110

kurniawansyarifuddin@gmail.com

Lukman Yudho Prakoso

Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810

kamalekumdeplek@gmail.com

Joni Widjayanto

Indonesia Defense University
IPSC Area, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810

joniwijayanto6@gmail.com

Article Info

Article history:

Received : December 29, 2020

Revised : April 17, 2021

Accepted : April 27, 2021

Keywords:

Defense,
Diplomacy,
Flight Information Region,
Military Training Area,
Repatriation,
Singapore,
Total War

Abstract

Total war is not always associated with power seizure using physical means, however, the real meaning is how a country could implement the whole of resources to fight for their national interest. This study is aimed to provide an understanding that total war could be implemented in all areas of activities. The study is conducted with a qualitative descriptive method through a case study approach, library study, interview, and observation in the field. It has been implemented in defense diplomacy accordingly without our awareness. For instance, in the case of the delay in the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) renegotiation which unites all personnel from different agencies and institutions, as well as all professional fields to come up with the same directions for Indonesia national interest. This study concludes that a total war strategy could be implemented in defense diplomacy to get a maximum result to fight for Indonesia's national interest.

DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v7i1.1118>

© 2021 Published by Indonesia Defense University

INTRODUCTION

When we hear the word war, then what comes to our mind for the first time is that there is hostility between two countries which carry out a major armed battle between their armies resulting in a fairly intense gunfight that resulted in bloodshed between the warring parties. War is a continuation of the political conflict using another way (Clausewitz, 2007). However, this does not always have to happen, especially with the development of the generation of warfare which has entered the fifth period, where war is no longer conventionally interpreted as the use of force is carried out in disguise so that the target party does not realize that it has been involved in the war and loses (Qureshi, 2019). Nonetheless, the essence of war itself has not changed, namely as an effort to achieve the national interest of a country by involving all the power it has and is not limited to military power only (Morgenthau, 1948). So that every country is required to strategize in achieving national goals, in addition to defending the country's existence from attacks by other countries (Kemhan RI, 2014).

For Indonesia, total war has been chosen as a strategy to be used to maintain the nation's sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity and save the entire Indonesian nation from attacks by other countries, carried out by all Indonesian people by mobilizing all their strength and national resources (Kemhan, 2015). For the Indonesian nation, the total war strategy is not only be used in a war that uses militaristic power and methods (hard power) but can also be applied in various forms of non-militaristic activities (soft power), in all kinds of places, with the involvement of the people, it does not have to be a combatant so that it can be implemented to face the era of the 21st century war generation (Prabowo, 2009). One of the soft power forms that can be used is conducting Defence Diplomacy activities, which are used as an important tool for implementing state policies in the

field of national security and foreign policy during peacetime to fight for its national interests (Anwar, 2018).

One of the objectives of Defense Diplomacy is to build mutual trust between countries to prevent war, which can be done in conducting cooperation agreements in the field of defense between countries (Cottey & Forster, 2013). One of the implementations of Defence Diplomacy activities is the existence of a cooperation agreement in the defense sector between Indonesia and Singapore, which, although it has been agreed upon, is still constrained from being fully implemented and is being renegotiated. Constraints that occur are due to a conflict of interest, including the potential threat to Indonesia's sovereignty over part of its jurisdiction (Hamdan, 2008). Efforts to renegotiate cannot run smoothly, this is because both parties carry their respective national interests so that the situation that occurs is like the situation on a battlefield, filled with the smell of battle and bloodshed in different forms, situations of uncertainty, trickery, and attacking each other by exploiting the weakness of the other, as Sun Tzu had said 2,500 years ago (Agopian, 1992).

In a war situation at the negotiating table as described, to obtain optimal results in achieving national interests, an appropriate strategy is needed. The Indonesian Total war strategy is certainly expected to be used in the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) negotiation process. How can this be implemented? In contrast to previous research related to DCA Indonesia-Singapore, this research intends to analyze how the Total war strategy can be implemented in Defence Diplomacy activities, particularly in the DCA Indonesia-Singapore renegotiation process.

METHODS

The method used in this study is a phenomenological qualitative descriptive method, where the researcher will apply his subjectivity and interpersonal abilities in the exploratory research process

(Helaluddin, 2018). A qualitative approach with a phenomenological approach is a more relevant approach, with the research being conducted that seeks to understand the meaning of events and their relationships to certain parties in certain situations, to explain the phenomena that occur to implement the total war strategy in defence diplomacy activities, especially when doing the DCA renegotiation between Indonesia and Singapore.

Sources of data used in this study are primary data sources obtained through interviews, empirical, and observation. Research is also carried out on secondary data sources obtained through documentation and literature. Data analysis techniques are carried out by using analytical coding techniques by processing and preparing data for analysis, reading the entire data, starting coding or data classification, participants, categories and themes to be analyzed, and interpretations of the available data (Creswell, 2013).

The research begins with a more in-depth analysis of the DCA Indonesia-Singapore negotiation process, as well as the Flight Identification Region (FIR) realignment activities over the Riau Islands Provinces of Indonesia. The research continues with the discussion of the relationship between the total war strategy and defense diplomacy, so the strategy could be implemented in the ongoing renegotiation process of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Long Journey of DCA Indonesia-Singapore

Defense cooperation between Indonesia-Singapore has been going on since 1973 when the two countries agreed to define maritime boundaries in the Singapore Strait. This collaboration continues and develops, which was marked starting in 1980 when joint exercises of the three Forces were carried out with the initial SAFKAR/Sea Eagle/Elang Indopura. The two countries have realized the strategic

importance of helping each other in the area of defense, including by building partnerships in various other defense fields, such as increasing the capacity of personnel, the Defence Industry, sharing information, and others (Kafrawy, 2014).

Defence cooperation between the two countries has continued to increase, with one of them being agreed in 1995 to grant Singapore access to two Military Training Areas (MTA), which was followed by the construction of several Military training facilities which were funded by Singapore and which could then be used two countries' Armed Forces. This agreement ended in 2003 and not extended, so the Singapore Armed Forces no longer had access to the MTA, including in Baturaja and Ara Island, with the reasons that the MTA (1) was used as a training ground for the Indonesian Armed Forces, (2) there are provisions for obtaining permission from the Singaporean party for the use of the MTA, and (3) there was a violation by the Singaporean party inviting a third party, in this case, is another country, to train together at the MTA without having a clearance from Indonesia. Access to the use of MTA is very beneficial for Singapore, which due to the limited area of its country makes it impossible to carry out military exercises with live munitions for its armed forces. So they continue to strive to be able to continue this defense cooperation.

Singapore also takes advantage of several articles in UNCLOS, namely article 51 (1) 1982 UNCLOS, in demanding Indonesia provide access to its country to carry out other legitimate activities which existed before the recognition of the Archipelago State, including for the implementation of its Armed Forces training. The details of article 51 (1) 1982 UNCLOS reads as follow:

Without prejudice to article 49, an archipelagic State shall respect existing agreements with other States and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighboring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters. The terms

and conditions for the exercise of such rights and activities, including nature, the extent, and the areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreements between them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared with third States or their nationals (UNCLOS, 1982).

Singapore's efforts to gain access to the use of parts of Indonesia as a training ground for its Armed Forces finally brought results when in 2005 the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement negotiations were restarted, which went through a series of tough negotiations in 2007 signed by the Ministers of Defence of both countries and witnessed by the national leaders. However, then this DCA did not go as expected when the Indonesian Parliament did not agree to ratify the agreement (Sari, Permatasari, & Syawf, 2013), even though the Indonesian Ministry of Defence and the Singapore Government attempted to clarify that this agreement would benefit both countries. This is because there are several articles in the agreement which are deemed to violate Indonesia's territorial sovereignty which must be aborted or corrected and are very substantial, one of them is the article that allows Singapore to invite other countries to carry out training in MTA that is inside the territory of Indonesia. With the non-ratification of the DCA, it means that up to now there has been no legal protection for the defense cooperation between the two countries, although the defense cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore is increasing, especially in the field of education and joint training.

Flight Identification Region (FIR) Management in Indonesia's Sovereign Territory and Extradition Agreement

The renegotiation process of DCA Indonesia and Singapore cannot be separated from other problems that hamper the closed bilateral relations between the two countries, namely the management of the Flight Identification Region (FIR) in the

Riau Islands Airspace and the extradition agreement between the two countries. Although the two problems are not the defense sector, the DCA Indonesia-Singapore is influenced and affects the success of solving other problems.

The absence of an extradition agreement between Indonesia and Singapore is a problem that is very detrimental to Indonesia because it has been used by many suspected perpetrators of the Indonesian corruption crime to flee to Singapore, or just make it a transit point. Singapore greatly benefits from the funds brought by the corruptors, because it can increase the resources needed by the country in carrying out development (Paluluh, 2018). Indonesia's efforts to make an extradition agreement between two countries began in 1973, but negotiations could only start in 2005 before signed in 2007, in line with the DCA Indonesia-Singapore negotiation process. This indicates that this extradition treaty is an inseparable unit from the DCA Indonesia-Singapore, and when the DCA is not ratified by the Indonesian Parliament, the extradition treaty cannot be implemented (Mahayasa, 2012).

Another problem is the management of FIR in Riau Islands province airspace which has been managed by Singapore since 1965, as a legacy from the British colonial government. The control of air space over the cities of Batam, Tanjung Pinang, Matak, and Natuna Islands should have been carried out by Indonesia as the sovereign, but at that time this was not possible, because it was deemed not to have the ability based on the provisions of the Annex 11 Chicago Convention 1944 (Husna & Riyanto, 2019). This has resulted in frequent incidents of Indonesian pilots being warned by the Singapore authorities, even though they are flying over Indonesian territorial airspace, a matter which greatly disturbs Indonesia's sovereignty over its territory. Indonesia's efforts to convince the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for approving the realignment of FIR management have been carried out

since 1973, which has then intense in recent years. President Jokowi has committed to be able to take over the FIR by 2019 by accelerating the preparation of the necessary technology and human resources, however, this has not yet been realized by the end of 2020. Singapore always trying to convince that FIR management is not based on sovereignty, but on aviation safety issues, is incompatible with the 1944 Chicago Convention and the UNCLOS 1982, which was strengthened by RI Law Number 1 of 2009 on aviation, stated that airspace over the land and waters of Indonesia as country's air sovereignty (Handini & Risdiarto, 2019). FIR realignment process is in a series with an agreement on the Military Training Area (MTA) which is part of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA, so the two agreements must be carried out simultaneously.

The Process of Renegotiating the Indonesia-Singapore DCA

The importance of the relationship between the two neighboring countries requires the existence of a defense cooperation agreement that has national and international legal provisions. In 2019 Singapore, which initially objected, finally willing to renegotiate with Indonesia, with the DCA Indonesia-Singapore 2007 as a reference. Since then a series of meetings have been held, and in the Covid-19 pandemic situation, the activities were conducted virtually. Besides, both parties realize that the DCA Renegotiation process cannot be separated by the agreement of two other related agreements, namely the extradition agreement (Wicaksana, 2016) and the FIR realignment agreement (Purba, 2020).

In the renegotiation process, the two countries agreed to discuss the FIR realignment and the DCA renegotiation using the Framework for Negotiation, the main points of which contain (1) the two countries understand that the FIR problem is not about sovereignty but security and efficiency of air traffic for advancing

international civil aviation and recognizing that military training in the South China Sea is governed by Article 51 UNCLOS 1982, (2) Singapore understands Indonesia's desire to harmonize the FIR by its territorial sovereignty as soon as possible, and (3) Indonesia fully respects and recognizes Singapore's right to conduct training militarily in the South China Sea (SCS), by Article 51 (1) UNCLOS 1982. Based on this, the DCA and the FIR discussions will be carried out simultaneously but in a separate session, while the extradition agreement becomes a package with the DCA agreement in the deal.

Based on the agreed negotiation framework, the DCA renegotiation process will be focused on making adjustments to the points of rejection of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) in the 2007 DCA that related to violations of sovereignty, namely article 3 about 'training cooperation' and article 13 'entry into force, duration, and termination' from DCA Indonesia-Singapore 2007. However, the main focus of the renegotiation was mainly aimed at access granted to Singapore for training its Armed Forces in MTA which are within the Indonesia territory. Indonesia cannot refuse to provide MTA facilities to Singapore, because it was part of the agreement with Singapore when ratified the UNCLOS 1982.

As it is known, the UNCLOS 1982 is a sign of the success of Indonesian diplomacy in fighting for Indonesia's national interests through international law and treaties, with the recognition of the archipelagic state regime which has doubled Indonesia's territory and obtained sovereignty claims over the territorial waters and air between its islands (Darmawan, 2019). However, Indonesia's success cannot be unilateral, but a reciprocal agreement must be made between Indonesia and other interested countries, including Singapore. In an international agreement, an interest that is obtained must be balanced with other interests that must be released, UNCLOS

1982 has been agreed through a consensus mechanism so that reservations are not possible to the provisions of the articles in it, also known as the package deal (Buzan, 1981).

Defense Diplomacy in Total War Strategy

In an explanation, it is said that diplomacy is a mechanism used to realize national interests and also to maintain the national security of a country (Fendrick, 2010). Diplomacy is also an important element in resolving political disputes between countries, to prevent bloodshed caused by wars using armed force (Gray, 2007). Because of its usefulness, the diplomacy of a country is then made into one of the elements of national power, which can be used to influence other parties to act as expected (Kunz & Morgenthau, 1948). So that diplomacy has been used as one of the important instruments for a country to achieve its national goals, in addition to intelligence, military, and economy (Hertenstein, 2019).

Likewise, defence diplomacy is none other than diplomacy which utilizes a country's defense/military assets as a tool to implement a country's foreign policy and national security (Pajtinka, 2016). Defence diplomacy is described as a negotiation practice that uses methods and instruments that do not increase hostility, with the main task of forming military cooperation between countries (Drab, 2018). The use of defence diplomacy is increasingly seen as important as a tool to fight for foreign policy and national security in the post-cold war era (Muniruzzaman, 2020). For Indonesia, which always seeks to find peaceful solutions in resolving every conflict that occurs with other parties, defence diplomacy is used as one of the main alternatives (Budi & Berantas, 2014).

Meanwhile, total war itself has become a popular strategy used in major wars that occurred in the 20th century, starting in World War I and continuing until the end of the cold war era (Chickering, Forster, &

Greiner, 2005). Even the definition of total war is increasingly being developed for use in the 21st century, as a result of globalization, technological developments, financial trends, and the involvement of civilians (Barrett, 2014). Indonesia has also made total war strategy a part of the country's defense strategy, which uses all its national strength, not only military but also economic strength and diplomatic capabilities (Kemhan, 2014). In which the implementation of Total war strategy by Indonesia in war has been applied since the revolutionary period between 1945-1949, with the implementation of war with armed force (hard power) combined with diplomatic efforts (soft power) simultaneously and mutually supportive (Nasution, 1965).

Diplomacy, in this case, defence diplomacy, can no longer be separated from the total war strategy implemented by Indonesia. It is not only used as a tool to resolve political disputes so that war does not occur but also as a means to implement a Total war strategy in realizing national interests. Especially if we study further the features of the Indonesian Total war strategy, namely:

1. Community (*Kerakyatan*), which means that the war being held in the right and obligation of all citizens, according to their respective professions, to protect the interests of all Indonesian people.
2. Universality (*Kesemestaan*), which means utilizing all elements of national power, both resources, and available facilities and infrastructure, for efforts to defend the country.
3. Territoriality (*Kewilayahan*), which explains that defense efforts are implemented in a decentralized manner throughout Indonesia's sovereign territory, but still to achieve the same goals.

From these characteristics, it can be interpreted that all the people and elements of the national power can be involved in efforts to defend the country in the integral unit, by not having to use weaponry, but

simply by making a dedication to their respective profession, without having to make themselves as a combatant (Abdi & Wijayanto, 2020). Based on this explanation, an employee of the Indonesian Government Institutions can participate in defending his country in a "war" situation using Defence Diplomacy as a tool, as a representative of their field of service, without having to carry weapons and hold the status of a combatant.

Total War Strategy Implemented in the Renegotiation of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA

The unratified of the DCA Indonesia-Singapore by the Indonesian Parliament does not solely constitute a potential threat to the survival of the nation, but the development of defense cooperation between the two countries is hampered by the absence of a formal protective legal basis. However, there are two other negotiation efforts, related to the settlement of the DCA, which could be a potential threat to Indonesia's national interests. Indonesia has an interest in not giving up control of its airspace to other countries and Indonesia has an interest in arresting corruptors who run and hide in Singapore and return to their homeland some of the corrupted money. Meanwhile, Indonesia still wants to maintain its dignity by maintaining its commitment to provide access to MTA in its territory, as part of an agreement with Singapore when fighting for UNCLOS 1982 to be operationalized globally.

There are differences in the national interests of each party, causing Indonesia and Singapore to wage a fierce "war" at the negotiating table so that their wishes can be optimally realized. That the war in the 21st century has changed the concept of conventional warfare, that war no longer requires a large battlefield, nor does it require a declaration of war, the minimal use of weapons during the war does not reduce the impact of enormous damage. Therefore, the contemporary war that

occurred must be faced with an appropriate, adaptive, and flexible strategy, involving all other potential powers in the economic, political, and other fields (Risman, 2018).

The total war which has been chosen as a national defense strategy is expected to be a solution to the conflict of interest between two neighboring countries and bring victory to Indonesia in the ongoing negotiation process, through several accommodative adjustments without losing the sovereign rights of a nation. The implementation of the total war strategy in the renegotiation activities of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA can be explained through the characteristics inherent in the Indonesia Total war strategy, community, universality, and also territoriality.

Community characteristics are carried out through activities of the DCA Renegotiation, FIR Realignment, and extradition negotiations were mostly attended by individuals from institutions outside the military/defence scope, but what was produced was closely related to efforts to uphold nations sovereignty. Because of this, each individual must realize that what is being done is part of an effort to defend the state which is an obligation for all Indonesian citizens in defending the country. Because this negotiation activity is part of an effort to defend the country, what must be the final goal was not threatening the sovereignty of the state or causing a territory controlled by other countries for any reason, including safety issues. An understanding of this must be instilled at the time of preparing for the negotiations, the occurrence of differences in perceptions needs to be avoided, by prioritizing state sovereignty as the main goal. The strategy applied in the negotiations must be made flexible, so as not to conflict with the framework for negotiation that has been agreed upon. Although state sovereignty is the main focus of negotiations, it does not leave other matters such as aviation safety, or provisions that apply in international law and treaties. The awareness in focussing on state sovereignty must continue to be

emphasized during pre-negotiation activities so when dealing with Singaporeans, the Indonesian is no longer divided into different perspectives.

The implementation of the Indonesia Total War Strategy must also be characterized by universality by involving all available resources or elements of national power. In the DCA renegotiation, especially to limit, reduce, or relocate the location of the MTA, another reason is needed outside the defence/military sector which Singapore considers to have been thoroughly discussed at the signing of the DCA in 2007. This requires the involvement of other institutions outside defence/military bodies, to provide strong reasons that are supported by applicable national or international regulations. Involvement of other institutions includes the Ministry of Environment which expresses views on the need to carry out conservation in the MTA area, the Ministry of Transportation by conveying increased frequency train trips, civil aviation, and commercial ship crossing, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and also Pertamina, which describes the existence of a submarine pipeline network, and the Regional Governments of South Sumatra and Riau Islands which describe the development of conditions of the density of the surrounding community in the last 15 years, including the Ministry of Fisheries which explains about the expansion of the fishing area of local fishermen. The final result that is expected from the involvement of all other related elements is the emergence of an understanding from the Singaporean of the wishes of the Indonesian regarding the MTA due to a reasonable reason and should have been done.

The next characteristic is territoriality, which can be explained that the implementation of operations is carried out in a decentralized manner while remaining integrated into a single 'Command'. Decentralized in the sense that all preparation processes in the framework of negotiations are carried out independently

by each Ministry as the Focal Point, in this case, the DCA Renegotiation by the Ministry of Defence, Realignment FIR by the Ministry of Transportation, and the Extradition Agreement by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. When the preparations have been carried out, as was done during conventional warfare, it is necessary to have a unit of command that will integrate the implementation of the negotiations. The Command Unit or lead integrator will have to coordinate interactively between focal points so that the results of the achievements of the negotiations can be synergistic in supporting the expected final goals (Prakoso, 2016). The appointed lead integrator does not have to be from the military/defense, because the overall strategy applied is not only in the defense sector but also involves other fields, such as Economy, Transportation, and also Law. In the case of the Indonesia-Singapore DCA Renegotiation which acts as a command center, is the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Kemenko Marvel).

So far, Kemenko Marvel has carried out its function as a lead integrator, by holding a series of joint meetings between focal points to equalize the understanding of the Indonesian delegation, before or during negotiations with the Singaporean. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence continues to coordinate with other related Institutions for DCA Renegotiations. This strategy making the DCA and FIR negotiations can be in line with the national defense strategy which aims to always uphold the sovereignty of the state and nation.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION, AND LIMITATION

Based on the explanation of the research it can be concluded that the Total war used by Indonesia as its State Defence Strategy can be applied in various forms of war. Not only conventional warfare that uses weapons and

bloodshed, but also contemporary wars that occurred in the 21st century where the use of weapons is minimal but the impact can be enormous. In its implementation, Total war can use means that are hard power, or with soft power, with Defence Diplomacy being one of the soft power. How Total war strategy can be applied in Defence Diplomacy can be analyzed through the characteristics inherent in the Indonesia Total war strategy, namely, commonality marked by the involvement of all people, universality marked by the use of all elements of national power, and territoriality marked by operational decentralization by the scope of its functions respectively but still integrated with achieving the same ultimate goal.

In the case of the DCA Indonesia-Singapore Renegotiation, which is a part of defence diplomacy, especially in the preparation of bilateral defense cooperation agreements, a total war strategy needs to be implemented so that the results are achieved can be in line with national interests. It is not only the interest of defense cooperation but also the interest in taking over the management of the FIR over the Riau Islands Province and the interest in composing an extradition agreement between Indonesia and Singapore. The characteristics of the Indonesia Total war Strategy have been embodied in the ongoing process, due to the growing awareness of defending the state from each individual involved in the negotiations, as part of the involvement of all related ministries/institutions, as well as being carried out by the scope of the duties of each focal point, with the Kemenko Marvel acting as the lead integrator to unify the entire interrelated negotiation process to achieve the same goals in harmony.

However, the use of total war as a strategy to resolve complex conflicts of interest has not been consistently implemented or its use is not realized, which results in frequent problem-solving in segmentation, not in one goal. This is due to the lack of understanding of the concept

of implementation of the Indonesia total war strategy in contemporary wars. Therefore, further research is needed to find out how the Total War can be applied in various contemporary war situations in the 21st century.

REFERENCES

- Abdi, R. N., & Wijayanto, J. (2020). Aspek Diplomas, Strategi Pertahanan Semesta, dan Irregular Warfare dalam Penanganan Gerakan Disintegrasi di Indonesia. *Mimbar Agama Budaya*, 37(1), 8–12.
- Agopian, S. (1992). The art of war. *Index on Censorship*, 21(9), 40–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03064229208535441>
- Anwar, S. (2018). Peran Diplomasi Pertahanan Dalam Mengatasi Tantangan Di Bidang Pertahanan. *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara*, 4(2), 71–94. <https://doi.org/10.33172/jpbh.v4i2.332>
- Barrett, C. (2014, March 12). Future of War (16): War will become less likely, but those that happen will be total. Retrieved March 16, 2021, from Best Defense website: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/12/future-of-war-16-war-will-become-less-likely-but-those-that-happen-will-be-total/>
- Budi, T., & Berantas, S. (2014). Diplomasi Pertahanan Sebagai Bagian Dari Diplomasi Total RI. *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara*, 4(2), 165–184.
- Buzan, B. (1981). Negotiating by consensus: developments in technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. *American Journal of International Law*, 75(2), 324–348.
- Chickering, R., Forster, S., & Greiner, B. (2005). A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937—1945. In C.

- Mauch (Ed.), *German Historical Institute*. Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.3200/hist.34.4.132>
- Clausewitz, C. von. (2007). On War. In B. Heuser (Ed.), *Oxford World's Classics*. Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0040571X9609900402>
- Cottey, A., & Forster, A. (2013). Reshaping defense diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance. *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, 1–84.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315000817>
- Creswell, J. (2013). Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach. In *Research design*.
- Darmawan, A. R. (2019). Catatan Hukum Terkait Implementasi Pasal 51 (1) UNCLOS dalam kaitannya dengan Hak Tradisional Latihan Militer di Perairan Kepulauan Indonesia. *Jurnal Hukum Dan Perjanjian Internasional*, 25(1), 20–30.
- Drab, L. (2018). Defense Diplomacy– An Important Tool for the Implementation of Foreign Policy. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 20(3), 57–71.
- Fendrick, R. J. (2010). Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power. In J. B. Bartholomees (Ed.), *The Theory of War and Strategy: Vol. I* (4th ed., pp. 189–194). The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues.
- Gray, C. S. (2007). War, peace and international relations: an introduction to strategic history. In *International Politics*. Retrieved from <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4ev29h1GxmEC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=War,+Peace+and+International+Relations&ots=rTvaZQYSvG&sig=1XCvujNWcVShB1Qt9kK-4PFnOnQ>
- Hamdan, Y. (2008). DCA RI-Singapura: Tinjauan Negosiasi. *Mediator: Jurnal Komunikasi*, 9(1), 89–96.
<https://doi.org/10.29313/mediator.v9i1.1153>
- Handini, W. P., & Risdiarto, D. (2019). Kedaulatan Wilayah Udara di Atas Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI). *Rechts Vinding*, 8(2), 277–292.
- Helaluddin. (2018). Mengenal lebih dekat dengan pendekatan fenomenologi: sebuah penelitian kualitatif. *Uin Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang*, (March), 1–15. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323600431_Mengenal_Lebih_Dekat_dengan_Pendekatan_Fenomenologi_Sebuah_Penelitian_Kualitatif
- Hertenstein, G. (2019). DIME without the ' M ' is DIE : A Case for Conventional Military Power in Modern Strategy Discourse.
- Husna, L., & Riyanto, A. (2019). Implikasi Perjanjian Internasional Flight Information Region (FIR) Singapura atas Ruang Udara Indonesia terhadap Kepulauan Riau. *Snistek*, 2(September).
- Kafrawy, M. (2014). *Kepentingan Singapura Terhadap Indonesia dalam Defence Cooperation Agreement*.
- Kemhan, R. (2014). *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2014*. Kemhan RI.
- Kemhan, R. Doktrin Pertahanan Negara. , Kemhan RI § (2015). Indonesia: Kemhan RI.
- Kemhan RI. *Strategi Pertahanan Negara*. , (2014).
- Kunz, J. L., & Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. *The Western Political Quarterly*.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/442951>
- Mahayasa, I. M. R. (2012). *Perjanjian Ekstradisi Antara Indonesia dan Singapura sebagai upaya pengembalian pelarian Koruptor Indonesia di Singapura*. Universitas

- Brawijaya.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (first). Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Muniruzzaman, A. N. M. (2020). Defense Diplomacy: A Powerful Tool of Statecraft. *CLAWS*, (Winter), 63–80.
- Nasution, A. H. (1965). Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. In O. Heibrunn (Ed.), *Praeger* (Facsimilie). Jakarta, Indonesia: Frederick A. Praeger. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2754103>
- Pajtinka, E. (2016). Military Diplomacy and Its Present Functions. *Security Dimensions: International & National Studies.*, (December 2016). <https://doi.org/10.24356/SD/20/9>
- Paluluh, J. D. E. (2018). Perjanjian Ekstradisi Indonesia Singapura. Retrieved from Kompasiana.com website: <https://www.kompasiana.com/jemica-damar-elyanto-paluluh/5a957556bde5753cc90a0b72/perjanjian-ekstradisi-indonesia-dan-singapura#>
- Prabowo, J. S. L. T. (2009). *Pokok-pokok Pemikiran tentang Perang Semesta* (Cetakan Pe). Jakarta Pusat: Pusat Pengkajian dan Strategi Nasional.
- Prakoso, L. Y. (2016). *Akuntabilitas kinerja pengadaan barang jasa di akademi angkatan laut surabaya (Studi Model Akuntabilitas Kinerja Berbasis Good Governance dalam Pengadaan Barang Jasa Alat Instruksi/Alat Penolong Instruksi)*.
- Purba, C. M. (2020). *Mengembalikan kedaulatan udara Natuna dengan pengambilalihan Flight Information Region (FIR) dari Singapura (era Pemerintahan Jokowi Periode 2014-2019)*. Universitas Sumatera Utara.
- Qureshi, W. A. (2019). Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Warfare: Technology and Perceptions. *San Diego International Law Journal*, 21(1), 188–215. Retrieved from <https://login.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=afh&AN=141875116&site=ehost-live>
- Risman, H. (2018). Transformasi perang: Perang semesta di masa damai. *Academia.Edu*.
- Sari, A. C., Permatasari, M., & Syawf, I. (2013). Pembahasan Defence Cooperation Agreement Indonesia - Singapura oleh DPR dan Pemerintah Indonesia dan Implikasinya bagi Teori Birokratik Politik. *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional UNPAR*, 9(2), 63–88.
- Sari, A. C., Permatasari, M., & Syawfi, I. (2013). Pembahasan Defence Cooperation Agreement Indonesia - Singapura oleh DPR dan Pemerintah Indonesia dan Implikasinya bagi Teori Birokratik Politik. *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional UNPAR*, 9(2), 97414. <https://doi.org/10.26593/jihi.v9i2.1044.%p>
- UNCLOS. (1982). Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. In *The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects*.
- Wicaksana, A. S. (2016). Penundaan Indonesia dalam Meratifikasi Perjanjian Ekstradisi dengan Singapura tahun 2007-2014 (Studi Kasus: Korupsi BLBI). *Journal of International Relations*, 2(4), 261–269.