

Defense Management concepts improving Indonesian Maritime Security

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Abstract

This study aimed to analyze the concept of Indonesian Defence Management in the 21st century in the context of Indonesian Maritime Security and to determine the readiness of defence management capabilities in facing threats. Research method used is descriptive qualitative with data collection methods through in-depth interview and documentation. The results showed that to improve maritime security in Indonesia has not been implemented in a structured and comprehensive defense in accordance with the management perspective of the countries more advanced, especially on defense preparedness in logistics management such as the management and alutsista availability owned Indonesia.

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Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis konsep manajemen pertahanan Indonesia di abad 21 dalam rangka keamanan maritim Indonesia, serta untuk mengetahui kesiapan kemampuan manajemen pertahanan dalam menghadapi berbagai ancaman. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui wawancara mendalam dan dokumentasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam upaya meningkatkan keamanan maritim di Indonesia belum diimplementasikan secara terstruktur dan komprehensif sesuai dengan perspektif manajemen pertahanan dari negara-negara yang lebih maju, terutama tentang kesiapan dalam manajemen logistik pertahanan seperti pengelolaan dan ketersediaan alutsista yang dimiliki Indonesia.

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Introduction

South China Sea dispute last few years, political and security escalate, because the government of the People Republic of China (PRC) claimed the South China Sea that make other countries do the same. Consequently, the diplomatic relations between the countries in the region become strained. Six countries disputing the South China Sea region, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. Paracel and Spratly islands dispute directly affect the stability of the economic, political, and security of the region.

The dispute became a central issue, not only for the region region countries, but also for large countries that have an interest in this area. United States decided to help resolve any effort peaceful resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. Border dispute began lead to Indonesian maritime territory, when Chinese claims over 2,361-kilometer square of Natuna islands. Lately, China has included most of the area Natuna into Nine dashed line on territorial map created

in 1974 which means the claim to Natuna has been done by China for a long time (Hardoko, 2016).

The Pentagon report states, since December 2013 China has around 2,900 hectares of land reclamation South China Sea, particularly on Ferry Cross Reef, which is part of the Spratlys. Not only the construction of civil and military facilities, the airstrip construction, a greenhouse area 500 square kilometers and 200 personnel placements at the People Liberation Army (PLA) of China. In addition, there has also been standing firm runway with 3 km a length and 300 m a width, which is able to accommodate the jet bombing H-6 and a large military transport aircraft Y-20. (Pusat, 2016)

Paracel and Spratly as a strategic area in international navigation path. With region control, these countries dominate Sea land of Communications (SLOC) and Sea land of trade (SLOT). In other words, these countries will also master the traffic investment, international trade and tourism value reached US \$ 5.3 trillion per year, including 85% of the

world's oil supplies from eastern Asia (Hardoko, 2016).

On other hand, the Chinese military aggression strength-based, proven to have violated international maritime law conventions (UNCLOS) of the United Nations. China violated an agreement with the 10 ASEAN countries, as stipulated in Declaration on parties Conduct in South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. Claims and reclamation efforts undertaken by China are unfounded and not in accordance with international law.

Indonesia as the chair of ASEAN, is obliged to act as a mediator in conflict management South China Sea. The conflict concerns region conditions, because South China Sea is a strategic trade shipping lines that intersect with ALKI I, II and III belong to Indonesia. If the South China Sea in politicization by China, it is not only the regional conditions are disturbed but also national sovereignty, especially seepage claims China has stretched into Natuna territory. Although not a claimant states on South China Sea territory, but must have a firmness against China. For this

the Government of Indonesia should quickly map out military and defense strategy in dealing with conflict in South China Sea. In Act No. 3 of 2002 on the defense stated that the President to be responsible for formulating a common defense policy in regulation form No. 41 of 2010 and defense strategy in government decree 97 of 2015 which is aligned with the draft that was published in National Medium Term Development Plan (Indonesia: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN)) about Defense Strategic Plan on 2015-2019 and 2015-2019. The rules relating to the strategic issues of defense and national security, including border area conflict, including security threats and lawlessness in the border areas and the national security system integrative.

Strategy and defense policy that is geared to meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF). Model-based capacity building of national defense policy MEF, increased budget form, defense equipment modernization, defense posture development and reserve components addition throughout the defense establishment,

country defense, including border areas, especially the issue Natuna due to potential boundary disputes in the Parcel and Spratly.

Nawacita program focuses on development in the maritime field so that the necessary sustainable development in the maritime sector. To reach that stage, required Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Doorey (2015) explained that transnational threat is a threat that knows no countries boundaries and actors in several levels, among other countries and organizations. Indonesia faces challenges in maritime sector development, one of them in maritime security area. The main factor that the problem is still not yet integrated the various agencies and sectors that are in the maritime sector. Indonesia is encouraged to be more involved in various maritime security cooperation, especially in the ASEAN region to prevent common threats to disrupt trade in the maritime sector as a major income source for the country's economy.

In facing South China Sea conflict and dynamism in Asia Pacific

region, Indonesia Government must show firmness in defending the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia: Negara Kesatuan Republik Indoneisa (NKRI)) through naval diplomacy. Furthermore, it should change of defense strategy, management and military force use to confront military threats and new models from conventional warfare. Indonesia should also accelerate changes in defense posture adequate and able to deal with conflict in South China Sea region (Arsyad, 2016). Conflict South China Sea is a real threat for Indonesia (Greater, 2014) focused on military power development Natuna Islands (Bhatnagar, 2016).

The complexities in Asia Pacific region and South China Sea conflict, forced Indonesian government to immediately create a policy to protect the NKRI. Therefore, this study focuses on defense management in Indonesian maritime security.

Joint Concepts for Defence Management

Generally, Joint Concepts

interpreted as relations strategic guidance for the development and ability execution of Joint Force (combined power) to changes doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policies (Mack, 2016; Walton et al, 2015; Williams, 2014). Another notion is to describe how to build a joint force commander to plan, prepare, deploy, use, defend and move joint forces (Williams, 2014).

in developing and planning a Joint Concept, the Force Development and Employment Force. In Force Development, influenced by the Defense Resource Management, Human Resource Management Defense and the Defense Logistics Management. Meanwhile, in Force Employment, influenced by the Joint Operational Planning and Training & Exercise for the Joint Concept (Mahoney, 2015). Dual Purpose of joint Concept Models (Figure 1).

There are two main objectives




Figure 1. Dual Purpose of Joint Concept (Mahoney, 2015)

In line with these objectives, establish process to Joint Concept (Joint Concept Development) as an advanced piece of Joint Concept Planning, according to Command (2003), there are five steps that must

be followed, as follows: Prospectus Development, Research and writing, Concept evaluation, Coordination and approval, and concept Implementation.

Five steps are part which becomes a cooperation area between the civilian and military to develop a joint concept that could be a solution to future challenges for a country to improve its capabilities as expected (Young, 2003; Baumann, 2008; Fleming, 2011), developing and carrying out research and write the desired concept (Lilien et al, 2006; Crossley, 2004; Gompert, 2003). In developing these five elements, civil-military role is important to build a joint concept that suits needs, challenges solution and improve capabilities (Tatham and Rietjens, 2016)

Maritime Security

There is no universal definition about maritime security internationally accepted (Rahman, 2009). Maritime security is a comprehensive maritime domain and systemic concept. Presenting multiple and inter-related requirements for cooperative security by state and non-state actors (addresses traditional and non-traditional security challenges). Maritime security includes: coordinating collective and

cooperation security to protect national, regional and global importance interests, purpose and core values (state sovereignty), navigation freedom, economic development, environment and ocean resources, human and social development, and political stability (Cordner, 2014).

Maritime security is an interesting issue (Germond, 2015; Bueger, 2015; Widen, 2015; Frittelli, 2005; 2007; Gilpin, 2007) as the new challenges that need support to overcome (Bueger, 2015), characterised as a basic wicked problem (Bateman, 2011), a term that draw sattention to new challenges and rallies support the various problems because of economic activities such as transportation, resource extraction and fishing. To defend maritime security required continued investment in infrastructure: both in terms of hardware such as ships, ports and communication networks; and a stable environment for trade, not only around the coast but in other places, but also on the high seas (Lin, 2015). Monitoring the maritime security is not an easy task as over 90 % of global trade carried by water (Burns, 2013).

In defending maritime security, can not be separated from the military, especially naval readiness. The defense readiness must be supported by the armed forces, especially with regard to sophisticated defense systems including war fleet readiness (Droff, 2016). According to Germond and Germond-Duret (2016), States extend their control over extra-national spaces under ocean governance (marine resources protection) and maritime security (against sea criminal actors).

Research Method

Research method used are descriptive qualitative. Qualitative research methods is verbal descriptions without statistical analysis use techniques (Sangaji & Sopiah, 2010). Design on a qualitative descriptive study was conducted in case studies.

The informants came from officials of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Professionals. Data analysis process in this study derived from sources and records collected with created

verbatim or matrix on interviews results for analyzed.

Result and Discussion

Indonesian Defence Management Concept within Maritime Security

Change in Defence Management Indonesia became Military Operations Other Than War (Indonesia: Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP)) as the appropriate measures to NKRI protect because Indonesia not involved in the South China Sea conflict.

Improved maritime defense management focused on people, readiness, and equipment. Force Maritime Defense used to implemented four elements of defense strategy, ie deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security (Supandi, 2016).

Defense management in maritime pivot concept based on government program. Therefore, maritime pivot has a range of activities exploiting marine potentials are not been developed, such as the fishing industry, shipbuilding, marine resources exploration, sea waves energy, energy generation, research

centers, fishermen settlements, marine tourism and interests other countries. The measures launched by government in defense management are: Defense Resource Management, Human Resources Management Defense, Defense Logistics Management and Joint Concepts for Military Operation.

The first strategy is Defense Resource Management; Using natural resources in Indonesian waters by humans according maritime pivot concept. For example marine areas used as shipping, tourism, traditional fishing areas, Navy training areas, conservation area, coastal reclamation area, oil & gas area, drilling and other activities.

From research result, potential sea in the Riau Archipelago, Natuna regency exploited through fishing activity (more than 1 million tons per year), D-Alpha gas field (total petroleum reserves estimated at 1 400 386 470 a barrel and natural gas as much as 112 356. 680,000, barrels with total reserves of 222 trillion cubic feet), Gas Hydrocarbon (by 46 TCT), attractions, etc.

Management of National Resources is one of the pillars within Economic Instruments framework in country defense through agency (institution) role. In addition, the Government also optimize economic operators role in support national economic growth improvement in achieve strong national economy (Defence White Paper, 2014).

The second strategy is the Defense of Human Resources Management; For the national defense is one of state government and organized functions by fostering and utilizing all national resources to create defense components and ability to country citizens defend, who are ready at any time tackling threats both military threats and non-military threats, while considering its use for welfare.

From the findings, it seemed that planning framework and operations implementation in Natuna regency, Indonesia Government will add 2,000 personnel force comprising paskhas (Kopaskhas) Air Force, Marine Corps Navy, and Army Raider. According to the Minister of Defence,

to date there have been 18 fighter planes at the airfield Hawk 100/200 Supadio, Pontianak. That as the government's efforts in NKRI defend and maritime security. The legal basis for human resource development defense is the 1945 Constitution Chapter X of Citizens and Residents, Article 27 paragraph (3), Act No. 3 of 2002 on National Defence.

The third strategy is the Defense Logistics Management; From research results conducted that related to the Conflict South China Sea, Indonesian Government has done some preparation, build bases Sukhoi SU-27 that was built in 2014, alerting helicopter AH-64E, add 1 battalion personnel infantry, patrol jet fighters squadron, to deploy dozens of warships of the Western Fleet Command (Indonesia: Komando Armada Wilayah Barat (Koarmabar)) Navy

Logistical support is directed also to guarantee and meet material needs, facilities and services quickly and accurately, both to support strength preparation, training activities and operation according to the

applicable procedures. Logistical support can be classified as: budget support and fees, supplies and logistical support, transport support services as well as support services and other facilities. The fourth strategy, Joint Concepts for Military Operation; From the research finding, Indonesian Government have three main dimensions in this case, namely Navy, Air Force, and Army, as well as civilian agencies in carrying out the functions and responsibilities to deal with conflict in the South China Sea.

Their operation conducted by the Indonesian Government, both strategic intelligence operations and joint operations are being conducted to improve security in the Natuna Islands. Efforts have been made by the Indonesian Government is align and harmonize each agency to realize vision and mission in facing threats and challenges in South China Sea area. The things above are the efforts taken by Indonesian Government to maximize concept within a joint military operation framework conducted by inter-agency resulting in the Joint Concept Planning (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Joint Concept Planning Model (Mahoney, 2015)

Joint Military Operation Planning Concept in Indonesia needs to be planning a joint operation of the military element (specific tasks). In the model, it appears that the Joint Concept Planning Strategy is built into the Area Mission, Objectives Readiness Requirements.

Readiness of Indonesian Defense Management Capabilities within Maritime Security

In preparation, the Indonesian government seeks to improve various preparations ability, ie people, equipment and readiness aspects. First, People; The research result that personnel are working throughout human element in the organization ranging from highs to lows. Each personnel has duties and each

organization responsibilities in main tasks support in accordance with the Defence Human Resources Management concept. Within this concept, attention focused on defend of strength, power, operating aid, education and training, maintenance personnel, and administration.

Second, Equipment; From data research, defense equipment has been purchased and ordered by Indonesian Government. Based on data ideal from various researchers, the number of defense equipment owned by Indonesia reached 50%, but this amount estimated able to achieve Indonesian alutsista. Defense equipment belonging Army, Navy, and Air Force (Table 1)

Table 1. Alutsista TNI

No	Kesatuan	Alutsista
1	Indonesian Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 103 MBT Leopard II • 50 Tank Marder • 38 Howitzer Digital Caesar Nexter • 36 MLRS Astross II Mk6 • 900 Trucks Force • 800 Rantis • 80 Panser Anoa • 5 Starstreak Missile Battery • 5 Mistral Missile Battery • 180 Javelin Anti-Tank Missile • 150 Anti-Tank Missile Nlaw • 20 Bell helicopter 412Ep • 16 Fennec helicopter • 6 Mi17 helicopter
2	Indonesian Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 37 Amphibian Tank BMP3F • 25 Amphibious vehicle LVTA1 from Korea (grant batch 2) • 5 Amphibious tanks types BTR-4 (order 55 units) • 10 MLRS RM Grad • 11 Anti-submarine helicopters Panther • 4 Maritime surveillance aircraft CN235 MPA • 4 Transport helicopters Bell 412 Ep • 3 Warships light frigate "Bung Tomo Class" • 3 Warship types of KCR (Quick Ship Missile) 60 m • 2 Warship type of KCR 40m • 3 Warships types of LST (Landing Ship Tank) • 2 Warships types of BCM (Bantu Cair Minyak) • 3 Battleships type of fast patrol • 1 Battleships type of screen training • 2 Submarine Kilo • 2 Hydrografi Ship
3	Indonesian Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 Coin Super Tucano Aircraft • 16 Golden Eagle fighter jet • 8 F16 fighter jet equivalent of block 52 (order number 30 F16 upgrade) • 5 Medium transport aircraft CN295 • 8 Hercules aircraft • 6 Cougar helicopters • 6 UAV Heron • 4 Radar Thales • 1 Sukhoi simulator

Source: author's data collection

The Indonesian military capabilities continue to experience significant increases. Modernization of defense equipment as stated in the MEF (Minimum Essential Force)

proved able to meet the needs of defense equipment Indonesia. Meeting the needs of equipment or the defense equipment related to the budget of the

Indonesian government granted to organize MEF in every five years.

Third, Readiness; This concept emphasizes the readiness of the Government of Indonesia in facing the South China Sea conflict. Readiness is made up of the needs of defense equipment as well as personnel or human resources who have the ability and expertise. From the research that has been done by Indonesia still has a

rather low in readiness in facing the South China Sea. Therefore, the Indonesian government should improve themselves in the face of conflict.

Based on the research results, and the Strategic Intelligence Agency intelligence efforts and provide information about the factors that may be a threat to the Homeland (table 2)

Table 2. Military readiness in Maritime Security Operations

	Current Condition	Ideal	%	Readiness
Personnel	526 Personel	2000 Personel	26,3%	
Army	57	87	66%	
Navy	102	329	31%	
Air Force	120	253	47%	
Training and Activity Level	Routine performed by the respective Unit	Routine and special	75%	
Equipment / Infrastructure	Field development navy and airfields Support from Indonesian Western Fleet Command, Regional Military Command, Indonesian Military Headquarters and 13 Indonesia Air base dan Provincial Police Commands Sumatera	Support from Three-Dimensional Police	90%	55%
Equipment Status	C-130H Hercules, EMB 34 Super Tucano, AS355 (Light Helicopter), EC725 Super Cougar, AS565S Panther (Helicopter), EC135 (light helicopter), C-295, F-16C, AH-64D, Apache, Bonanza Light Aircraft, 3 submarine, Leopard, 1 Infantry Battalion, Hawk, F100	SU-35, SU30, SU-27, F-16, T-50i,, AH-64E Apache, Mi-35p, UAV, 5 submarine, 1 Rider Battalion, 1 Arhanud Batalyon, 1 Aviator Squadron, 1 Marine Battalion, 1 Paskhas Battalion, Oerlikon Skyshield, Pantshir-S1, MLRS Astross II	55%	
War stock supplies	War Stock and Based on Requestn	Able to meet operating requirements	50%	

Source: author's data collection

From research data about the Indonesia Government readiness in facing the South China Sea conflict. The result is Indonesia Government readiness reached 55% (personnel and equipment preparation number). The Indonesian government has been preparing to facing conflict, but such efforts should be increased.

Conclusion

First, The government measures in defense management are: Defense Resource Management, Human Resources Management Defense, Defense Logistics Management and Joint Concepts for Military Operation. **Second**, Model-based capacity building of national defense policy MEF, conducted an increased budget, modernization of defense equipment, defense posture development and additions to reserve components throughout defense establishment. **Third**, The Indonesian government attempted to improve various preparations ability from aspects of people, equipment and readiness.

Recommendation

The need for socialization or

learning to all stakeholders and the elements involved on Management Concepts of Defense and Indonesian Defense Readiness Management Capabilities in the 21st century.

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