SEA DEFENSE STRATEGY AND URGENCY OF FORMING MARITIME COMMAND CENTER

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Abstract

Adagium Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum, which means who wants peace, prepare for war. Faced with the dynamics of the global and regional strategic environment affecting the defense system that must be prepared by Indonesia. China’s aggressive action in the Natuna Sea is one proof that defense in the Indonesian sea is still a serious concern that must be addressed. The aim of this study is to find the best sea defense strategy, to secure the New Capital, especially in the sea area. The study was carried out in the sea area which is the responsibility of the Makassar Navy Base VI. This study uses George Edward III's public policy implementation theory, qualitative descriptive is the method used with the phenomenological approach. The results of this study show that the implementation of the transmission subfactor, communication is only limited to the internal communication of each law enforcement entity, there is no integrated operational-tactical operational nature. The implementation of the communication clarity sub-factor between law enforcement entities is also not yet optimal, due to the limited facilities and other facilities, especially related to the problem of operational-tactical communication equipment. While the implementation of the communication consistency subfactor, the existence of regulations on each entity as the operational basis at sea, makes the bureaucratic procedures ineffective and inefficient. In conclusion, the communication factor between law enforcement entities must be a priority, so that performance can be optimally effective and efficient, integrated hardware, software, and brainware must be built. An entity that can act as the main controller that can coordinate all entities related to law enforcement at sea, and see the results of research related to the entity that has the greatest potential as a controller of sea security in the Makassar region, the researchers recommend the Navy as the Command Center.

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has an open sea area. Various forms of threats that must be faced increasingly diverse. The dynamics of the strategic environment at the global, regional and domestic levels present a very broad spectrum of threats; ranging from threats to environmental and resource security, maritime security, human security at sea, to threats to state sovereignty (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019a). Moreover, in interconnected seas, forms of threat are always dynamic and difficult to predict.

Therefore, the responsibility to guarantee stability and security in Indonesian waters which is one of the tasks of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) carries complex challenges. TNI AL has a task that is currently increasingly prominent, in line with government policies to make the maritime sector a priority in national development, or better known as the vision of building Indonesia into a World Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia). The success of TNI AL in realizing maritime security in Indonesia (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019b), is one of the preconditions for the achievement of this vision, in the table below is one of the challenges in securing the territorial waters of Indonesia, namely crime of ship piracies. The table below shows data on ship robberies around the world.

Indonesia’s struggle to gain international recognition as an archipelago has an impact on its responsibility to provide the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Path (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia or ALKI). This path is used by various countries for transportation of both ships and aircraft. ALKI is not only prepared by Indonesia as a sovereign country over an island nation's sea area but has a great responsibility to guarantee the safety of anyone who uses ALKI. This is not so easy to be implemented by Indonesia, given the various limitations that are also related to the territory of neighboring countries that are not yet fully felt safe such as ALKI III through the Philippine sea area.

The philippine sea area is currently still a concern of the international community due to frequent piracies by hostage of several crew members from various countries. The signing was followed by a ransom request for a very large amount of money. This condition makes special attention in safeguarding ALKI in Indonesia, especially ALKI III.

According to Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002, ALKI mentioned that there are 3 (three) ALKIs in Indonesia:

1. ALKI I includes maritime lanes from the South China Sea across the Natuna Sea, Karimata Strait, Java Sea, and Sunda Strait to the Indian Ocean, and vice versa; and for maritime lanes from the Singapore Strait through the Natuna Sea and vice versa (Sea Path Branch I A).
2. ALKI II maritime lanes from the Sulawesi Sea crossing the Makassar Strait, the Flores Sea, and Lombok Strait maritime lanes to the Indian Ocean, and vice versa.
3. ALKI-III-A maritime lanes from the Pacific Ocean crossing the maritime lanes of the Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, Banda Sea, Ombai Strait, and Sawu Sea. ALKI III-A maritime lane itself has 4 branches, namely ALKI III. B maritime lane Branch: for maritime from the Pacific Ocean across the Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, Banda Sea, and Leti Strait maritime lanes to the Indian Ocean and vice versa; ALKI maritime lane Branch III C: for maritime lanes from the Pacific Ocean across the Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, the Banda Sea to the Arafura Sea and vice versa; ALKI maritime lane Branch III D: for maritime lanes from the Pacific Ocean across the Maluku Sea, maritime lanes of the Seram Sea, Ombai Strait, and Sawu Sea to the Indian Ocean and vice versa; ALKI maritime lane Branch III E: for maritime lanes from the Indian Ocean across the Savu Sea, Ombai Strait, Banda Sea, Seram Sea, and Maluku Sea.

Every ALKI maritime channel has a factual and potential threat. The threat must be addressed immediately by implementing a sea defense strategy. In the current...
research conducted in ALKI II, especially in the territorial waters that are the authority of the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar with the consideration that the government has decided to move the capital to East Kalimantan. Henceforth, the current research aims to optimize sea defense strategies, especially on communication factors between law enforcement entities at sea carrying out operations in the ALKI II region, especially in waters that are under the authority of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on the implementation of sea defense strategies in the working area of the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar uses the theory of public policy implementation according to George C. Edward III. According to George Edward III, four factors determine the success of public policy implementation, namely communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). In this study, the factor that will be used to analyze the problem is only the
communication factor, with its sub-factors are communication transmission, communication clarity, and communication consistency. The researchers only take one factor, namely communication because, from previous studies that have been carried out by both other people and researchers themselves, this communication factor is the biggest inhibiting factor that has occurred in the effort to implement sea defense strategies in each of Indonesia's jurisdictional maritime area.

METHODS
In the study of the implementation of the sea defense strategy in the working area of the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar, the researchers used a qualitative descriptive method with a phenomenological approach. The phenomenological approach used is according to Johann Heinrich Lambert. The phenomenological approach intended to be used in this research approach is as a basic theory of appearance to study empirically about the knowledge of sensory sightings (Creswell, 1998).

The researchers collected secondary data from various sources and collected primary data from well-informed resource persons related to the implementation of sea defense strategies in Makassar waters, which were directly involved. Speakers who were asked for their opinions provided information and information according to their respective experiences based on the phenomena they experience.

Some of the entities involved in this research were Marine Police Directorate of South Sulawesi Regional Police, Customs Office of the Southern Sulawesi, Sea, and Coast Guard Unit of Soekarno Hatta Port in Makassar and Head of Untia Port in Makassar.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Implementation of Communication Factors between Law Enforcement Entities at Sea
The communication factor is very important in the implementation of the sea defense strategy in securing the Makassar waters, especially in securing national and international interests in using the ALKI II maritime lane. The implementation of this communication factor guarantees the effective implementation of ALKI II security if decision-makers know what they are going to do (Agustino, 2006).

In implementing ALKI II, information is needed that is known by decision-makers which can only be obtained through good communication, internal entities involved, and between entities that have the same task in securing the Makassar waters. A very important communication subfactor is divided into communication transmission subfactors, communication clarity subfactors, and communication consistency.

Communication Transmission
In the implementation of a sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters, a good channel of communication between law enforcement entities will be needed to produce a good implementation as well. There are often problems between law enforcement entities in communication distribution, namely misunderstanding (miscommunication) due to the many levels of bureaucracy between law enforcement entities that must be passed in the communication process so that what is expected in the implementation of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar region is distorted in the middle of the road.

The Operational Assistant of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar said that the transmission of ALKI II surveillance communications between Lantamal VI and related agencies, in this case, the stakeholders at sea were well maintained. This is implemented with a joint coordination forum in each agency in turn to strengthen relations between agencies. However, different information was obtained by the researchers from informants in the Sea and Coast Guard Unit that in security operations that are the area of their
responsibility, it was constrained by communication tools. If the security area is covered by their cellular network, they can easily contact or coordinate with other law enforcement entities, but if it is not covered by the cellular network, the radio communication equipment on their patrol boat cannot contact other entities.

Communication Clarity
The implementation of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters area related to clarity Communication received by state-level bureaucrats must be clear and not confusing between law enforcement entities at sea or unambiguous/ambiguous. Speaking of which, the Operational Assistant of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar said that, the clarity of monitoring information between Naval Main Base VI with other maritime stakeholders is positioned following the authority rules stated in the existing laws and regulations. For example, the law enforcement authority at sea has been regulated in a law stating that there are 7 (seven) law enforcement entities that have the authority to enforce the law at sea, including TNI AL, Marine Police Directorate of Indonesian National Police, General Directorate of Maritime Transportation of Ministry of Transportation, General Directorate of Supervision of Marine Resources and Fisheries of Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries, General Directorate of Customs of Ministry of Finance, Indonesian Coast Guard dan Task Force 115 on Illegal Fishing Eradication.

Communication Consistency
The implementation of the sea defense strategy implemented in Makassar waters requires that the commands given in the implementation of communication in securing the Makassar waters have to be consistent and clear to be established or implemented. If the order to safeguard Makassar's maritime territories is given to change frequently, it can confuse implementing entities in the field. Speaking of which, the Operational Assistant of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar related to communication consistency between maritime law enforcers in the working area of Naval Main Base VI in Makassar. The consistency of ALKI II supervision between Naval Main Base VI and related agencies in Sulawesi waters has been going well according to the existing legal basis so that we always adhere to the laws and regulations as paying law to act in the field.

Based on the research results of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar region, there are several obstacles in the communication factor as stated by Edward III relating to the implementation of a policy in the communication transmission subfactor, namely (Winarno, 1984):

- **The first obstacle**, there is a conflict between the policy implementing entity and the order issued by the policymaker. From the Customs informant, it was conveyed that there were individuals from certain entities who did not fully understand the existing regulations so that conflicts in the field often occurred. Conflicts between entities implementing a sea defense strategy such as this will result in distortion and direct obstacles in policy communication.
- **The second obstacle**, there is information that is conveyed internally by law enforcement entities, and between law enforcement entities through layers of bureaucratic hierarchy. Distortion of communication between law enforcement entities can occur due to the length of the information chain which can result in information bias.
- **The third obstacle**, there is the problem of capturing information between entities is also caused by perceptions and the inability of law enforcement entities at sea to implement in understanding the requirements of a law enforcement policy.

In implementing the sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters, some factors encourage this uncertainty due to the complexity of the policy, the lack of
consensus of law enforcement entities regarding the objectives of securing the Makassar waters, there are problems in starting a new policy related to law enforcement at sea, and there is a tendency to avoid policy accountability.

From the results of research in Makassar, actually at the leadership level among law enforcement entities involved in the implementation of the sea defense strategy in Makassar has been well established, with the existence of a communication forum for regional leaders. However, it cannot be denied that there are persons who have certain goals that are spared from the leadership’s supervision. This can be an obstacle considering the vast area of Makassar’s waters with various constraints and limitations of law enforcement. The cause of this communication distortion is in line with what Winarno said that the more layers or implementing actors involved in implementing the policy, the more likely the obstacles and distortions faced (Winarno, 2005). This is also the case with the implementation of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters.

In implementing the sea defense strategy, it is necessary to manage good communication between law enforcement entities, it is necessary to establish and develop effective communication channels internally and externally. The better the development of communication channels between the entities that are built, the higher the probability of the commands in the successful implementation of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar area is continued correctly.

In the implementation of the sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters area, information clarity is needed, it is found that there is a tendency to obscure the objectives of information by individual actors of certain entities based on their interests by interpreting information based on their understanding. So that the implementation of the sea defense strategy can be optimal, the way to anticipate obscuring such actions is by making joint procedures between law enforcement entities through clear statements about strengthening commitment requirements, commitment to objectives, eliminating the choice of multiple interpretations between law enforcement entities, commitment to implement procedures with care careful and committed reporting mechanisms in detail.

In the implementation of the sea defense strategy, the communication factor is very influential on policy acceptance by the target group of law enforcement entities, so that the quality of communication will influence in achieving the effectiveness of the implementation of the sea defense strategy. Thus, the dissemination of policy content through a good communication process will affect the implementation of the sea defense strategy.

In this case, the communication media used by law enforcement entities, to disseminate the contents of the sea defense strategy policy to the target group, will be very instrumental in securing the Makassar waters.

**Optimization of Communication Factors between Law Enforcement at Sea**

Based on the analysis and discussion of the implementation of ALKI II safeguard communication factors carried out by the Naval main Base VI in Makassar, linked to supporting and inhibiting factors as well as the current and expected implementation conditions, the researcher formulate the strategy by building Maritime Command Center by positioning Indonesian Naval Base in each Indonesian Maritime Territory as the Command Center. Maritime Command Centre can be seen in Figure 2.

Based on Figure 2, departing from the results of the analysis and discussion of the implementation of the sea defense strategy currently in the working area Naval Main Base VI in Makassar, it can be explained that the current condition of the prominent threat is related to drug smuggling, especially those that are already
very prevalent, this smuggling entered from various sea and land areas. With the condition of a very open area of South Sulawesi being a region that has a high vulnerability. If this is not immediately taken concrete steps, likely, other crimes will also develop so that strategic steps need to be taken to immediately resolve the problem of surveillance and control of marine areas, especially ALKI II in the Naval Main Base VI in Makasar.

Factual and potential threats that occur in Makassar waters that still dominate are transnational organized crime (TNOC), illegal drug trafficking of seepage from the Sebati-Tawau border region of Malaysia, some of which is smuggled on the coasts of the Western Region of South Sulawesi. Besides, the smuggling of used clothing is also still common. The findings in this study are new patterns found related to drug smuggling and used clothing, namely the route from Timor Leste. The smuggling route from Tawau into Timor Leste, then from Timor Leste transported by wooden ships to several regions of Indonesia including into the waters of Makassar.

Regarding drugs, one of the informants believes that in the Makassar region it is possible to have a drug factory, this is indicated by the large variety of drug products in the Makassar area, the informant believes that the drug products in Makassar are not only to be circulated in Makassar but also to be sent various regions. It can easily be followed by news in online media about the rampant arrests of drug cases in Makassar and other South Sulawesi regions.

Another problem related to threats occurring at sea is the rampant fish bombing case, according to an informant from the Untia Makassar port head, who is unique that many of these actors are underage so that they are not continued in legal proceedings, they are fostered in the Makassar social shelter near the Untia Fishing Port Makassar, at one time the number was quite large to more than 50 people. Law enforcement entities at sea continue to take action against fish bombers. The number is currently decreasing considerably, but there are still several cases.

At present, 6 law enforcers can conduct law enforcement patrols at sea operating in the Naval Main Base VI in Makassar. Each has its operating pattern. Based on the analysis and discussion it was revealed that in fact, each entity has the same limitations, especially human resources and facilities to carry out patrols. For example, General Directorate of Supervision of Marine Resources and Fisheries of Ministry of

Figure 2. Maritime Command Center Strategy in Supervision and Control of ALKI
Source: Authors’ Data 2020
Maritime and Fisheries Office in Makassar, according to its authority, has the task of overseeing the waters in terms of fishing outside the district and provincial boundaries above 12 nautical miles. But only has a small speedboat, which is only capable of patrolling along the coast, as well as Marine Police, Customs, and Sea and Coast Guard Unit.

Patrol ships that are quite adequate in the Makassar area are owned by Naval Main Base VI in Makassar, and that too is currently being constrained by government policy to use B20. This policy is quite an obstacle because ships from TNI AL have not yet received equipment that can convert B20 to become the fuel that can be used for operations at sea. Navy ship engines when using B20 there must be additional equipment so that B20 can be used to operate the ship's engine.

The Makassar waters are very important with the existence of the ALKI II shipping lane that crosses the Makassar Strait. This shipping channel has a strategic role in Indonesia. Opportunities for Makassar to utilize ALKI II are very potential for economic interests. So far, Makassar has been seen as a gateway to the economy of eastern Indonesia, where trade flows through Makassar before entering eastern Indonesia.

Makassar's current strategic position has also become prominent because the Government decided to move the Capital City to the Kalimantan Region in Penajam Regency, East Kalimantan. The closest force of TNI AL is Makassar's Naval Main Base VI, so the current research is very much related to how to optimize the sea defense strategy in the Makassar waters which is the working area of Makassar's Naval Main Base VI. The new Capital Territory is directly confronted with ALKI II, where the channel is traversed by international interests. Vulnerability will arise with potential threats that must be anticipated as early as possible.

The current policy of the Indonesian Minister of Defense that national defense is the responsibility of all layers (universal defense), means that the issue of defense is not only the responsibility of the military but all state entities, and all levels of society must share responsibility for maintaining the upholding of Indonesia's sovereignty. Budget constraints are indeed a major obstacle, but because of this reasoning is needed, a concept of how each defense strategy implemented can be carried out effectively and efficiently. With all the limitations that exist must be able to find the best strategy, especially in securing sea areas.

In this study, the communication factor becomes very important, with the hope that if the communication factor between law enforcers at sea can find the best solution, it is hoped that there will be further solutions for other factors. Operational synergy is the goal expected in the current research by promoting communication factors, both in terms of communication transmission, communication clarity, and communication transmission between law enforcement entities at sea that support the implementation of a reliable sea defense strategy.

Regarding the current national public policy, the Omnibus Law is being initiated, currently preceded by policies related to the economy, namely taxation. One of the objectives of this policy is to simplify the many overlapping regulations so that they become obstacles in economic development. The spirit of this regulation can be applied in various fields such as law enforcement at sea. The existence of authorized entities in law enforcement at sea creates obstacles in terms of communication because each entity has its policy base.

Research related to the implementation of the sea defense strategy carried out in Makassar waters can be a model to be applied in various territorial waters of Indonesia so that Indonesia's sea defense becomes stronger. The synergy of law enforcement at sea will also have an impact on the economy, as a small example that sea transportation businesses are often troubled by repeated checks by different law
enforcement entities, complaints of these entrepreneurs must be considered because they are very detrimental to business actors. They lost a lot of time, whereas they already commit with the user regarding the delivery time.

Policies that form the basis of operational law enforcement entities at sea, which are the main force of the sea defense strategy, on the ground are often constraints due to overlapping authority in the field. Both law enforcement entities and those affected by the policy as described above, often sea transportation business actors are repeatedly examined with different entities. The overlapping policy makes ambiguous some implementing parties or those affected by the policy, this policy ambiguity arises as has been stated by Matland (Matland, 1995).

Following are the basic regulations used by each law enforcement entity at sea that often overlaps:

a. Naval Commander, Commander of State Warship, Naval Airbase, Shipmaster of the Directorate General of Perla, people who are under the command of the commander, commanders, officers of the Directorate General of Maritime Transportation, harbormaster, sea scouts, and the captain of the area of the Territorial Sea Ordinance and the Prohibited Sea Environment (TZMKO 1939 Staatsblad 1939 No. 442 )
b. Polri officials, certain civil servant officials who are given special authority by law, Navy, and other investigating officials determined by the applicable law Law No. 8 of 1981 (Law Number 8, 1981) concerning the Criminal Procedure Code or KUHAP (Article 4, Article 6 Paragraph 1 and Article 17).
c. Navy officers appointed by the Commander in Chief as law enforcement officers in the field of investigation of violations of the provisions of Law No. 5/83 of Law Number 5 of 1983 (Law Number 5/83, 1983) concerning Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (Article 14).
d. Investigating officials as stipulated in Law Number 5/83 of Law Number 9 of 1985 (Law Number 9, 1985) Concerning Fisheries (Article 31 Paragraph 1)
e. Related officials, warships, and government vessels to carry out law enforcement at sea Act Number 17 of 1985 concerning Ratification of UNCLOS 1982 (Article 107, 110, 111 and 224).
f. Police Investigators, certain Civil Servants in a department environment whose scope of duties and responsibilities includes fostering the conservation of biological natural resources and ecosystems, without reducing the authority of the investigator as stipulated in Law Number 5/83 of Law Number 5 of 1990 (Law Number 5, 1990) concerning Conservation of Resources Biodiversity and Ecosystems (Article 39 Paragraph 2).
g. Indonesian National Police officers, certain civil servants in the Ministry of Health who were granted special authority as referred to in Law Number 6 of 1981 concerning Criminal Procedure Code, and Law Number 23 of 1992 concerning Health (Law Number 23, 1992) (Article 79).
h. Police Officer Investigators, certain Civil Servants within the department whose scope of duties and responsibilities are in the field of shipping, Navy officers to conduct criminal investigations in the field of shipping Law Number 21 of 1992 concerning Voyage (Law Number 21, 1992) (Article 99).
i. Indonesian National Police Officers, certain Civil Servants in the Department whose scope of duties and responsibilities include immigration guidance are given the authority of investigators vide Law Number 6 of 1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate immigration criminal acts Act Number 9 of 1992 (Law Number 9, 1992) concerning Immigration (Article 47).
j. Certain Civil Servants within the Directorate General of Customs and
Excise who are given special authority as vide investigators of Law Number 6 of 1981 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate criminal acts of customs Act Number 10 of 1995 (Law Number 10, 1995) concerning Customs (Article 112).

k. Indonesian Navy, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, Department of Finance, and Department of Justice following the respective authorities of the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 6 of 1996 (Law Number 6, 1996) concerning Indonesian Waters (Article 24 Paragraph 3).

l. Investigators according to the applicable laws and regulations Act Number 23 of 1997 concerning the Environment (Paragraph 5; see Article 14 Paragraph 1 of Law Number 5 of 1983)

m. The Indonesian National Police plays a major role in the investigation & investigation of all criminal acts, without prejudice to the authority of other investigators following the applicable laws and regulations Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police (Article 14 Paragraph 1)

n. Indonesian Armed Force; Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning State’s Defense (Article 14)

o. Fisheries Civil Servant Investigators, Navy Officers, and Indonesian National Police Officials; Law Number 31 of 2004 concerning Fisheries (Article 73 Paragraph 1).

It is undeniable that the TNI AL, among law enforcement entities at sea, is the entity that has the most complete and most ready bureaucratic structure if it becomes a Command Center for sea surveillance and control. So that in the strategy of building a Maritime Command Center 2 things become significant:

a. Changed the network that originally used the Star Network to become a Wheel Network. From the star network picture, it can be seen that the current network takes a long time and process because each law enforcement entity coordinates with each other law enforcement entity. Meanwhile, if we consider the Wheel Network. It will be very effective with the Command Center because all the needs will be a movement controlled by one party. With the hope that there will be no overlapping patrol areas and effectiveness and efficiency can be obtained. From this strategy patrol zoning can also be built for supervision and control.

b. At present each entity that has to patrol in the context of law enforcement at sea has its policy base, so the next step in implementing the Maritime Command Center strategy is synchronizing policies. If this step is considered to take a long time and high difficulty can be taken by issuing a new policy to support the implementation of the Maritime Command Center strategy by stating that if the existing regulation contradicts the new policy, the Navy in the relevant area acts as Command Center decides.

The findings of this study which put the TNI AL as the Command Center for maritime control in optimizing sea defense strategies in Makassar waters are in line with Ken Booth’s (Booth, 1977) theory which says in his book entitled “Navies and Foreign Policy” that the Navy has a universal role which is not owned by other law enforcement officers at seas such as Marine Police, Customs, Indonesian Coast Guard and other entities in carrying out their duties, the roles are:

a. The military role of the Navy. That the Navy has a role in upholding the sovereignty of a country using its military power, from all forms of threats in the sea area which becomes its jurisdiction.

b. Constabulary role of the Navy. That the Navy has the authority to enforce the law at sea, conduct activities in the context of protecting national marine resources and wealth, take action to maintain order at sea and carry out activities in the framework of supporting national
development by carrying out activities that contribute to national stability and development.

c. Diplomatic role of the Navy. That the Navy can use sea power as a means of diplomacy, to support the foreign policy of a country's government, and is designed to be able to influence the country's leadership or decisions of several countries in a state of peace or hostile situations.

These three roles cannot be separated from the duties of the Navy universally so that in the selection and determination of the national defense strategy at sea must also be able to reflect a strategy to deal with security disturbances. National maritime security cannot be separated from regional or global regional security, because the ALKI maritime lanes in the Indonesian seas are used for international purposes, such as the theory of complex regional security presented by Barry Buzan and Ole Waiver in “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” (2003).

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION, AND LIMITATION

The implementation of ALKI II security by the Naval Main Base IV in Makassar has so far been going well. The existence of a communication forum between entities is still the mainstay to carry out the supervision and control of sea areas, especially related to ALKI II. Handling threats at sea is still dominated by criminal acts both traditional such as the use of fish bombs and those that are transnational crimes related to drug smuggling and Ball Press. Overcoming inhibiting factors the implementation of ALKI II security by the Indonesian Naval Main Base IV in Makassar is an urgent need that must be met immediately by the central government in cooperation with the relevant Regional Governments, in the context of preparing the transfer of the New Capital City.

Based on the results of the analysis and discussion, the formulation of a strategy to guarantee the security of ALKI II and can be applied to each ALKI pathway for optimization of communication factors in this study is by building Maritime Command Center by positioning Indonesian Naval Base in each Indonesian Maritime Territory as the Command Center. Strengthening the Maritime Command Center strategy requires government policy support as an operational basis by synchronizing all existing regulations or making new regulations with a single strengthening placing the Naval Base as a Command Center in each sea area that is its responsibility.

As a recommendation of the current research with the momentum of the government to implement the omnibus law, now is the right time to implement the findings of this study, making a law enforcement policy at sea to strengthen the sea defense strategy by placing the TNI AL as Maritime Command Center.

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