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### **ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE STRATEGY POLICIES IN DEALING WITH THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT**

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#### **Abstract**

Several countries have implemented the diplomacy model using second-track diplomacy in solving various problems. With the dynamics of global, regional, and national strategic environmental conditions, the second track diplomacy model is a step that is considered to be effective and efficient in finding solutions to every problem between countries. The Indonesian Navy, which, according to Kent Booth, has one of its functions in carrying out diplomacy, has carried out several diplomatic steps. As an archipelago that has land and sea borders with ten neighboring countries, prioritizing this second track diplomacy model is necessary. The purpose of this study is to find a marine defense strategy in dealing with the potential impacts of the conflict that occurred in the South China Sea. Considering the vast territory of Indonesia's territorial sea, a method of sea defense strategies can apply this diplomacy model. This study uses a literature study by gathering various information from various sources, then the theory used in conducting discussions and analysis with the theory of Barry Buzan. This study concludes an input and recommendations for policymakers to prioritize second-track diplomacy in solving various existing problems, especially in Indonesia's sea border region with neighboring countries.

## INTRODUCTION

As an archipelagic country in which there is an Indonesian archipelagic sea lane that becomes a route of world shipping traffic, Indonesia is responsible for safety and security in the territorial sea that is its jurisdiction. Including the free seas which border directly with neighboring countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, East Timor, Singapore, and Papua New Guinea. The rise of armed robberies and kidnappings in the territorial waters of the southern Philippines, which is around the Sulu Sea which is a sea border region between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines is one example of crime vulnerability that is the responsibility of Indonesia, especially the Indonesia Military (TNI) (Novaria, 2017)

There have been several robbery cases and also happened to Indonesian citizens. In this case, the responsibility is even absolutely in the hands of the Indonesian Military, especially the Navy. Other forms of crime that are also very detrimental to Indonesia are illegal fishing and the smuggling of goods, people, weapons, and drugs. The crime is part of other even more significant and internationally organized threats such as international theorists and syndicates or proxies from certain foreign powers.

Indonesian President, Joko Widodo, has a vision of Global Sea Fulcrum, which is an effort to make Indonesia a world sea axis (Prakoso, Suhirwan, & Prihantoro, 2020). Indonesia has an interest in making not only the Indonesian Ocean region, but also the sea region in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality, and prosperity for all through the collaboration of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Even though Indonesia is in the position of a country that does not participate in making claims (non-claimant state) of the South China Sea (SCS) region, Indonesia continues to encourage countries in dispute to resolve the problem peacefully. Indonesia has

sought to encourage ASEAN and China to complete the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea (Prakoso et al., 2020).

Prolonged disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) involving China and ASEAN countries that border directly with the SCS region are at the same time a warning signal for Indonesia to be alert to the threat of conflict in the territorial waters. Indonesia, which also has a common interest, has taken firm steps to maintain the sovereignty of the Indonesia territory by changing the name of the SCS waters that enter Indonesia into the North Natuna Sea.

The Indonesian Government announced the name change of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea in the northern waters of the Natuna Islands through the Coordinating Ministry for Sea Affairs on 14 July 2017, in conjunction with the launch of the new map of the Republic of Indonesia. The name of the waters was changed to accompany the settlement of disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and Vietnam. The new map of the Republic of Indonesia emphasizes that the Natuna Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has been named "The North Natuna Sea". In addition to changing the dotted blue line into a solid blue line, the Ministry of Sea Affairs also wrote the name of the North Natuna Sea in the north of Natuna Island, which included the territorial waters of Indonesia (Rachmad, Mohamad, Suhirwan, Zaini, Ansori, n.d.).

Problems in the South China Sea have been going on for a long time, and various diplomatic measures have been carried out between the Government and together regionally. Reflecting on the limitations of the first track diplomacy carried out by ASEAN and China, a sustainable peace settlement approach, if referring to the theory of multi-track diplomacy, will be more likely to be achieved if it involves and empowers other potentials at all levels of diplomacy. In this case, second track diplomacy is one of the potentials methods needed to support and cover the limitations

that exist in the first track diplomacy (Pssat, 2016).

According to Kent Booth's theory of the Navy Trinity, one of the functions of the Navy is the diplomatic function where diplomacy is support for government foreign policy designed to influence the leadership of other countries in a state of peace or hostile situations. With its involvement, the Navy can guarantee international stability (Booth, 2014). Based on the explanation above, this study was conducted to analyze how the Indonesian Navy has been in carrying out its diplomatic function to resolve some of the problems in the Indonesian sea area, which are steps of the sea defense strategy in carrying out the second track diplomacy.

## **METHODS**

This article uses the literature study method. M. Nazir, in his book entitled *Research Method* states that literature study is a data collection technique by conducting a study of the review of books, literature, notes, and reports related to the problem to be solved (Nazir, 1985). Literature study is researching by studying and reading literature related to the problem that is the object of research.

The theory used in this study is the theory of regional security theory presented by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in the book entitled *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (2003) (Gupta, 2010). This theory is used to analyze complex regional security. The concept of complex regional security discusses the centralization of security in geographically formed regions. Security problems are challenging to spread widely, and threats are very likely to arise within the region. The fact that the security of every actor in an area interacts with the security of other actors. Generally, there are high-security interdependencies within an area; interdependence across regions does not occur. That is what defines an area and makes regional security a unique

field of study. Sometimes the periphery separates two regions, for example, Afghanistan, located between the Middle East and South Asia. The region must be treated as a small system that makes all theories of international relations applicable, for example, the balance of power, polarity, interdependence, and alliance systems.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

### **Navy Trinity**

In *Navies and Foreign Policy*, Kent Booth states that international practices/habits that are considered reasonable and generally accepted where the Navy worldwide has roles, namely Military, Constabulary, and Diplomacy Role (Supriyono, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2021).

### **Military Role**

This role appropriately forms the base of the trinity, for the essence of navies is their military character. Actual or latent violence is its purpose. A navy can threaten and use force that gives meaning to its other modes of action. It derives its diplomatic impact from the perception of its military character (Palupi et al., 2021). It originates its service in conflicts from its ability to exert brute force successfully. When viewed from the definition of the use of the sea, one of the three leading roles in the military role, which is closely related to war and combat operations and the consequences of states that claim to have military roles must have combat strength and capability in dealing with combat situations. Furthermore, the navy must possess the ability to control sea and sea denial (Harris, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2019).

This role is carried out in the context of upholding the sovereignty of the country at sea, utilizing national defense and deterrence, preparing forces for war preparations, warding off any military threats through the sea, and maintaining the stability of sea security (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021).

### **Constabulary Role**

The Constabulary Role is both internally as much as externally oriented. This role is not often concerned with the armed forces of other states. They are mainly concerned with extending sovereignty over the state's sea frontiers. The role of the constitution is closely related to the reach of force laws and treaties, which include national territory and national interests. Its implementation is to uphold the law at sea, protect national marine resources and wealth, maintain order at sea, and support national development in contributing to national stability and development. This role is carried out either independently or in combination with other sea power instruments (Prasetyo, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2021).

### **Diplomacy Role**

The Diplomatic Role of the navies is concerned with the management of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force. Diplomatic purposes support state policy in particular bargaining situations or general international intercourse. This role includes starting from naval presence even though not all of the features must and can have this option and latent naval capabilities. This role refers to a 'show of force of the Navy', which has become a traditional Navy role. Diplomacy is support for government foreign policy designed to influence the leadership of other countries in a state of peace or a war situation (Listiyono, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2019).

In the three roles, it is clear that there are several inter-correlations among the fundamental roles of the naval synergy that cannot be reached by other forces. Naval platforms and crews are formed and trained to fight at sea and wider water littorals, although they cannot reach the mainland but are the same length as the air force. According to the analysis, the inherent flexibility of naval forces makes them well-suited for a wide range of

missions and tasks in politically sensitive crisis management situations. The description of the three roles in the current era are:

- a. The military role includes command of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, the fleet in being, seapower projection, and sea maneuver.
- b. The constabulary role includes sovereignty patrols, the aid of the civil power, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Supportive to Other Government Departments (OGDs), oceans management, and Search and Rescue (SAR).
- c. The diplomacy role includes preventive deployments, coercion, Sea Interdiction Operations (MIO), Peace Support Operations (PSO), Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), symbolic use, presence, humanitarian assistance, Confidence Building Measures (CBM), and Track Two Diplomacy (Supriyono et al., 2021).

### **Second-Track Diplomacy (STRAD) Concept**

In 1981, Joseph Montville has first introduced the term 'second-track' or 'track two' diplomacy. The term was stated in the process when he tried to define the informal and non-government activities, which brought about a diplomatic resolution of conflicts (Diamond & McDonald, 1996). Montville needs to label the differences between efforts, which were people to people and that Government to Government. In its original conception, 'track two' or 'citizen' diplomacy refers to private citizens discussing issues that are usually reserved for official negotiations (Jones, 2020).

STRAD rises above the narrow power-based approaches of traditional diplomacy by substituting the nation-state as the primary settlement of a conflict. In other words, rather than only pursuing strategic

interests by conducting favorable discussions with just governments, a fundamental characteristic of track one missions, STRAD seeks to include all parties to the conflict. STRAD recognizes its part of a practice of mounting shared thoughtful between larger groups of the citizen, while track one diplomacy tends to limit its focus to the narrower world of the politician or military leaders. STRAD tries to make its impact felt on the entirety of what it describes as identity groups: namely, communities that share a specific ethnic, regional, national, socio-economic, or other identities. Rather than just trying to inspire military leaders or politicians to make decisions based on a standard calculation of interests and options, STRAD seeks to help all the people involved to change their way of thinking (Widiarto, Prakoso, Suhardono, Warka, & Dar, 2021).

The concept of STRAD stems from the belief that conflict can be avoided by building linkages of friendship and shared understanding between people. Changes in the way they are thinking, settlement of the conflict, and finding the possible solutions are the objectives to bring people together. In this way, STRAD can transform conflict to be a constructive dialogue between those involved in disputes. The engagements between citizens of different political positions adapted the requirements of techniques of bargaining and negotiation. STRAD, therefore, entails processes such as problem-solving workshops, dialogues, cultural exchanges, and between people that are engaged in a dispute. These methods are a must for STRAD practitioners who have neither acquired such skills nor developed them appropriately.

Although STRAD happened between two or more groups in a conflict, it was also designed at working with only one party to gain a proper understanding of other people's positions. Working with a single agent can be useful in facilitating

group cohesiveness where individuals become marginalized by their group.

Power-based, official, and frequently inflexible method of formal interface amongst briefed governments of free states recognizes as first track diplomacy (Diamond & McDonald, 1996). Additionally, track one practices can easily construe as interfering in the internal affairs of a free nation. Under such situations where first-track communications can easily break down, STRAD channels can be a working method to resume dialogue and interaction needed for a settlement to the conflict.

STRAD is a non-governmental, unofficial, and informal form of conflict settlement that has potentially reduced the tendency for prolonged conflict by improving dialogues and encouraging shared interests amongst the warring groups. The importance of chasing informal communication among groups on conflicting edges is that they can scaling-down a conflict before any formal talks can effort to establish. Unofficial interventions are more ready for handling Intra-state conflicts (Ali, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2021)

Indeed, STRAD should not substitute the first track diplomacy but rather as an additional channel that offers a preliminary segment for productive dialogues. As a pre-dialogues tool, STRAD efforts could provide crucial information to pave the way for a peaceful settlement. In general, track two diplomacies can be most effective when linked to the formal peace process at the government level.

Despite STRAD being a relatively recent practice, it has been able to record some successes. A classic example is a contribution made by Former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who became the negotiator between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (FAM) (Kusuma, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2021). Furthermore, the 2009 Aceh Tsunami was eventually becoming a turning point for GAM, the people of Aceh, and the Government of

Indonesia (Hakim, 2019). Central government assistance knocked the hearts of FAM leaders to open dialogue space. The Acehnese, who were full of terror during the establishment of the status of the Military Operations Area in the Veranda of Mecca, could breathe with relief from a ceasefire. Kalla played a central role in negotiations between the central Government and FAM.

On August 15, 2005, the signed of the Helsinki agreement by FAM and the Indonesian Government evidenced a sign of peace had established in the Veranda of Mecca. This peace process is an example of the success of STRAD. It was a long-term process with adequate time spent on building trust between all the parties involved in negotiations. It was not public and maintained a high level of confidentiality (Mitchell, 1993:8).

### **The South China Sea Conflict**

The case of disputes that occurred in the South China Sea region is one of the most complicated regional dispute cases that ever occurred in Southeast Asia. This dispute does involve not only several parties at once, namely Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but also includes several issues related to overlapping territorial claims and withdrawal of sea boundaries in the region. Although the current dispute in the South China Sea is relatively peaceful, the fact that the dispute has not unresolved entirely allows friction or even military confrontation in the future. In the last five years at the trends, tensions that have arisen between disputing parties show a higher level than in the previous decade. For this reason, a clear peace settlement framework is compulsory to avoid a worsening situation in the future.

Nevertheless, the peaceful settlement approach that has endeavored so far has not been able to resolve the dispute that has existed since four decades ago. In the first-track diplomacy, a regional approach

by Indonesia has already been implemented. The approval of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which was quite successful in managing disputes, but this approach has not been able to support dispute resolution sustainably. In addition to difficulties in mediating the conflict given that several Southeast Asian countries are also parties to the dispute, several other factors have hampered the regional approach, such as the ASEAN member states that want the role in resolving the conflict and countries that want a bilateral settlement such as the one conceived by China (Rifqi & Prakoso, 2020). At the other extreme at the first track diplomacy level, the bilateralism approach initiated by China also has limitations. First and foremost, a strategy that tends to lead to *'divide et impera'* towards countries in the region will not be in China's interests in the long run. Second, the increasingly assertive policies of China in this dispute will be counterproductive to its bilateral approach. Reflecting on the limitations of the first track diplomacy carried out by ASEAN, Indonesia, and China, a sustainable peace settlement approach, if it refers to the multi-track diplomacy theory, will be more likely to be achieved if it involves and empowers other potentials at all levels of existing diplomacy. In this case, the exploration of second-track diplomacy is one of the potentials to support and cover the limitations that exist in the first-track diplomacy.

### **Second Track Diplomacy that has been carried out by the Indonesian Navy**

Defense diplomacy is a multilateral, regional, and bilateral state cooperation activity carried out by military entities and relevant stakeholders in peacetime by involving military cooperation on strategic issues, ranging from the military's role to the role of non-military, for example, the presence of a maintenance force peace (peacekeeping force), the existence of

security enforcement (peace enforcement), the promotion of good governance, disaster response, protecting human rights, and others (Simatupang, 2013). The dynamics that occur at present are different from the past, where the military only cooperates with its allies, the current condition of military cooperation is also starting to be carried out internationally, even by competing countries (Simatupang, 2013). This diplomacy aims to achieve the national interest (national interest) of the country concerned, especially in terms of defense and security, to avoid a war.

Defense diplomacy is conducted by armed forces (defense equipment) and related infrastructure as a tool for security policy and foreign policy. Furthermore, defense diplomacy is carried out among others, to find a balance between the need to create regional security stability, increase defense capability, and the independence of a country's defense (Simatupang, 2013). The successful implementation of national defense diplomacy is highly dependent on diplomatic efforts undertaken at the global, regional, and bilateral levels (Puspen TNI, 2006) Defense diplomacy is also a process that involves not only state actors (such as politicians, armed forces, or intelligence agencies) but also non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, and civil society. Such diplomacy is the difference between military diplomacy, where military diplomacy only focuses on the use of military force related to security issues alone (Multazam, 2010). Defense diplomacy aims to improve relations between countries through both formal and informal channels, with Government and non-government and with low risk and costs. Defense diplomacy has now become an essential tool in a country's security policy and foreign policy (Multazam, 2010).

Second Track Diplomacy or Track two diplomacy is a form of diplomacy carried out by non-state actors in an informal situation to be able to handle conflicts

between groups of people whose aim is to reduce tension by increasing communication and mutual understanding to create world peace. According to McDonald, this second track diplomacy is a supporter of diplomacy in opening the first path for negotiations and agreements conducted by the Government.

Until now, the Indonesian Military has carried out various collaborative activities with several countries, both activities with countries that border the sea with Indonesia and those that do not. These activities include training between the Navy, cooperation in education programs, and joint activities in natural disaster management.

### **Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK)**

The Komodo Exercises hosted by the Indonesian Navy are an example of the implementation of the STRAD. The exercise with the theme "Cooperation to Strengthen International Sea Security", focuses on non-warfighting exercises and with the theme raised and is believed to be able to articulate a common interest in increasing interoperability among the Navy, to maintain the stability of regional sea security. These exercises allowed the unarmed military to achieve greater coordination of their programs and an opportunity to organize themselves into a settlement for the South China Sea conflict (Kurniawan, Widyarto, & Prakoso, 2020).

In this exercise, the Navy of various countries worked together to carry out humanitarian aid mission scenario activities, such as the Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP), the Engineering Civic Action Project (ENCAP), and the Sea Peace Keeping Operation (MPKO) exercise. Komodo Exercise aims to the readiness to support peace and maintain stability in the regional and global (Prakoso, 2021a)

One of the implementations of the STRAD by the Indonesian Navy is the symposium. In the second MNEK in 2016,

the Indonesian Navy was also the host for the 15th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) with the theme of "Sea Partnership for Stability in the Western Pacific Region" (Prakoso, 2021b). Experts and practitioners have made share knowledge and insights about sea security and stability in the region. In a bid to support sea security, regional countries generally seek cooperation and partnerships in dealing with any threat. All countries are aware that they could not alone face challenges. WPNS is a vital forum to implement regional sea partnerships that would need a strong foundation and mutual trust between countries or navies. WPNS is also proof of the effectiveness of second-track diplomacy conducted by the Indonesian Navy. The key to successful diplomacy in developing mutual trust lies in the men and actors to developing collective confidence and cooperation peacefully for mutual interest and benefit. The symposium is one example of second-track diplomacy that has been carried out so far and has the potential to support sustainable dispute resolution conducted in first-track diplomacy.

There are at least two critical things that are the reasons for the second-track diplomacy in resolving this conflict (Prakoso et al., 2020). First, emphasizing diplomacy in this symposium that informal second track diplomacy provides an opportunity for the parties to the dispute to be able to attend in a personal capacity and express their opinions more openly without the pressure that occurs in the first track diplomacy. The second reason for the importance of this symposium as a potential supporter of the settlement of a sustainable peace dispute is related to Indonesia itself as the host country. In addition to the fact that Indonesia is not a claimant nation, which makes its position as a mediator more acceptable to all parties, Indonesia act as a normative leader in a region that is often trusted to mediate disputes.

### **Navy Second Track Diplomacy Optimization**

According to Bary Buzan's theory, to realize security in a region, the role of regional cooperation between countries is crucial to the success of the stability of a region. Indonesia, as one of the largest countries in the ASEAN Region, initiated the establishment of the ASEAN regional cooperation. Indonesia's position is considered by ASEAN countries and other large countries such as America and Europe, still seeing Indonesia's strategic position in the ASEAN Regional Region. With a variety of security issues, especially in the territorial sea region, the Navy has an active role in realizing regional security by utilizing the cooperation of ASEAN countries. One of the efforts in establishing cooperation between ASEAN countries is the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

That the principle of centrality is the foundation in building naval power in the Southeast Asian region, Indonesia also strongly supports the concept of ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) by using ASEAN organizations as the main actors. The outlook was stated by Navy Chief of Staff (CoS) Admiral Siwi Sukma Adji during the 13th ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM), at the Sokha Angkor Resort Ball Room, Siem Reap, Cambodia on November 27, 2020 (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019).

In addition to the principle of ASEAN centrality, Admiral Siwi also conveyed two main ideas for realizing sea security stability in the Southeast Asian region, namely increasing naval cooperation in line with ASEAN's framework for forming regional powers (Dipua et al., 2020). These activities include cooperation at high-level meetings, humanitarian assistance and natural disasters, joint exercises and operations, and education. He also believes that increasing sea domain awareness capabilities through information exchange mechanisms is an essential implementation. The CoS

believes that the nature of sea threats is cross-border, cross-country, and many actors. The exchange of information has become very fundamental in facing this challenge. Those ASEAN countries are geographically connected by the sea, which is a vital part of the countries in the region. The development of the global geopolitical situation, which is uncertain and the development of various nontraditional threats at sea, makes ASEAN cooperation necessary.

The Chiefs of the ASEAN Navies attended the 13th ANCM activity with the theme of Enhancing cooperation for sustainable security at sea. Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy Admiral Tea Vinh as Chairman of the ANCM reminded ASEAN countries not to participate in the rivalry of superpowers, such as Cambodia's dark history due to civil war, the impact of proxy war in the cold war era. Vinh aims to optimize the roles of the Navy to improve the stability of the area (Sartono, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2021).

First, those other efforts can also be increased in the context of the second track diplomacy carried out by the Indonesian Navy that the second track diplomacy carried out also against other countries that have far greater strength than Indonesia is also essential. However, given the current situation can it is considered that getting distinctive second track diplomacy for ASEAN countries can be prioritized and improved. Second, the optimization step is the support of the Indonesian Government to the Indonesian Navy. That there is a high aim implemented by the Navy to realize security in the ASEAN region. The Indonesian Navy's budget alone is not enough. The Government must be able to provide proportional support for the success of diplomacy carried out by the Navy. Coordination, communication, and cooperation of the Ministries and related Institutions are a must for the success of the Indonesian Navy in carrying out the role of state diplomacy.

## **CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION, AND LIMITATION**

Indonesia has a substantial and dominant role in the history of ASEAN formation. Currently, major countries are still remarkably accounted for the existence of Indonesia in the ASEAN region. Faced with the current condition of the role of Indonesia through the second track diplomacy implemented by the Indonesian Navy has a high expectation of playing a more significant role in realizing security stability in the ASEAN region.

The Indonesian Navy becomes a vital role and valuable asset for Indonesia in leading ASEAN to aim not only for the welfare of the people of Indonesia but also for the welfare of the ASEAN members. Based on the above discussion, the Indonesian Government should provide more optimal support to the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the ministry/institutions related to the purpose of the second track diplomacy implemented by the Indonesian Navy.

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